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Up until 1800, economic growth has been non-existent or modest at best: between the
year 1 and 1820, real income per capita growth was only 0.02% per year on average (Stutz,
2010). The spectacular escape from the Malthusian conjecture of low and stagnant per-
capita incomes from the Industrial Revolution onwards has been enabled by a shift away
from land-intensive to capital-intensive production techniques, particularly in the energy
sector (Hansen and Prescott, 2002). The UK’s overreliance on wood as a fuel resulted in
serious scarcities in the sixteenth century (Ray, 1979). Though the substitution of coal
for wood for domestic heating and industrial use initiated much earlier,1 the pressure on
British wood supplies only abated after the succesful adoption of coke in all stages of
the iron smelting process in 1784 (Warde, 2006). Fossil fuels have since offered a cheap,
reliable and abundant source of energy. Jevons (1865) extols their significance as follows:
”Coal in truth stands not beside but entirely above all other commodities.
It is the material energy of the country - the universal aid - the factor in
everything we do. With coal almost any feat is possible or easy; without it
we are thrown back into the laborious poverty of early times.”
Jevons was one of the first to warn about the exhaustibility of fossil fuels and the impli-
cations of a decline in coal production for living standards. The oil crisis in the seventies
of the twentieth century drew renewed attention to the prospect of energy shortages.
Optimists trust that the market mechanism will appropriately signal the scarcity of nat-
ural resources, giving incentives to develop improved extraction techniques, explore new
reserves and substitute to alternative energy sources. Pessimists fear that these factors
1In the fifteenth century, the use of coal for domestic heating was banned in London to reduce air
pollution. By 1615, the paucity of wood had induced a 180 degree turn and it was wood that was banned
for this very purpose.
1
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will not be able to compensate for the permanent loss of cheaply accessible supplies.
Over the last few decades, anthropogenic climate change has emerged as one of the
biggest global threats. Though the effect of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on the
global climate, as well as the impacts of higher temperatures and changing weather
patterns on human well-being are still uncertain, the consequences of climate change
are potentially catastrophic. Fossil fuels are an important contributor to the problem,
accounting for 57% of global GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007).
Policymakers across the globe must contend with the two challenges of energy avail-
ability and climate change. Scarcity of fossil fuels in the physical sense has not ma-
terialized so far: fossil fuel production has not yet peaked, and physically recoverable
reserves of coal and unconventional oil and gas are sufficient for the foreseeable future.
Economic exhaustion is a more realistic prospect: the deepwater and tar sand oils that
are currently being explored are far more costly to extract than reserves in the Middle
East. Nonetheless, the recent shale gas boom in the United States and other countries
may herald a protracted era of low natural gas prices. But even if these fossil fuels will
be more abundantly and cheaply available than renewable alternatives for a long period,
continued reliance on them can gravely exacerbate the climate change problem. Climate
scientists already advocate a cold turkey style abandonment of fossil fuels (Kharecha and
Hansen, 2008).
Limiting climate change and ensuring the continued availability of low-cost energy is
complicated by an important market failure. CO2 emissions are a textbook example of
a so-called externality: producers and consumers enjoy the full benefit of emitting a unit
of carbon, but face only a fraction of the total costs in terms of climate change, because
these are shared between all members of current and future generations. This causes
individual decision makers to consume more fossil fuel than would be optimal from
a social perspective. A carbon price can realign the individual and social objectives:
by requiring each emitter to pay a price equal to the burden his emissions impose on
contemporaries and future generations, individual decision makers will only emit a unit
of carbon if their private benefit exceeds the social cost of emissions.
Regulators that want to impose such a carbon price face limited spatial and tempo-
ral jurisdiction however. Free-riding problems make it difficult to form a global climate
coalition: each country would like all other countries to participate in an agreement
2
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so that it can benefit from their abatement efforts in terms of lower temperatures, but
continue under business-as-usual itself (Barrett, 1994). An international treaty offers no
panacea: since a supranational authority that can audit emission levels and punish coun-
tries that do not abide by their commitments would be at odds with national sovereignty,
participating countries still have an incentive to shirk.2
The free-rider problem applies even when all agents in the economy are equally con-
cerned about climate change. This dissertation instead focuses on the implications for
climate and energy policy when players have different objectives. Fossil fuel produc-
ing countries care about export revenues as well as climate change and energy scarcity.
Saudi Arabia has been accused of deliberately obstructing climate negotiations (De-
pledge, 2008), and Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011. In turn, importers
may use environmental policy to capture a share of the fossil fuel rents or for other strate-
gic reasons. European proposals to tax emissions embodied in imports3 or impose an
aviation tax4 have been criticized by developing countries as ’green protectionism’. The
inefficiencies that can result from conflicting objectives and strategic behaviour cannot
easily be remedied through multilateral bargaining,5 because the bargaining outcome
may not be enforceable for similar reasons as international environmental agreements.
Aside from different objectives between countries, there are also conflicts between
successive regulators or generations. Each regulator may be committed to long-term
emission reductions, but prefer the costs of these reductions to incur after her tenure
or lifetime. Examples from multilateral declarations abound. The Rio Declaration from
1992 calls upon states to ”cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”and ”reduce and eliminate
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption”, yet global carbon emissions
from energy increased 48% in the next twenty years.6 The EU has resolved in 2007 to
reduce emissions by 80% in 2050 compared to 1990, but the largest and most costly cuts
2See Di Maria et al. (2013) for a non-technical overview of the channels and magnitude of carbon
leakage, i.e. the extent to which emissions increase in non-regulated countries following a unilateral
emission reduction by a coalition of concerned countries.
3India urges rich not to use ”green” protectionism, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/
07/us-climate-india-bonn-idUSTRE5365FJ20090407, accessed February 11, 2013.
4EU’s carbon trade plan for aviation is green protectionism, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
indepth/2011-12/22/c_131321709.htm, accessed February 11, 2013.
5In this vein, Harstad (2012) proposes that climate-conscious countries buy the physical coal deposits
in less concerned countries, with the intention of leaving them unexploited.
6Global carbon emissions rise is far bigger than previous estimates, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2012/jun/21/global-carbon-emissions-record, accessed February 11, 2013.
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are reserved for the latter part of this horizon.
The success of energy or climate policy in achieving its aims, whether securing a sta-
ble energy supply or reducing cumulative carbon emissions, thus depends on the actions
of fossil fuel suppliers and future generations that may not have the same preferences
as the policy maker. Effective regulation must take these reactions into account. After
highlighting the importance of an abundant energy supply in Chapter 2, this disserta-
tion discusses some implications of conflicting objectives and strategic considerations for
energy and climate policy.
Chapter 2 quantifies the effect of energy abundance on industry location. Attracting
jobs and profitable industries is a key concern of policy makers, so it is useful to under-
stand what drives firms’ decisions to locate in one jurisdiction or another. The chapter
specifically asks whether energy-intensive manufacturing sectors have a tendency to lo-
cate in US states that have abundant coal, natural gas, oil and hydro reserves. These
energy carriers are traded internationally in well-functioning markets but even within the
US, local energy prices can differ by a factor three or more. Especially coal and electricity
are costly to transport across large distances, and local regulation further contributes to
price disparities across states.
Relatively homogeneous jurisdictions such as US states or OECD countries differ more
in their energy endowments than in their endowments of capital and skilled labour, which
are traditionally considered as the most important factor endowments for firms’ location
decisions. At the same time, manufacturing sectors are more similar in their capital- and
skilled labour requirements than in their energy requirements. The empirical results in
Chapter 2 confirm that energy abundance is more important for energy-intensive firms
than capital abundance is for capital-intensive firms. States with high coal reserves, such
as Montana and Wyoming, mainly attract energy-intensive industries because they have
lower electricity prices. Natural gas, oil and hydro endowments also have a direct effect
on industry location conditional on energy prices, for example because energy-intensive
sectors (e.g. Aluminum and Iron and steel mills) sell part of their output to energy
extraction firms, and want to locate close to energy reserves for that reason.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with incentives of fossil fuel suppliers and their implications for
climate and energy policy. In most economic markets, suppliers’ decisions how much to
produce are more or less separated over time. When firms expect demand to increase in
4
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say ten years, they may start investing in additional capacity ahead of time, but today’s
supply need not adjust. Fossil fuels are exhaustible commodities however: each unit that
is extracted today cannot be used to satisfy demand in the future. As a result, their
owners constantly compare whether it is more profitable to sell their resources today
or in the future. They prefer to sell an additional unit today if the profit from selling
an extra unit today (the marginal profit) plus the interest on the proceeds exceeds the
marginal profit tomorrow, and vice versa. Along the fossil fuel owners’ preferred supply
path, marginal profits increase at the interest rate.7
Carbon taxes and investments in renewable alternatives typically reduce fossil fuel
demand in the medium- and long term more than in the short run. Carbon policies, like
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, often become stricter over time to give producers and
consumers some time to adjust their investment decisions, and R&D efforts only result
in lower renewable energy prices with a time lag. When climate policies make selling
fossil fuels today comparatively more attractive vis a vis selling them in the future, the
policies may accelerate fossil fuel extraction. This observation has sparked the fear that
anticipated climate policies will worsen rather than solve the climate problem - a ’green
paradox’ (Sinn, 2008a).8
Chapter 3 qualifies this fear by arguing that anticipated carbon taxes are unlikely
to increase today’s supply of coal and unconventional oil, which are the most potent
threat to the global climate. Because these resources are so abundantly available, the
tradeoff between extracting a unit today or in the future is less salient than for low-cost
oil and natural gas, which are in much more limited supply. Today’s supply of coal
and unconventional oil primarily depends on today’s prices and extraction costs, rather
than on expected future market conditions. The chapter derives conditions for which
anticipated policies reduce current as well as future emissions. Calibrations suggest
that anticipated climate policies are likely to reduce future emissions from coal and
unconventional oil much more substantially than they accelerate oil and gas extraction.
Chapter 4 abstracts from climate change and focuses on consumer and producer sur-
plus in the energy market. An importer (for example the OECD) has the ability to
7A simple intuition is that a barrel of oil in the ground can be thought of as an asset, which must
earn the same return as all other assets in the economy - the interest rate.




develop a substitute for oil by paying an upfront cost, and is both interested in alleviat-
ing the physical scarcity of oil and maximizing its share of the oil rent. A monopolistic
exporter (say the OPEC) wants to maximize profits while discouraging the OECD from
developing the substitute. Because today’s oil supply depends on the OPEC’s expecta-
tions about future conditions, the OECD would like to make a binding promise about
the innovation time in order to favourably influence the OPEC’s supply schedule. Such
a promise would not be credible however, because the OECD has an incentive to renege
on its announcement when the oil becomes scarce.
The chapter uses game theoretic methods to derive the OECD’s optimal innovation
policy and the OPEC’s optimal supply rule when neither player can commit to future
actions. In equilibrium, the OPEC induces the OECD to delay innovation until the
oil is exhausted. By innovating earlier, the OECD loses an important benefit of oil
consumption, namely delaying the moment at which the substitute’s development costs
have to be incurred. Early innovation also causes the OPEC to sell a larger share of its
oil reserves just below the substitute price, which is wasteful from the point of view of
the OECD. From the OPEC’s perspective, the OECD’s ability to develop a substitute
is equivalent to an already available substitute that is more costly to produce. The
chapter raises the possibility that two commonly cited objectives of research in renewable
energy - securing a sustainable energy source and obtaining better prices from fossil fuel
producers9 - may actually be at odds with each other.
Chapter 5 explores the implications of conflicting objectives between generations: how
can the current generation best adjust its environmental policy when future generations
will make a different tradeoff between consumption and preventing an environmental
catastrophe, such as severe climate change or large biodiversity loss? Such a disagreement
arises naturally when generations share a common concern for preventing a catastrophe,
but attach more weight to their own consumption than to the consumption of their
descendants. Each generation would then like to implement an austere environmental
policy in the future, but enjoy a comparatively high level of consumption today. When
today’s policy makers realize that their successors will not play their part in such a
9US Senator Maria Cantwell for example argued that ”[t]ransportation fuel choice could [..] reduce
the $200 billion ’monopoly premium’ the Department of Energy calculates U.S. consumers currently
pay to OPEC and other foreign oil producers each year through excessive petroleum prices.” http:
//www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=334142, accessed February 12, 2013.
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’pollute now, clean up later’ plan, the policy that best enacts the current generation’s
preferences depends on the characteristics of the environmental problem.
Firstly, the chapter considers environmental problems that are caused by a sufficiently
scarce pollutant, for example local pollution related to the extraction of an exhaustible
resource. In this case, today’s generation has an incentive to be conservationist when
its descendants have full discretion (in subgame-perfect equilibrium) that is not present
when it can fully commit all current and future resource use. Under discretion, future
consumption is too rapacious from the current generation’s perspective. By reducing its
own consumption, the current generation ensures that the resource stock is consumed
more smoothly over time, allowing the ecosystem’s natural recovery to reduce the prob-
ability of a catastrophe.
If the environmental risk is expected to recede in the near future, for example be-
cause technological change will make the polluting resource obsolete, today’s generation
may in contrast have a strategic motive to increase its consumption in subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Because the number of future generations that can affect the catastrophe
risk is small, the current generation has a direct influence on future decisions. When an
increase in today’s consumption causes future generations to become more precaution-
ary, today’s generation has an incentive to increase its resource use compared to when it
has full commitment power, even if this increases the probability of a catastrophe.
Lastly, the chapter analyzes the case in which the polluting resource is abundant
and expected to remain essential for a long period. This model has some relevance for
climate change if we do not find a substitute for coal and unconventional oil. Here, the
catastrophe becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Early generations realize that far-future
generations will not respect stringent emission ceilings, and that the pollution stock will
reach dangerous levels regardless of their actions. Because any mitigation efforts will be
undone by future generations, it becomes optimal to continue under business-as-usual.
Though each generation has an explicit desire to prevent a catastrophe, generations may
act in equilibrium as if they are indifferent about the catastrophe risk. The chapter
shows that intergenerational preferences that explicitly value the long-run future can
still result in environmental degradation.
Chapter 6 considers a different type of time-inconsistent preferences than Chapter 5,
namely hyperbolic discounting: each generation values its own well-being very highly
7
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vis a vis their children’s well-being, but does not make as sharp a distinction between
their children’s and their grandchildren’s well-being. At the level of an individual, such
preferences can explain why people prefer receiving e 200 in one year and one month to
e 150 in one year, but simultaneously favour e 150 today over e 200 in one month, as
well as various kinds of behaviours such as procrastination, addiction, undersaving and
lack of exercise. In an intergenerational context, hyperbolic preferences can resolve the
tension between high short-term interest rates, which suggest a high degree of impatience,
and concerns for far-future generations from stated preference studies and introspection.
The positive and normative appeal of these preferences is similar to the preferences
in Chapter 5, and future research can shed light which ones are most appropriate for
long-lived environmental problems.
The chapter studies the management of a nonrenewable resource with amenity value,
for example biodiversity, which provides a range of ecosystem services and is valuable
for pharmaceutical research, or the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, which con-
tributes to a hospitable climate. The natural resource provides a stream of benefits
when left intact, but can also be irreversibly depleted for immediate economic gain, for
example by cutting down the habitat of an endangered species for timber production.
Today’s generation values the resource’s ability to provide amenity value into the far
future relatively highly vis a vis the consumption of their immediate descendants. As a
result, today’s generation may consume the resource if it believes that its descendants
will do so otherwise, even if it would prefer to see the resource preserved indefinitely.
Today’s generation is more inclined to follow a conservationist policy if it is confident
that future generations will follow suit.
By contrast, naive policies that ignore the current generation’s inability to rule from
the grave are less likely to degrade the environment: naive policy makers do not contend
with the possibility of future depletion, and thus have no motive to capitalize the resource
before their descendants will. The chapter shows that such an unawareness of future
preferences need no longer be a blessing when the resource can regenerate naturally. In
this case, naive policies can lead to rapacious depletion in the mistaken belief that future
generations will restrain themselves to replenish the resource. The chapter provides an
example in which a more resilient ecosystem leads to lower welfare if the ecosystem is




energy-intensive sectors in the
US10
2.1. Introduction
What drives the location of industries? This paper argues that energy is a major deter-
minant. Though coal, natural gas and oil are traded internationally at well-established
prices, availability and end-user prices differ substantially across regions. Chemical and
metal sectors spend 5-15% of their turnover on energy inputs and benefit greatly from
being close to energy reserves, in order to minimize costly transport and to take advan-
tage of energy subsidies. Particularly for coal, transport costs are high compared to the
value at the mine,11 and electricity grids are not designed to handle large volumes of
interregional traffic. At the same time, sought-after energy reserves are highly concen-
trated. The Powder River Basin for example contains more than 40% of coal reserves in
the US, the world’s most coal-abundant country.
When a select group of industries has a strong incentive to locate near a handful of
reserves, variations in energy endowments are an important driver of regional specializa-
tion. I test this hypothesis using data on 86 4-digit manufacturing sectors in 50 US states.
Coal, natural gas, and to a lesser extent hydro endowments, attract energy-intensive in-
dustries. A one standard deviation increase in per capita coal or natural gas endowments
increases value added in industries that are more energy-intensive than average by more
than 20%. Natural gas, hydro and oil abundance also affect industry location directly
10This chapter will also appear as Michielsen (2013a).
11Gerking and Hamilton (2008)
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once I condition on (instrumented) energy prices, possibly through forward and backward
linkages between extractive industries and energy-intensive manufacturing.
The location of manufacturing industries is of great interest to policy makers, and
commentators repeatedly highlight the importance of reliable and affordable energy avail-
ability for energy-intensive sectors. After the German government’s decision to abandon
nuclear power in 2011, a leading national newspaper wrote: ”What will the new energy
age cost us [..] in terms of money and jobs? [..] Energy is the lifeblood of industry, which
in turn is the basis of our economy and our prosperity. A stable energy supply is taken
for granted [..] and is an enormously important locational advantage when attracting
foreign investment.”12 This paper contributes to quantifying the locational advantage
that energy abundance provides.
Since the development of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, many studies have tested the
factor abundance hypothesis, which states that regions specialize in industries that use
their abundant factors.13 These studies mostly focus on capital and (skilled) labour
however.14 Though capital is a stock input and energy a flow, expenditures on capital
and energy as a fraction of turnover (3% and 2%, respectively)15 suggest that they are
an equally important determinant of industry location. Sectors are more similar in their
capital- and skilled labour requirements than in their energy requirements, and capital
and skilled labour are distributed more evenly across regions than energy reserves. I
find that capital abundance is less important for capital-intensive industries than energy
abundance is for energy-intensive industries.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to consider in detail the relation
between energy abundance and industry location at the regional level. By focusing on
US states instead of countries, I reduce the risk that heterogeneity in technology and
consumer tastes dilutes the relation between factor endowments and specialization. De-
tailed data on energy reserves allow me to insulate effects for four endowments: coal,
natural gas, oil and hydro. Furthermore, my primary interest in energy reserves makes
12Die Welt, May 30th 2011 (translation by Der Spiegel)
13c.f. Bowen et al. (1987), Trefler (1995), Davis et al. (1997) and Romalis (2004)
14I list three important exceptions. Hillman and Bullard (1978) assume capital-energy complementar-
ity and conjecture that energy is a source of comparative disadvantage for the US. Ellison and Glaeser
(1999) find that US states with low energy prices have a higher activity in energy-intensive sectors, but
the direction of causality is unclear. Closely related to the current paper, Gerlagh and Mathys (2011)
use data on 14 OECD countries and find that energy-abundant countries produce and export more in
energy-intensive industries.
15Average during 2001-2009 in US manufacturing, Economic Census
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interpretation of the results less prone to endogeneity in the distribution of production
factors across states (Schott, 2003). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2.2 outlines the methodology. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the data. Section 2.4
presents the results, and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Methodology
The three main theories of industry location are Ricardo’s theory of comparative advan-
tage, the factor abundance hypothesis and the new economic geography literature which
emphasizes increasing returns and external economies. While I am foremostly interested
in testing whether the factor abundance hypothesis hold for energy carriers, I control
for explanations given by the other two theories. This paper is closely related method-
ologically to Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000), Crafts and Mulatu (2005) and Gerlagh and
Mathys (2011). In their report on industry location in the EU, Midelfart-Knarvik et al.
(2000) interact regional characteristics with sectoral characteristics. If region i has a
desirable characteristic j, say an abundance of capital, all sectors will be interested in
locating in region i. However, a region’s capacity to absorb industries is bounded. The
industries that end up in region i are the ones that benefit most from capital abundance
and low capital prices, i.e. capital-intensive sectors. Capital-extensive sectors locate
somewhere else and are thus underrepresented in region i.
This approach can be applied to production factors, as in the example above, as well
as new economic geography (NEG) effects. I include three of these. Industries that
have strong forward or backward linkages may agglomerate near large markets, to be
close to other producers. I control for this by interacting regional market potential with
sectoral forward and backward linkages. Furthermore, industries with large economies
of scale may locate in central locations to minimize transport costs. I capture this by
interacting market potential with average plant size. I include state-year and sector-year
fixed effects.16 The state-year fixed effects control for any changes in state characteristics
16Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) include cutoff levels for state endowments and sectoral intensities in
the interaction terms. The interpretation of an endowment cutoff for skilled labour is the endowment
level such that an industry’s activity does not depend on the skilled labour intensity of the industry.
Analogously, the skilled labour intensity cutoff signals the intensity for which industries do not consider
the state endowment of skilled labour when making their location decision. Mulatu et al. (2010),
studying the effects of environmental regulation on European industry location, present and discuss
11





j production factor subscript
l economic geography subscript
E set of energy production factors
N set of non-energy production factors
V Ai,s,t value added
πj,s,t sectoral factor intensities
θj,i,t state factor endowments
pj,i,t state energy prices
ξj,i state deregulation indicators
σl,s sectoral economic geography characteristics
χi,t state market potential
that affect all sectors, which may include changes in the tax code or labour regulation.
The sector-year fixed effects absorb any unobserved nationwide sectoral trends, such as
price changes for crucial inputs or changes in consumer tastes. I omit sector-state fixed
effects as energy reserves and sectoral energy intensities, which enter into the interaction
effects of interest, do not vary much over time. To control for this persistence, I cluster
error terms by sector-state pair.
I measure industrial activity by value added.1718 Table 2.1 describes the notation. I
estimate industry location as dependent on a set of production factor interaction terms,
three economic geography interaction terms and control variables. The equation I esti-
mate is






δlσl,sχi,t + ǫi,s,t (2.1)
their estimated cutoff levels in some detail. Because I include fixed effects, I cannot identify these
cutoffs.
17Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) normalize the left-hand variable by country and sector size. In my
specification, size effects are absorbed by the fixed effects.
18In a robustness check in the Appendix, I use the log of employment as left-hand variable.
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The factor abundance hypothesis predicts that the coefficients on the factor interac-
tion terms γj are positive, indicating that energy-intensive industries have a higher value
added in energy-abundant states. New economic geography posits that the δl coefficients
are positive. For ease of interpretation, I discretize the sectoral characteristics such that
they are equal to one (zero) if they are higher (lower) than average.19 As in Mulatu et al.
(2010), I normalize state characteristics by their standard deviation. The γj coefficients
in (2.1) are then comparable across factors. The magnitude of the coefficient on the in-
teraction term for e.g. capital tells us how much variations in capital endowments across
states affect the location of industries that are more capital-intensive than average.
I then decompose the effect of energy abundance on the location of energy-intensive
industries into a direct effect and an indirect effect through energy prices, as predicted
by factor endowment models of trade (c.f. Romalis (2004)). Energy prices are poten-
tially endogenous to industry location, so I instrument for prices using a two-step GMM
approach.











For capital and skilled labour, I preserve the sectoral intensity × state endowment in-
teraction term. For energy, I interact sectoral intensities both with state endowments
and state prices. γ̃j measures the direct effect of energy abundance on energy-intensive
sectors, such as forward and backward linkages between the extractive activities and
manufacturing sectors (Michaels, 2010), and effects on economic fundamentals such as
institutions and infrastructure (c.f. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007)). Using the same nor-
malization as for the other interaction terms, the interpretation of ζ̃j is the percentage
change in industrial activity in energy-intensive sectors if energy prices increase by one
standard deviation.
For electricity and natural gas, I instrument the price interaction terms πj,s,tpj,i,t
with deregulation interaction terms πj,s,tξj,i. For electricity, I use an indicator whether
the electricity sector was deregulated at the start of my sample period.20 A large part
of electricity price differences across states in the eighties and nineties was not related
19In the Appendix, I present robustness checks with continuous factor intensities.
20Source: EIA (2000).
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to fundamentals such as energy abundance and utilization, but to inefficient generation
investments and long-term contracts between generators and utilities that stipulated
high prices (Joskow, 2000; Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000). Deregulation took place in
states in which the gap between regulated prices and the market value of electricity was
largest, primarily on the West Coast and in the Northeast. The restructuring proved to
be unsuccessful in most states, and did little to curb prices (Blumsack et al., 2006). The
deregulation indicator is thus a proxy for long-standing inefficiencies in the electricity
sector that, unlike energy reserves, only affect industry location through electricity prices.
Because the deregulating states do not have large energy-intensive manufacturing sectors,
reverse causality from the composition of the manufacturing industry to deregulation is
unlikely.
For natural gas, I employ two similar instruments: indicator variables whether a state
adopted a price cap or cost incentive measure for natural gas utilities before the start
of my sample period.21 The utilities, which enjoy natural monopolies, were traditionally
subject to rate-of-return regulation. In the nineties and the beginning of the aughts,
a number of states introduced price caps and cost-incentive measures. While the two
measures are quite different in nature, Hlasny (2011) demonstrates that they were both
most likely to be implemented in states with high natural gas prices conditional on
geographic characteristics such as natural gas endowments and climate, and in states
with high concentration ratios for natural gas distribution. Like in the case of electricity,
the reforms did not reduce consumer prices (Hlasny, 2006). Furthermore, I use the
population-weighted number of heating degree days22 as an instrument for natural gas
and fuel oil prices. These energy types are widely used as a heating fuel, and temperature-
induced variations in demand for heating across states will affect natural gas and fuel oil
prices across states.
2.3. Data
I use state-level US panel data containing information on energy reserves, sectoral output
and factor inputs, covering a period of 2001-2009. Appendix 2.A.1 contains a full list
21Source: Hlasny (2008).
22Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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of data sources and definitions. I compute energy abundance as proven reserves per
capita. I assume that proven reserves are independent of industrial activity. Though
per-capita measures are potentially endogenous, the bias goes against my hypothesis:
if energy-abundant states attract more people because they offer better employment
opportunities, energy reserves per capita are similar across states. Variations in reserves
per capita then have a smaller influence on the location of energy-intensive industries
than if reserves per capita are exogenous.
Moreover, area normalizations are distortive as land area is an imperfect indicator of
economic potential. Montana and Wyoming, the states with the first and third largest
coal reserves, are considerably larger than Illinois, which has the second largest reserves.
Comparing these three states using an area-normalized measure of coal abundance, we
would predict Illinois to have a comparative advantage in energy-intensive sectors and
Montana and Wyoming in energy-extensive, i.e. labour-intensive, sectors. This pre-
diction is implausible as Illinois is more than ten times as populous as the latter two
states. Appendix 2.A.2 contains a robustness check in which I define energy abundance
as reserves per square mile of land area.
I measure energy intensity as national energy expenditures per employee. The re-
sults do not change when measuring energy intensity as energy expenditures per dollar
of value added, to ensure that my measure of energy intensity is not clouded by varia-
tions in labour intensity. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) has data on four energy
endowments: natural gas, coal, oil and hydro.23 The left-hand variable and factor in-
tensities come from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and are observed at the
4-digit NAICS level. For energy, I have data on electricity- and fuel intensity. I use a
perpetual inventory approach to construct capital endowments and intensities.
Table 2.2 shows the least and most energy-intensive sectors. Industries that process
raw materials, as well as chemical industries, tend to require a lot of energy. Sectors
that are further down the production chain, especially those that cater to consumers,
are typically energy extensive. Figure 2.1 depicts the sources of electricity generation
in in the US. Coal is the predominant source of electricity, accounting for nearly 50%
23Hydropower generation is constrained by geographic characteristics, so I regard hydropower capacity
as an adequate proxy for the endowment of suitable hydropower generation locations. The location of




























Table 2.2: Four-digit NAICS sectors with lowest and highest shares of turnover spent on energy
Least energy intensive Energy expenditures
Turnover
Most energy intensive Energy expenditures
Turnover
3341 Computers & peripheral equipment 0.30% 3315 Foundries 4.77%
3122 Tobacco 0.30% 3252 Resin, syn rubber, & artificial syn fibers 4.83%
3361 Motor vehicles 0.39% 3279 Other nonmetallic mineral products 4.85%
3342 Communications equipment 0.45% 3313 Aluminum 7.10%
3343 Audio and video equipment 0.46% 3271 Clay products & refractories 7.26%
3379 Other furniture 0.48% 3251 Basic chemicals 7.31%
3369 Other transportation equipment 0.51% 3311 Iron & steel mills 7.42%
3345 Electronic instruments 0.59% 3272 Glass & glass products 7.62%
3391 Medical equipment & supplies 0.60% 3221 Pulp, paper, & paperboard mills 9.03%
3362 Motor vehicle bodies & trailers 0.60% 3274 Lime and gypsum 13.91%
Shares are averaged over 2001-2009, Annual Survey of Manufactures
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Table 2.3: Sample correlation coefficients for energy interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) electricity intensity × coal abundance 1
(2) electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.33 1
(3) electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.24 0.11 1
(4) fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.26 0.81 0.07 1
(5) fuel intensity × oil abundance 0.40 0.62 0.14 0.75 1
of total generation. As natural gas is also an important input, I interact natural gas
endowments with electricity intensity as well as with fuel intensity.
Table 2.3 presents the correlation between the energy interaction terms. Multi-
collinearity between the natural gas and oil interaction terms makes it difficult to disen-
tangle the effect of natural gas and oil endowments on the location of energy-intensive
industries. In the Appendix, I use a more disaggregated measure of energy intensity,
decomposing fuel intensity into natural gas-, distillate fuel oil- and residual fuel oil in-
tensity. The extra information on energy intensities comes at the cost of observing 3-digit







Figure 2.1: Electricity generation in the US by source in 2007 (EIA)
Lastly, Table 2.4 shows the correlation between energy reserves and prices. In accor-
dance with the factor abundance hypothesis, industrial energy prices tend to be lower in
states with large energy reserves. Consistent with Figure 2.1, coal and hydro abundance
are negatively correlated with electricity prices. The relation between natural gas abun-
17
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Table 2.4: Correlation between state energy abundance (rows) and prices
(columns) in 2007
Electricity Natural gas Distillate fuel oil Residual fuel oil
Coal −0.26∗ −0.37 ∗ ∗∗ 0.18 −0.33 ∗ ∗
Hydro −0.25∗ −0.04 0.04 −0.20
Natural gas −0.05 −0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 −0.37 ∗ ∗∗
Oil −0.03 −0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.06 −0.39 ∗ ∗∗
a Prices are for the industrial sector. Abundance and prices are truncated at the 95th percentile.
Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Source: State Energy
Data System, EIA.
dance and electricity prices is weak however. Natural gas and oil abundance are strongly
negatively correlated with natural gas and residual fuel oil prices respectively. There is
no significant relation between distillate fuel oil prices and oil reserves, suggesting that
the distillate fuel oil market is more nationally integrated than the residual fuel oil one.
2.4. Results
Table 2.5 presents the results of regression (2.1). The effect of energy endowments
on industry location is both statistically and economically significant. A one standard
deviation increase in per capita coal or natural gas endowments increases the value
added of electricity-intensive sectors by 23%. The effect for hydro is slightly lower,
as hydropower constitutes a smaller share of total electricity generation. Natural gas
endowments play an even stronger role in the location of fuel-intensive industries: a
one standard deviation increase in endowments brings about a 39% increase in value
added in fuel-intensive sectors. I find no evidence that oil endowments matter for the
location of fuel-intensive industries. The senstivity analyses with finer energy-intensity
disaggregation in the Appendix suggest that the negative sign on the oil interaction term
is caused by multicollinearity with the natural gas interaction terms. The US possess
4.5% of world conventional natural gas reserves, but only 1.5% of oil reserves.24 For
oil-intensive industries, access to imports may be more important than for natural gas-
intensive industries.





Table 2.5: Location of 4-digit NAICS sectors
(1) (2) (3)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.23 0.25
(0.058)*** (0.061)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.25 −0.04
(0.069)*** (0.074)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.17 0.18
(0.047)*** (0.046)***
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.39 0.48
(0.076)*** (0.088)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance −0.05 −0.16
(0.104) (0.112)
capital intensity × capital abundance 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
skill intensity × skill abundance 0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.030)* (0.030)* (0.030)*
forward linkages × market potential 0.05 0.01 0.05
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
backward linkages × market potential −0.12 −0.13 −0.12
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
scale economies × market potential −0.07 −0.08 −0.08
(0.039)* (0.039)** (0.039)**
Number of observations 18423 18908 18423
Number of clusters 2971 3071 2971
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1). Variable definitions are given in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Two-way fixed effects (state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard
errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are
equal to one if they are larger than average, and zero if they are smaller than average. State characteristics are divided by
their standard deviation.
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Figure 2.2: Coal endowments per capita (left) and value added in electricity-intensive
industries per capita (right), 2007
Figure 2.3: Natural gas endowments per capita (left) and value added in fuel-intensive
industries per capita (right), 2007
Figure 2.2 illustrates that electricity-intensive industries tend to locate in states with
large coal endowments. The left panel shows coal endowments per capita; the right panel
value added in electricity-intensive sectors per capita. There are two main coal producing
regions in the US: the Appalachians (with Illinois, Kentucky and West Virginia as the
most abundant states) and the Western Coal Region (with large reserves in Wyoming,
North Dakota and Montana). With the exception of North Dakota, states in these regions
also have a high value added in electricity-intensive sectors. Figure 2.3 shows that fuel-
intensive sectors are overrepresented in natural-gas abundant Great Plains (Wyoming,
Oklahoma and Colorado) and Gulf Coast (Texas and Louisiana) states.
By comparison, the distribution of capital and skilled labour across the US has a
much smaller influence on the location of industries that rely on these factors more than
average. The coefficients (0.07 and 0.05 respectively) are smaller in absolute value than
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Figure 2.4: Labour, capital and energy intensities in 4-digit US manufacturing sectors.
(Source: Economic Census, 2007)
this difference come from? Firstly, the variation in energy intensities across sectors is
much higher than the variation in capital- and skill intensities (Figure 2.4). Energy
expenditures in the most energy-intensive sector are 152 times as large as in the least
energy-intensive sector. The largest difference factors for capital- and skill intensities
are 22.8 and 3.3, respectively. For industries that are extremely energy-intensive, being
close to energy reserves can be a crucial consideration in the location decision. Because
capital- and skill-intensities are much less skewed, locating in capital- or skill-abundant
states is not as overriding a concern for capital- and skill-intensive industries.
Secondly, state energy endowments are much more concentrated than capital and
skilled labour endowments. Figure 2.5 illustrates this point for natural gas reserves.
More than half of states has no natural gas at all, whereas the most abundant state
(Wyoming) has 155 times as many reserves per capita as New York. Sectors that require
a lot of energy thus have limited options if they want to locate close to energy reserves.
Skilled labour and physical capital on the other hand are available in every state. The
fraction of adults with a Bachelor’s degree or higher differs by a factor 2.2 at most;
the largest difference in physical capital per capita is a factor 8.1. As capital and skill
21
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Figure 2.5: Natural gas, capital and skilled labour endowments of US states (Source:
EIA and Economic Census, 2007). Dots without labels represent states with little or no
gas reserves.
endowments vary much less across states than energy reserves, we can expect variations in
endowments to play a smaller role in the location decision for capital- and skill-intensive
industries than for energy-intensive industries.
I find no support for the new economic geography hypotheses. Market potential
does not significantly affect the location of sectors that have more forward linkages than
average. For backward linkages and economies of scale, my findings contradict the NEG
prediction: sectors with strong backward linkages and scale economies are under- rather
than overrepresented in large markets.
Table 2.6 shows the results when I include both endowment and price interaction
terms (for brevity, I do not report the coefficients on the capital, skill and NGE interaction
terms). The first-stage IV results are in Table 2.9 in the Appendix. Energy abundance is
significant in the first-stage IV regressions. A one standard deviation increase in natural
gas abundance is associated with a 38% decrease in natural gas prices. Coal abundance
has a stronger influence on electricity prices than hydro or natural gas abundance, which





Table 2.6: OLS and GMM-IV coefficient estimates for location of 4-digit NAICS industries with energy intensity and price
interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV
electricity intensity × electricity price -0.24 -0.33
(0.042)*** (0.094)***
fuel intensity × natural gas price -0.18 -0.58
(0.045)*** (0.229)**
fuel intensity × distillate fuel oil price -0.07 -0.18
(0.035)** (0.088)**
fuel intensity × residual fuel oil price -0.07 1.63
(0.033)** (225.866)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.14 0.08
(0.060)** (0.065)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.13 0.12
(0.047)*** (0.049)**
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.22 0.19
(0.069)*** (0.063)***
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.28 -0.01
(0.062)*** (0.161)
fuel intensity × oil abundance 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.80
(0.086)*** (0.071)*** (0.089)*** (67.074)
Number of observations 18423 18423 18908 18908 18908 18908 18908 18908
Number of clusters 2971 2971 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.56 0.57 -0.01 0.56 0.44 0.56 -0.10
Hansen overidentification p-value 1.00
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 237.48 19.67 237.79 21.90
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.2). All regressions include capital, skill and NGE interaction terms. In the GMM-
IV regressions, the energy price interaction terms are instrumented. The excluded instruments are the following. In (1): electricity intensity ×
electricity deregulation. In (2): fuel intensity× natural gas price cap, fuel intensity× natural gas cost incentive and fuel intensity× heating degree days.
In (3) and (4): fuel intensity× heating degree days. Results for the first-stage IV regressions are reported in Table 2.9. Two-way fixed effects (state-year
and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 10%
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are equal to one if they are larger than average, and zero if they are smaller than average. State
characteristics are divided by their standard deviation.
23
Chapter 2: Energy-intensive sectors in the US
that adopted deregulation are characterized by higher electricity and natural gas prices.
The coefficients on the endowment interaction terms in the second stage are smaller
than in specification (2.1) without price interaction terms. The results indicate that
part of the effect of energy endowments on the location of energy-intensive industries
goes through energy prices. Energy abundance causes lower energy prices, which in turn
attract energy-intensive manufacturing sectors.
Natural gas, hydro and oil endowments also have a direct effect on the location
of energy-intensive industries; for coal, the direct effect becomes insignificant when I
instrument for electricity prices. Compared to coal, the former three energy types are
characterized by a more capital-intensive extraction or generation process, which may
result in stronger linkages with manufacturing.
When I instrument for energy prices, the coefficients on the price interaction terms
are larger in absolute value than in the OLS regressions. In the OLS results, a one
standard deviation increase in electricity or natural gas prices results in a 24% or 18%
decrease in value added in electricity- or fuel-intensive industries, respectively. In the
IV results, the decrease is 33% and 58%. This result suggests that the presence of large
energy-intensive sectors drives up energy prices in energy-abundant states, ameliorating
the effect of energy endowments on prices. This demand effect is stronger than possible
negative influences of energy-intensive industries on energy prices, for example through
lobbying.
The larger magnitudes of the IV coefficients for price interaction terms may also be
caused by measurement error in the industrial energy prices.25 If energy abundance is
better correlated with the true prices than the observed prices are, the IV estimates will
be larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates. The large standard deviations in
IV regression 4 suggest that the number of heating degree days is not an informative
instrument for residual fuel prices.
Appendix 2.A.2 presents the robustness checks. The effect of hydro abundance on
specialization is less robust than that of coal and natural gas, but the main conclusions
remain unaltered.
25Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) propose a method to recover energy prices that is based on the optimality
conditions for a Cobb-Douglas production function. They regress observed energy use on a sector- and
country fixed effect. The coefficients on the country fixed effects can then be interpreted as a proxy for
marginal costs. This approach requires energy use data with variation across both sectors and states,




Though energy is often overlooked in industry location analyses because it is a tradable
commodity, it plays a significant role in the distribution of manufacturing sectors. My
findings suggest that energy is more important than capital and skilled labour for the lo-
cation of manufacturing industries in the US. Energy abundance affects industry location
indirectly through lower energy prices, but also directly when I condition on prices. The
analysis in this paper focuses on reserves as an exogenous source of energy abundance,
but policy makers can also influence energy availability, for example through investments
in nuclear, solar and wind energy. Considering the strong influence of coal and hydro
endowments on the location of electricity-intensive industries, such investments can play
an important role in attracting value added and employment in energy-intensive sectors.
2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. Data definitions and sources
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 list the definitions and sources of the state and sector characteristics,
respectively. I measure state capital abundance by the manufacturing capital stock per
capita and sectoral capital intensity by the capital stock per employee. I construct state
and sectoral capital stocks using a perpetual inventory method.26 Denote capital stocks
by K, capital expenditures by I and the geometric decay rate by δ. State and sectoral
capital stocks evolve according to
Ki,t =(1− δ)Ki,t−1 + Ii,t (2.3a)
Ks,t =(1− δ)Ks,t−1 + Is,t (2.3b)
26The US Census’ Quarterly Financial Report directly measures capital stocks for 3-digit NAICS
sectors, so I do not need a perpetual inventory approach for sectoral capital intensities for the robustness
check with disaggregated energy intensities in the Appendix.
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Harberger (1978) notes that when capital growth It/Kt−1 − δ equals output growth g,
the initial capital stock can be calculated as
Kt−1 = It/ (δ + g) (2.4)
I set δ = 0.035 and g = 0.03. My data on state capital expenditures start in 1987; the
data on sectoral expenditures in 1997, because of the transition from the SIC to NAICS
classification.
2.A.2. Supplementary tables and robustness checks
Table 2.9 presents the first-stage regression results for specification (2.2), which are
discussed in the main text. The results indicate that energy prices are lower in energy-
abundant states. The first-stage coefficients should be interpreted with care, as they are
overproportionally driven by states with large energy-intensive sectors. The coefficient on
the coal interaction term implies that a one standard deviation increase in coal abundance
is associated with a decrease in electricity prices of 0.45 standard deviations.
Table 2.10 shows the regression coefficients of (2.1) when I normalize energy- and
capital abundance by land area instead of population. The coefficients on all interaction
terms for energy and capital are smaller in absolute value than in the main specification.
The results do not suggest that energy and capital endowments attract migration. The
coefficients for coal and hydro decrease more than for natural gas, as area normaliza-
tions introduce more noise into the coal and hydro abundance than in the natural gas
abundance measure. The variation in population density between states with the largest
absolute coal27 and hydro28 endowments is larger than between states with the largest
natural gas29 endowments.
Table 2.12 lists the results for regression equation (2.1) when I decompose fuel inten-
sity into natural gas intensity, distillate fuel oil intensity and residual fuel oil intensity.
The correlation between the natural gas and oil interaction terms is much lower than in
the main specification, as can be seen in Table 2.11. Natural gas intensity and electricity
intensity are perfectly correlated however. The negative coefficient on the oil interac-
27Montana, Illinois, Wyoming, Kentucky, West Virginia
28Washington, California, Oregon, New York, Alabama








Table 2.7: State Characteristics
Variable Definition Source
Skilled labour abundance Fraction of population over 25 with a Bachelor’s degree or higher US Census Bureau
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures in all manufacturing sectors Annual Survey of Manufactures
Capital abundance Capital stock per capita Eqns (2.3a) and (2.4)
Coal abundance Estimated recoverable coal reserves per capita Energy Information Administration
Natural gas abundance Dry natural gas reserves per capita Energy Information Administration
Oil abundance Crude oil reserves per capita a Energy Information Administration
Hydro abundance Summer capacity hydroelectric generation per capita Energy Information Administration
Electricity price Electricity price in the industrial sector State Energy Data System, EIA
Natural gas price Natural gas price in the industrial sector State Energy Data System, EIA
Distillate fuel oil price Distillate fuel oil price in the industrial sector State Energy Data System, EIA





population in state i′ in 100.000
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Electricity deregulation 1 if electricity restructuring legislation enabled by July 2000, 0 o.w. (EIA, 2000)
Natural gas price cap 1 if price caps implemented in 2000 or earlier, 0 otherwise (Hlasny, 2008)
Natural gas cost incentive 1 if cost incentive measures implemented in 2000 or earlier, 0 otherwise (Hlasny, 2008)
Heating degree days Total heating degree days weighted by population NOAA
All state characteristics are truncated at the 95th percentile and divided by the yearly standard deviation. I therefore provide no units of measurement.
Except for the electricity and natural gas deregulation indicators, the dimension of all state characteristics is i, t. Monetary values are adjusted by the
consumer price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. a Does not include Federal Offshore Reserves b I follow Harris (1954). Distances are for the
quickest route between the largest cities (2000) in both states (Source: www.mileage-charts.com). Distances to and from Burlington, VT and Honolulu,



























Table 2.8: Sector Characteristics
Variable Dimension Definition Source
Value added i, s, t Value added Annual Survey of Manufactures
Employment i, s, t Number of employees Annual Survey of Manufactures
Skilled labour intensity s, t Nationwide average wage per employee Annual Survey of Manufactures
Capital expenditures s, t Capital expenditures in all manufacturing sectors Annual Survey of Manufactures
Capital intensity s, t Capital stock per employee Eqns (2.3b) and (2.4)
Electricity intensity s, t Quantity of electricity purchased per employee Annual Survey of Manufactures
Fuel intensity s, t Cost of purchased fuels per employee Annual Survey of Manufactures
Forward linkages sa Row sum of the Ghosh inverse Bureau of Economic Analysis
Backward linkages sa Column sum of the Leontief inverse Bureau of Economic Analysis
Scale economies s, t Nationwide average establishment size County Business Patterns
Sector characteristics are equal to one (zero) if the sector characteristic is higher (lower) than the yearly average across sectors. a The
input-output matrix is only available for 2002. I equate forward and backward linkages to the 2002 value for the whole sample period.
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tion term in the main specification disappears, though the oil interaction terms are not
significant when I control for natural gas abundance and intensity.
Table 2.13 presents the results when I use the log of employment, rather than the
log of value added, as dependent variable. All interaction terms have slightly smaller
coefficients than in the main specification, though the significance levels are unchanged.
A possible explanation is that factor prices are lower in states in which the factor is
abundant. For a given output level, capital-intensive industries then have lower costs,
and hence a higher value added, in capital-abundant states. By contrast, the number
of employees per unit of physical output is more likely to be constant across capital-
abundant and capital-scarce states.
Table 2.14 contains the coefficient estimates when energy- and capital intensity are
defined as energy expenditures and capital stock per dollar of value added, respectively.
Like in Table 2.13, the coefficients are slightly lower in absolute value. The distribution
of energy expenditures per employee is more skewed than that of energy expenditures
per dollar of value added. Therefore, the average energy-intensity using the alternative
metric is lower than the average intensity using the main metric, and more industries
classify as energy intensive than in the main specification. Since energy endowments are
less important in the location decision of the marginal energy-intensive industries, the
energy interaction terms lose some explanatory power.
Table 2.15 shows the results when I do not discretize the sector intensities, to ver-
ify whether we lose information as a result of the discretization. The first energy in-
teraction term, as well as the capital and skill interaction terms, are slightly larger
than in the main specification. The electricity intensity × hydro abundance coeffi-
cient is no longer significant, suggesting that hydro abundance does not play as large
of a role in the location of the most electricity-intensive industries. The correlation
coefficient between electricity intensity × natural gas abundance and fuel intensity ×
natural gas abundance is higher than in the main specification (0.84 instead of 0.81).
Due to increased multicollinearity, the coefficients on the natural gas interaction terms



























Table 2.9: First-stage coefficient estimates for instrumental variables regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
electricity intensity × fuel intensity × fuel intensity × fuel intensity ×
electricity price natural gas price distillate fuel oil price residual fuel oil price
electricity intensity × electricity deregulation 0.77
(0.050)***
fuel intensity × natural gas price cap 0.35
(0.066)***
fuel intensity × natural gas cost incentive 0.05
(0.052)
fuel intensity × heating degree days 0.08 0.43 -0.11
(0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.024)***
electricity intensity × coal abundance -0.45
(0.027)***
electricity intensity × hydro abundance -0.13
(0.020)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance -0.20
(0.035)***
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance -0.38
(0.059)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance -0.11 -0.40
(0.048)** (0.046)***
Number of observations 18423 18908 18908 18908
Number of clusters 2971 3071 3071 3071
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.97
This table reports first-stage coefficient estimates for the GMM-IV regressions in Table 2.6. Capital, skilled labour and new economic geography
interaction terms as well as two-way fixed effects (state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors
in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are equal to one if they are larger than








Table 2.10: Location of 4-digit NAICS industries with area-normalized energy and capital endowments
(1) (2) (3)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.07 0.07
(0.041)* (0.040)*
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.16 −0.00
(0.052)*** (0.053)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance −0.01 0.00
(0.039) (0.038)
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.33 0.34
(0.057)*** (0.063)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance −0.14 −0.13
(0.050)*** (0.050)***
capital intensity × capital abundance −0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
skill intensity × skill abundance 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
forward linkages × market potential 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
backward linkages × market potential −0.13 −0.13 −0.13
(0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)***
scale economies × market potential −0.08 −0.08 −0.09
(0.039)** (0.038)** (0.039)**
Number of observations 18423 18908 18423
Number of clusters 2971 3071 2971
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1). Energy and capital endowments are measured as
reserves or stock per square mile of land area, truncated at the 95th percentile and divided by the yearly standard deviation.
Other variable definitions are the same as in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Two-way fixed effects (state-year and sector-year) are
included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are equal to one if they are larger than average, and zero if
they are smaller than average. State characteristics are divided by their standard deviation.
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Table 2.11: Sample correlation coefficients for energy interaction terms with disaggregated
energy intensities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) electricity intensity × coal abundance 1
(2) electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.18 1
(3) electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.09 −0.02 1
(4) natural gas intensity × natural gas abundance 0.18 1 −0.02 1
(5) distillate fuel oil intensity × oil abundance 0.28 0.45 0.01 0.45 1








Table 2.12: Location of 3-digit NAICS industries with disaggregated energy intensities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.25 0.23
(0.084)*** (0.086)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.23
(0.088)***
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.03 0.03
(0.064) (0.065)
natural gas intensity × natural gas abundance 0.33 0.24
(0.083)*** (0.085)***
distillate fuel oil intensity × oil abundance 0.23 0.10
(0.086)*** (0.084)
residual fuel oil intensity × oil abundance 0.17 0.10
(0.097)* (0.091)
capital intensity × capital abundance 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
skill intensity × skill abundance −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
forward linkages × market potential 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10
(0.054)* (0.052)* (0.052) (0.054)*
backward linkages × market potential −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11
(0.065)* (0.063)* (0.063)* (0.064)*
scale economies × market potential 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.11
(0.063)** (0.062)** (0.062)* (0.064)*
Number of observations 7080 7335 7335 7080
Number of clusters 931 968 968 931
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1). Energy intensities, defined as energy use per employee, are from the Manufac-
turing Energy Consumption Survey. These data are only available for 2002 and 2006. I use the 2002 values for 2001-2004 and the 2006 values for
2005-2009. Capital intensity is defined as net property, plant and equipment per employee from the Quarterly Financial Report of the US Census.
I constructed yearly data by taking averages across quarters. Other variable definitions are the same as in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Two-way fixed
effects (state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are equal to one if they are larger than average, and zero if they are



























Table 2.13: Location of 4-digit NAICS industries with log of employment as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.17 0.20
(0.046)*** (0.049)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.14 −0.08
(0.048)*** (0.063)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.14 0.14
(0.039)*** (0.039)***
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.26 0.37
(0.058)*** (0.075)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance −0.06 −0.16
(0.083) (0.089)*
capital intensity × capital abundance 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
skill intensity × skill abundance 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.025) (0.025)* (0.025)*
forward linkages × market potential 0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.030)** (0.029) (0.030)**
backward linkages × market potential −0.10 −0.10 −0.10
(0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
scale economies × market potential −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Number of observations 19373 19896 19373
Number of clusters 3109 3210 3109
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.51 0.52
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1) with log of employment, rather than log of value added,
as dependent variable. Two-way fixed effects (state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-
state pair. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector
characteristics are equal to one if they are larger than average, and zero if they are smaller than average. State characteristics








Table 2.14: Location of 4-digit NAICS industries with alternative energy and capital intensities
(1) (2) (3)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.21 0.22
(0.055)*** (0.057)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.17 −0.05
(0.056)*** (0.106)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.13 0.13
(0.045)*** (0.045)***
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.24 0.34
(0.074)*** (0.118)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance −0.02 −0.11
(0.101) (0.104)
capital intensity × capital abundance 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)***
skill intensity × skill abundance 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
forward linkages × market potential 0.03 −0.00 0.03
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
backward linkages × market potential −0.12 −0.13 −0.12
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
scale economies × market potential −0.08 −0.08 −0.08
(0.039)** (0.039)** (0.039)**
Number of observations 18423 18908 18423
Number of clusters 2971 3071 2971
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1). Energy and capital intensities are measured as ex-
penditures or stock per dollar of value added. Other variable definitions are the same as in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Two-way
fixed effects (state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Sector characteristics are equal to




























Table 2.15: Location of 4-digit NAICS industries with continuous sector characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
electricity intensity × coal abundance 0.27 0.28
(0.044)*** (0.048)***
electricity intensity × natural gas abundance 0.30 −0.26
(0.076)*** (0.182)
electricity intensity × hydro abundance 0.07 0.07
(0.045) (0.045)
fuel intensity × natural gas abundance 0.36 0.67
(0.099)*** (0.194)***
fuel intensity × oil abundance −0.01 −0.15
(0.129) (0.137)
capital intensity × capital abundance 0.11 0.09 0.10
(0.046)** (0.047)** (0.046)**
skill intensity × skill abundance 0.10 0.08 0.10
(0.038)** (0.038)** (0.038)***
forward linkages × market potential 0.02 −0.00 0.01
(0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
backward linkages × market potential −0.17 −0.18 −0.17
(0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.044)***
scale economies × market potential −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Number of observations 18423 18908 18423
Number of clusters 2971 3071 2971
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
This table reports coefficient estimates for regression equation (2.1). Sector characteristics are truncated at the 95th
percentile and normalized so that the yearly mean and standard deviation across sectors is 1/2. Definitions of state char-
acteristics are listed in Table 2.7; sources of sector characteristics are the same as in Table 2.8. Two-way fixed effects
(state-year and sector-year) are included. Error terms are clustered by sector-state pair. Standard errors in parentheses.




Brown backstops versus the green
paradox30
3.1. Introduction
Well-intended climate policies may have perverse effects. Climate policies typically be-
come stricter over time. Fossil fuel owners, deciding when to sell their scarce resources,
may respond by speeding up extraction. This side effect can occur when fossil fuel re-
serves are limited and cheap to exploit: a reasonable characterization for conventional
oil and natural gas, but much less for other important energy sources such as coal and
unconventional oil. In this paper we ask whether climate policy has unintended conse-
quences when there are two types of fossil fuels: one dirty and scarce, the other even
dirtier and abundant.
Policies that reduce future dependence on fossil fuels might encourage suppliers, an-
ticipating a future drop in demand, to bring forward the extraction of their resources.
When present emissions are more harmful than future emissions, gradually increasing
carbon taxes can be counterproductive: a green paradox (Sinn, 2008a). Developing a
carbon-free substitute for fossil fuels can cause a similar effect (Strand, 2007; Hoel, 2011).
Cost reductions for the substitute decrease the scarcity value of fossil fuels, and thereby
increase fossil fuel supply in all periods before exhaustion.31
The crucial feature that drives the above mechanism is the exhaustibility of the
resource. This causes the tradeoff between current and future supply, and thus the
30An earlier version of this article circulates as Michielsen (2011).
31The green paradox may vanish when the substitute has an upward-sloping supply curve (Gerlagh,
2011). Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a) find that the green paradox occurs for clean but expensive
backstops (such as solar or wind), but not when the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to emissions
damages, as it is then attractive to leave part of the oil in the ground.
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effect of (expected) future policies on current supply and emissions. If the resource is
fully abundant, resource owners supply the myopically optimal quantity in each period
and the link between current and future markets is severed. Exhaustibility is a fair
assumption for conventional oil and natural gas, which will be depleted in 50 to 70 years
at current consumption rates.32 Coal and unconventional oil are much more abundant
however. Coal reserves are sufficient to last another 250 years, and tar sand deposits in
Alberta are estimated at 1800 bln barrels.33 The supply of these resources is primarily
driven by costs rather than scarcity rents. Anticipated carbon taxes cause coal mines to
shut down in the future, but do not increase near-term supply.
Coal and unconventional oil are significant from an economic and a climate change
point of view. Coal satisfies a third of global energy demand and accounts for almost
half of energy-related CO2 emissions,34 outranking petroleum in emission intensity by
30-40%. The IEA expects coal supply to increase by 60% in 2035 under business-as-usual
policies;35 twice as much as the projected increase in oil supply. Supply of unconventional
oil, which is 20% more emission-intensive than petroleum (Charpentier et al., 2009), may
increase fivefold to 11 mln barrels per day in 2035. These numbers suggest that in order to
keep climate change within tolerable limits, it is imperative that coal and uncoventional
oil reserves remain largely unexploited (Gerlagh, 2011). A comprehensive assessment of
the effectiveness of climate policies should take into account these dirty substitutes and
their unique characteristics.36
In this paper, we develop a simple model with two time periods. We do not derive
optimal policies, but present a descriptive analysis of the effect of future climate poli-
cies on emissions. We generalize assumptions in previous research along two important
dimensions. Firstly, the model contains three energy types: a dirty exhaustible resource
(e.g. oil), an even dirtier substitute (coal) and a clean substitute (solar). Secondly, we
assume types to be imperfect substitutes for one another. Previous theoretical studies
often assume perfect substitution, which is unrealistic. We model climate policy as a
carbon tax or a decrease in the cost of the clean substitute. We calculate intertemporal
32BP (2010, p. 6, p. 12)
33Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2010 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2011-2020, p.5
34International Energy Statistics, Energy Information Administration
35IEA (2010b, p. 201)
36Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b) show that rising carbon taxes may not cause a green paradox
when coal, rather than renewables, is the primary alternative for oil.
38
Introduction
carbon leakage as the increase in present emissions over the decrease in future emissions.
By virtue of the abundance of their resource, coal owners do not trade off present and
future extraction. When faced with a demand reduction in the future, they will therefore
not increase supply today. Oil emissions may leak away to the present, but the increase
in current oil supply reduces demand for dirtier coal. Carbon taxes can cause negative
leakage when the substitutability between oil and coal differs between periods. We may
call this a ’strong green orthodox’ (Grafton et al., 2012). Moreover, since carbon taxes
decrease the price of oil relative to coal, a future tax delays rather than accelerates oil
extraction when oil and coal are good substitutes in the future. Reducing the future
cost of solar decreases present emissions when oil and coal are good substitutes or if the
emission intensity of coal is high.
Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we offer a general theoretical framework that can
make more accurate predictions than models that include only one or two energy types
or assume perfect substitutability. The presence of an abundant dirty substitute reduces
intertemporal leakage directly and indirectly, and may even cause negative leakage rates.
By making more specific assumptions, we can obtain similar findings as in other papers
on the green paradox. Secondly, our model is well suited for empirical calibration. For
carbon taxes, intertemporal leakage rates are negative or less than 5%. For reductions in
the future cost of renewables, leakage is between 2-13% for biofuels and 0-2% for solar or
wind electricity. Biofuels are a close substitute for oil, the most emission-intensive scarce
fossil fuel, and hence more prone to intertemporal leakage than renewable electricity,
which primarily competes with coal.
Though we focus on intertemporal leakage, our framework can also be used to analyze
spatial carbon leakage, by relabeling the two time periods as two countries and setting
the interest rate to zero. Calibrating a spatial version of the model, we find leakage
rates ranging from negative to 40%, comparable to estimates from computable general
equilibrium models (Di Maria and van der Werf, 2012). These findings suggest that the
green paradox is a small concern relative to spatial carbon leakage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the model. Sec-
tion 3.3 analyzes intertemporal and spatial leakage when carbon emissions are taxed in
the future. Section 3.4 studies the impact of reductions in the future cost of a clean
substitute. We calibrate the models in section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses implications
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of the model for spatial carbon leakage, and calibrates a spatial version of the model.
Section 3.7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2. Model
Consider a model with three types of energy: an exhaustible resource, a dirty backstop
and a clean backstop. The backstops are inexhaustible, supplied competitively and have
constant marginal costs.37 Though the word ’backstop’ is sometimes used to denote
a perfect substitute for an exhaustible resource, we explicitly allow for imperfect sub-
stitutability. The exhaustible resource is supplied competitively by a group of energy
exporters and costless to extract. For the energy exporters, it is always optimal to fully
exhaust the fossil resource stock S. An energy-importing country derives utility from
consuming energy. Denote the exhaustible resource, the dirty and the clean backstop
with superscripts R, D and C respectively. Demand functions are given by
di(pi, p−i), i ∈ {R,D,C} (3.1)
where pi is the consumer price of resource i. Throughout the paper, we write shorthand
di for (6.8). Partial derivatives of di are indicated by a subscript of the corresponding
type. We make the following assumptions about energy demand
dii < 0, d
i








Energy types are imperfect substitutes for one another: demand for each type is
non-decreasing in the price of other types (3.A1) and own-price effects are larger than
cross-price effects (6.10). Cross-price effects are symmetric (3.A3). Assumption (3.A3)
is not necessary for many of our results; we explicate any invocation of (3.A3) in the
proposition texts. The assumptions hold if the relative budget shares of the three energy




types do not depend on available income.
Consumption of the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop generates a constant
amount of emissions. The dirty backstop is more emission intensive than the exhaustible
resource
e = ζRdR + ζDdD, 0 < ζR < ζD
The model consists of two periods. All variables corresponding to the second period
are denoted by capitals. We allow for emissions in the first period to be more harmful
than emissions in the second period. Total emission damages are
Σ = e+ βE, β ≤ 1 (3.3)
When only cumulative emissions matter, β is equal to one. When society and ecology can
adapt more easily to slow rather than rapid temperature increases (Hoel and Kverndokk,
1996; Gerlagh, 2011), near-term emissions have a higher weight (β < 1). The green
paradox entails a positive relation between the stringency of future climate policy and
emissions (Sinn, 2008b). Following Gerlagh (2011), we differentiate between a weak green
paradox (future climate policy increases present emissions) and a strong green paradox
(emission damages increase).
Definition 3.1. Denote the stringency of second-period climate policy by Θ. The weak








Analogous to the literature on (spatial) carbon leakage, we define the intertemporal
carbon leakage of a future climate policy as the share of period 2 emission reductions
that ’leaks’ away to the first period.
Definition 3.2. The leakage λ of an increase in the stringency of second-period policy
Θ is the increase in period 1 emissions over the decrease in period 2 emissions.
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Both green paradoxes are related to the intertemporal leakage rate λ in a straight-
forward way. As intertemporal leakage is positive if and only if the future climate policy
increases present emissions, the weak green paradox is equivalent to λ > 0. The strong
green paradox occurs if the leakage rate exceeds the emission discount factor (λ > β).
Exhaustible resource owners discount future revenues at rate r. In equilibrium, they
are indifferent between extracting now and in the future. Letting ΠR be the second-









We discuss carbon taxes (section 3.3) and investment in green technologies (section
3.4) in turn.
3.3. Emission taxes
Regulators who want to reduce carbon emissions may not be able to do so immediately.
Swift implementation of climate policies is often impeded by political and technological
considerations. Announcing carbon taxes or caps in advance reduces compliance costs:
it gives firms the opportunity to purchase abatement equipment and adjust their pro-
duction processes, and allows consumers to make informed decisions about durable good
purchases (Di Maria et al., 2008). The European Commission notes that ”a sufficient
carbon price and long-term predictability are necessary”38 in order to meet the 80-95%
EU emission reduction target in 2050.39
Carbon emissions are taxed at a constant rate T in the second period. The tax may
also be interpreted as a willingness to pay to reduce emissions (Hoel, 2010). Exhaustible







A second-period carbon tax only affects first-period variables through the exhaustible
38A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, p.7, European Commission
COM(2011) 112
39Announcements should of course be credible. For discussions on credibility issues in climate policy,
see (Helm et al., 2003; Golombek et al., 2010).
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We discuss the two components of the right-hand side in turn. The carbon tax increases
the period 2 producer price of the exhaustible resource and, by (3.4), the period 1 price if













Holding the producer price constant, the carbon tax directly reduces exhaustible resource
demand in the second period by −ζRDRR. The tax has an even stronger effect on the
future price of the dirty backstop by virtue of its higher emission intensity however.
This induces substitution from the dirty backstop to the exhaustible resource, increasing
future exhaustible resource demand by ζDDRD. The period 1 exhaustible resource price
goes up if the net effect of the tax on period 2 exhaustible resource demand
∂DR
∂T
= ζRDRR + ζ
DDRD (3.7)
is positive, i.e. if the substitutability between the dirty backstop and the exhaustible
resource is high in period 2 and if the emission intensity of the dirty backstop is high. Con-
versely, a period 2 carbon tax decreases exhaustible resource prices if the dirty backstop
and the exhaustible resource are poor substitutes in period 2 and if the dirty backstop
has a low emission-intensity.
The effect of exhaustible resource prices on period 1 emissions is similar. An increase
in the period 1 exhaustible resource price directly reduces emissions by −ζRdRR. Higher
exhaustible resource prices also encourage substitution towards the dirty backstop, in-
creasing emissions by ζDdDR . The net change in emissions
∂e
∂pR
= ζRdRR + ζ
DdDR (3.8)
is positive if the dirty backstop and the exhaustible resource are good substitutes in
the first period and if the emission intensity of the dirty backstop is high. On the
other hand, higher exhaustible resource prices decrease first-period emissions when the
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substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop is low in the
first period and when the dirty backstop is not very emission intensive. Proposition 6.3
gives the condition for positive leakage.
Proposition 3.1 (weak green paradox). Following a carbon tax increase in period 2,









A weak green paradox is less likely if the substitutability between the exhaustible
resource and the dirty backstop is different in the two periods. Table 3.1 summarizes
whether the weak green paradox occurs for different values of dDR and D
R
D and how these
cases relate to previous research.
When the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop are poor substitutes in both
periods (dDR and D
R
D are both low), the future tax reduces exhaustible resource prices
and increases emissions in the first period. This is the classic green paradox result
when exhaustible resource owners anticipate a future carbon tax (Hoel, 2010). When
substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop is low in the first
period but high in the second (dDR is low, while D
R
D is high), the tax increases exhaustible
resource prices and reduces emissions in both periods. Exhaustible resource owners delay
extraction in response to the tax, as the tax puts them at a comparative advantage vis
a vis the dirty backstop in the future. Since the dirty backstop is a poor substitute for
the exhaustible resource in the short term, the decline in period 1 exhaustible resource
supply does not cause a surge in dirty backstop demand. Our model provides a theoretical
framework for the numerical findings of Persson et al. (2007). They show that OPEC
countries may benefit rather than lose from strict climate policies, because the price of
synthetic substitutes for petroleum-based fuels (e.g. diesel from coal) goes up faster than
the price of oil.
When substitutability is high in the first period but low in the second (dDR is high,
but DRD is low), the second-period tax reduces exhaustible resource prices and emissions
go down in both periods. As the substitutability between the exhaustible resource and
the dirty backstop is low in the second period, exhaustible resource prices decrease. This
makes the exhaustible resource an attractive alternative to the dirty backstop in the first
period. Lastly, suppose that exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop are good sub-
stitutes in both periods (dDR and D
R
D are both high). The tax then increases exhaustible
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weak GP? Related articles
low low - - yes Sinn (2008a); Hoel (2010)
low high + - no Persson et al. (2007)
high low - + no
high high + + yes
Smulders and van der Werf (2008)
Di Maria et al. (2008)
resource prices and increases emissions in the first period, as the dirty backstop is used
more intensively early on. This result connects to work of Smulders and van der Werf
(2008) and Di Maria et al. (2008), who analyze how an anticipated cap on the flow of
emissions affects the order of extraction when there is a high- and a low-carbon fuel. The
cap makes the low-carbon fuel more valuable and increases the use of the high-carbon
fuel in the period before the constraint becomes active.
Proposition 6.4 describes the effects of a period 2 tax on period 2 emissions and
emission damages.
Proposition 3.2 (strong green paradox). Following a carbon tax increase in period 2
(i) DD decreases
(ii) under (3.A3), E decreases
(iii) under (3.A3), λ ≤ 1













Ξ = (1− β) ζRdRR + ζD
(





(v) λ decreases in |DDD |
A higher own-price effect of the dirty backstop causes the tax to more sharply reduce
period 2 dirty backstop use, and therefore reduces leakage. The effect of the own- and
cross-price effects of the exhaustible resource on the intertemporal leakage rate cannot
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be signed because the effect of the tax on exhaustible resource extraction is ambiguous.40
Although the tax increases future demand for the clean backstop, clean backstop prices,
quantities and elasticities do not appear in the conditions for λ > 0 and λ > β. The
clean backstop does not generate emissions, so dC does not enter into either e or Σ.





not contain any derivatives with respect to pC . The impact of the clean backstop on
intertemporal leakage is implicit in the demand functions for the exhaustible resource
and the dirty backstop.
Interpreting (3.10) is not straightforward, but we can calibrate λ as estimates of




i/pj, where ηij is the elasticity of demand for type i with respect to the price of
type j. We estimate the magnitude of intertemporal carbon leakage in section 3.5.
3.4. A cheaper clean backstop
In addition to implementing a carbon tax, climate-conscious policymakers may opt to
reduce emissions by stimulating the development of clean alternatives to fossil fuels. To
model such a policy, we analyze the effect of a reduction in the period 2 price of the clean
backstop PC on emissions. The development of alternative energy sources requires re-
sources to be committed well before the new technologies can be put to use, so exhaustible
resource owners anticipate the lower period 2 clean backstop prices when deciding on the
intertemporal extraction pattern. A lower PC reduces exhaustible resource demand in
period 2, and thus decreases the right hand side of (3.4). For exhaustible resource owners
to remain indifferent between extracting in either period, period 1 extraction dR must
go up. This is the classic green paradox result (Strand, 2007; Hoel, 2011). The improved
technology also reduces emissions from the dirty backstop however. In the next Propo-
sitions, we show how the occurrence of the weak and the strong green paradox depend
on the emission intensities and the substitutability between energy types.
Proposition 3.3 (weak green paradox). Assume DRC > 0. When the clean backstop
40Albeit through a different mechanism (intertemporal substitution in consumption rather than sub-
stitution between energy types), (Eichner and Pethig, 2011) also find that a future emission constraint
need not cause a green paradox.
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becomes cheaper in period 2, λ R 0 iff
ζRdRR + ζ
DdDR ⋚ 0 (3.11)
As opposed to the case of a future carbon tax, exhaustible resource owners always
bring forward extraction when clean alternatives become cheaper in the future. The
lower exhaustible resource prices also causes a drop in period 1 demand for the dirty
backstop. The occurrence of the weak green paradox hinges on whether the increase in
exhaustible resource-related emissions outweighs the decrease in dirty backstop-related
emissions (3.11). This is more likely if the relative emission intensity of the exhaustible
resource is high and if the substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the
dirty backstop is low. All first-period effects are proportional to the change in the period
1 exhaustible resource price dp
R
dPC
. Because period 2 parameters only affect period 1
emissions through this term, the condition for the weak green paradox consists solely of
period 1 parameters.
Proposition 3.4 (strong green paradox). When the clean backstop becomes cheaper in
period 2,
(i) λ ≤ 1
(ii) λ > β iff
DRC
−dRR − (1 + r)DRR
[
(1− β) ζRdRR + ζD
(




+ βζDDDC < 0 (3.12)
(iii) λ increases in DRC and |dRR|





As substitute types become cheaper in both periods, demand for the dirty backstop
goes down in both periods. The strong green paradox arises if the damage from bringing
forward exhaustible resource emissions (1− β) ζRdRR exceeds the benefits of reduced dirty
backstop consumption in both periods. This is more likely when DRC is high, as a decrease
in PC then poses a larger threat to exhaustible resource demand in period 2. An increase
in |dRR| increases leakage by making it more attractive to shift exhaustible resource supply
to period 1 (the reverse applies to |DRR|). Lastly, λ decreases in dDR , DDR and DDC , as high
values of these parameters induce more substitution away from the dirty backstop.
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By making stronger assumptions on the substitutability structure, we can obtain more
powerful results about the occurrence of the green paradox and compare our findings with
previous research. We analyze three special cases in which two of the energy types are
perfect substitutes. When we calibrate Proposition 6.2 in section 3.5, we look at three
scenarios that relate to these special cases.
3.4.1. Perfect substitutability between R and C
We are interested in this case as a reference point: the assumption that clean backstops
are perfect substitutes for the exhaustible resource is common in green paradox models. It
leads to the most powerful green paradox results in the literature. When the exhaustible
resource and the green backstop are imperfect substitutes, exhaustible resource owners
are ensured of future demand for their commodity and the green paradox may vanish
(Gerlagh, 2011).
Corollary 3.1. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the clean
backstop
(i) if PC > PR, a decrease in PC has no effect
(ii) if PC = PR, then λ > β if
(1− β) ζRdRR + ζD
(





When PC is sufficiently low, it fully determines exhaustible resource prices in both
periods and the last term in (3.12) vanishes. In accordance with the literature, the con-
dition for the strong green paradox is weaker than in the general case. Corollary 3.1
shows that if we take into consideration the availability of dirty backstops, the substi-
tutability structure that is most conducive to the green paradox no longer suffices for
its occurrence. Even when the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop are perfect
substitutes, both near-term emissions and emission damages may go down as a result of
lower clean backstop prices.
3.4.2. Perfect substitutability between D and C
Corollary 3.2. With perfect substitution between the clean and the dirty backstop
(i) if PC > PD, a decrease in PC has no effect
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(ii) if PC = PD, the strong green paradox does not occur
(iii) if pC > pD, PC < PD, then λ > β iff
(1− β) ζRdRR + ζDdDR < 0 (3.14)
(iv) if pC < pD and PC < PD, then λ = 1
When the clean backstop is more expensive than the dirty backstop in both periods,
the former is used in neither period and a small cost reduction has no effect. In the
knife-edge case when the period 2 prices of the clean and the dirty backstop are equal, a
reduction in the price of the clean backstop eliminates all demand for the dirty backstop,
so there is no strong green paradox. When the clean backstop is already cheaper than the
dirty backstop in the second period, further cost reductions only reduce dirty backstop
use in period 1, at the cost of accelerated exhaustible-resource extraction. A green
paradox then becomes more likely. When the clean backstop is cheaper than the dirty
backstop in both periods, the latter is never used. The model reduces to a classic green
paradox model and both the weak and the strong green paradox occur.
The analysis in Corollary 3.2 is complementary to Fischer and Salant (2010) and
van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b). Fischer and Salant (2010) analyze the effect of
cheaper backstops in the presence of high- and low-cost oil. They find that moderate cost
reductions for the backstop will cause some high-cost oil to remain unexploited and thus
improve the environment. Beyond the point at which all high-cost oil remains in situ,
further investments bring forward extraction of the low-cost oil and cause a ’renewed’
green paradox. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b) assume perfect substitutability
between a clean and a dirty backstop and note that subsidizing renewables to the cost
of the dirty backstop always reduces climate damages.
3.4.3. Perfect substitutability between R and D
Corollary 3.3. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the dirty
backstop
(i) if pR < pD and PR < PD, λ = 1
(ii) if pR < pD and PR = PD, λ = 0
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Table 3.2: Occurrence of the strong green paradox for cost reductions for the clean backstop
Substitutability between Likelihood of strong GP Related articles
R, C + Strand (2007); Hoel (2011); Gerlagh (2011)
D, C -
van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a)
Fischer and Salant (2010)
R, D -
If the economy is in regime (ii), cost reductions benefit the environment by reducing
the use of the dirty backstop in period 2, without affecting exhaustible resource extrac-
tion. When the clean backstop is sufficiently cheap, demand for the dirty backstop in
period 2 goes to zero. The economy then moves into regime (i), in which additional
investment only brings forward the extraction of the exhaustible resource and the green
paradox returns.
Table 3.2 consolidates the discussion from the subsections.
3.5. Empirical calibration and special cases
In this section, we explore the magnitude of intertemporal carbon leakage by calibrating
Propositions 6.4 and 6.2. When calibrating Proposition 6.2, we vary the substitutabil-
ity between energy types and illustrate how the leakage rates change under different
assumptions.
At the economy-wide level, conventional oil and coal are currently the biggest con-
tributors to the climate change problem. We therefore approximate the effect of a future
carbon tax on the time path of aggregate emissions by looking at its effect on oil and
coal use. The substitution possibilities between oil and coal are not equally relevant in
all sectors however. In electricity generation, coal primarily competes with conventional
natural gas, the other scarce fossil fuel. We take a more detailed look at the electricity
sector and calibrate the effect of a future tax on natural gas and coal emissions from
electricity generation.
We observe current energy demand and prices, and the IEA forecasts future demand
and prices. The upper panel of Table 3.3 presents an overview of these statistics. We
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Table 3.3: Current and future energy demand and prices
2009 2035
Aggregate oil demand 29165 36765
Aggregate coal demand 24096 38631
Oil price 60.4 135
Coal price 20.84 20.84
Natural gas demand for electricity generation 7337 12640
Coal demand for electricity generation 15683 26612
Natural gas price 40.14 78.12
Coal price 20.84 20.84
Quantities in mln boe, prices in 2009$ per boe. Emission intensities in
t/boe: 0.3644 for oil; 0.5169 for coal; 0.3101 for natural gas. Values for 2035
are from the ’Current Policies’ scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2010.
A full list of definitions and sources is provided in Table 3.8.
use empirical estimates of interfuel own- and cross-price elasticities from previous work,
though the values differ substantially across studies and may not adequately reflect long-
term substitution possibilies (Stern, 2012).
In the first calibration exercise, we take oil as the exhaustible resource and coal as
the dirty backstop. From the upper panel of Table 3.3, oil and coal demand are both
expected to increase in 2035, though the relative increase is larger for coal. The oil
price more than doubles during the next 26 years; we assume the coal price to remain
constant. The literature on interfuel substitution typically distinguishes between coal
and electricity as energy inputs. Since most coal is used for electricity generation, we
take the elasticities for electricity as those for the dirty backstop.41 We assume the
elasticities to be equal across time periods.
We calculate the intertemporal leakage of a small global carbon tax in 2035. The
first four columns in Table 3.4 contain the estimated economy-wide own- and cross-price
elasticities for oil and electricity from five studies. Using the parameters from Table 3.3,
for each set of estimates we determine the change in oil extraction and emissions and the
intertemporal carbon leakage λ as a result of a small tax increase.
41We multiply the elasticity of oil demand with respect to electricity prices by the global share of
coal-based electricity generation in total electricity generation, which was 0.47 in 2009 (IEA, 2011, p.
544).
51
Chapter 3: Brown backstops
















Perkins (1994) -0.25 0.07 0.11 -0.07 -18.93 -3.49 -15.56 -0.22
Cho et al. (2004) -0.97 -0.01 -0.10 -0.79 48.67 19.93 -412.60 0.05
Ma et al. (2008) -0.27 0.01 0.07 -0.68 9.07 2.27 -337.95 0.01
Serletis et al. (2009)a -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.63 -0.14 -30.88 -0.00








are given by (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32), respectively. λ is defined in
Definition 3.2. a Median estimates over all countries included in the study.
The intertemporal leakage rate is negative for three elasticity estimates, and the rates
are small in absolute value. Except for Perkins’ estimates, the effects of the future tax
on second-period coal use through the own-price effect outweigh the substitution effects
and the changes in the intertemporal pattern of oil extraction. For two sets of estimates
in which ηRD is high compared to |ηRR|, the tax benefits oil exporters and increases second-
period oil extraction, as in Persson et al. (2007): the tax-induced increase in future oil
demand through substitution from coal to oil is larger than the decrease through higher
own prices. The intertemporal leakage rate is negative for these two estimates: since oil
is relatively cheap in the first period, the own-price effect of oil ηRRd
R/pR is strong in the
first period. When the oil price increases in the first period, the reduction in oil-related
emissions exceeds the increase in coal-related emissions. Overall, the sum of period 1 and
2 emission reductions is almost linear in ηDD , suggesting that the most important effect
of carbon taxes is the direct reduction in coal use. The estimated emission reductions
may be biased downwards, since we conservatively assumed that oil reserves are fully
exhausted.
In the second calibration exercise, we look at the effects of a small future carbon
tax on emissions in electricity generation, taking natural gas as the exhaustible resource.
The lower panel of Table 3.3 shows current and future natural gas and coal demand for
electricity generation. Demand for both energy types increases by 70% in 2035, though
the relative price of natural gas goes up significantly.
Table 3.5 contains the leakage estimates using own- and cross-price elasticities for
natural gas and coal in electricity generation. Natural gas demand is more elastic than
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Söderholm (2000)a -0.82 0.03 0.04 -0.20 11.66 2.99 -70.75 0.04
Söderholm (2001)a -0.38 0.03 0.09 -0.13 3.46 0.21 -42.26 0.00
Ko and Dahl (2001) -1.46 1.54 0.28 -0.57 -150.45 -14.77 -78.47 -0.19








are given by (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32), respectively. λ is defined in
Definition 3.2. a Median estimates over all countries included in the study.
coal demand, as gas-fired power plants have higher marginal and lower fixed costs. Be-
cause natural gas is much cleaner than coal, a future tax increases future natural gas
demand and delays natural gas extraction for two sets of elasticity estimates. When
the cross-elasticities are small, as in Söderholm (2000) and Söderholm (2001), the tax
accelerates natural gas extraction but the intertemporal leakage rate is low, as the direct
decrease in second-period coal use dominates the effects on first-period emissions. The
leakage rates have opposite signs in the bottom two rows depending on the |ηRR|/ηDR ratio.
For high values of this ratio (Ko and Dahl, 2001), higher first-period natural gas prices
decrease first-period natural gas emissions by more than they increase emissions from
coal. For low values of |ηRR|/ηDR (Serletis et al., 2010), the converse applies and total
first-period emissions increase.
Our calibration fixes the sum of current and future natural gas use for electricity
generation. In reality, the change in cumulative natural gas use in electricity generation
depends on the tax’ effect on energy use in other sectors. Natural gas competes with oil,
more than with coal, for heating and in industry (Stern, 2012). As oil is cleaner than coal,
natural gas’ comparative advantage vis-a-vis other fossil fuels as a result of a carbon tax
is largest in electricity generation. By this reasoning, we may expect cumulative natural
gas use in the electricity sector to increase. The resulting effect on emissions in the
electricity sector depends on the elasticity of coal demand with respect to natural gas
prices. A further caveat is that the difficulty to measure long-run substitution possibilities
is especially relevant for electricity generation, as power plants have very long service
lives. If we believe that the true own- and cross price elasticities are larger across the
board, a future carbon tax will cause a larger reduction in cumulative emissions, but the
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leakage rate (which is a ratio of current and future emission reductions) may not be as
responsive.
Finally, we calibrate Proposition 6.2. Energy types differ in their suitability for two
main purposes: electricity generation and transport. Natural gas (R), coal (D) and wind
and solar energy (C) more readily lend themselves for electricity generation, whereas oil
(R), tar sands (D) and biofuels (C) are primarily used in the transportation sector.
Energy types that are employed in the same submarket are closer substitutes than ones
that are not. We look at three scenarios with different substitutability structures. The
calibrations highlight the sensitivity of the intertemporal leakage rate to interfuel substi-
tution possibilities, and illustrate how technology improvements for wind or solar energy
and biofuels are likely to impact emissions from conventional oil, coal and unconventional
oil - the three fossil fuels that present the biggest threat to the global climate.
The studies on interfuel substitution in the previous calibrations do not include re-
newable energy, so we follow the CGE literature on carbon leakage and assume a nested
CES demand structure with two nests: electricity E and non-electricity N . We set the
elasticity of substitution between nests at 1.5 and within nests at 5. In each scenario, we
consider a relevant combination of energy types and group them by primary use. Ap-
pendix 3.A.2 contains a full description of the demand structure and parameter values
per scenario.
3.5.1. Developing alternative fuels
In the first scenario, we study the effect of anticipated cost reductions for biofuels on
emissions from oil (R) and coal (D). First-generation biofuels such as ethanol from
sugarcane already compete with petroleum-based fuels, which currently dominate the
transportation market. Second-generation fuels from biomass have the potential to be
cheaper in the long run and exert less pressure on land and water supplies, but still
face significant barriers to large-scale commercialization (Sims et al., 2010). By Proposi-
tion 6.2 and Corollary 3.1, the high substitutability between the clean backstop and the
exhaustible resource and the low substitutability between the exhaustible resource and
the dirty backstop are both associated with high leakage rates. This scenario is therefore
likely to produce lavish estimates of the leakage rate.
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of reductions in the period 2 biofuel price on the first-period
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Figure 3.1: Effects of future cost reductions for biofuels (parametrization in Ap-
pendix 3.A.2).
oil price (top left), the marginal intertemporal leakage rate (bottom left), first-period oil
and coal demand (top right) and second-period biofuel and coal demand (bottom right).
The oil stock is normalized to one, so the top-right panel also indicates the fraction of the
oil stock that is used in the first period. To facilitate comparisons of the change in first-
and second-period coal demand, the right axes of the rightmost figures have the same
scale. The horizontal axes indicate the relative second-period biofuel cost reduction as a
fraction of the original second-period price, which is equal to the first-period price.
The share of the oil stock that is extracted in the first period increases almost linearly
in the period 2 cost reduction for biofuels. For large cost reductions, the oil stock is
exhausted almost completely in the first period. The associated drop in first-period oil
prices is not large enough to substantially affect first-period coal consumption. When
the cost reduction for biofuels is small, the marginal decrease in second-period coal use
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is also low, and the leakage rate reaches 13%. For larger cost reductions, it becomes
comparatively more attractive to substitute biofuels for coal for non-transport purposes,
as evidenced by the concave shape of the dashed curve in the bottom-right panel. The
leakage rate drops to below 2% when the second-period cost reduction equals 80% of the
initial price.
Of the renewable energy types, biofuels are the closest substitute to oil - the most
emission intensive scarce fossil fuel. Investments in biofuel technologies are therefore
more likely to lead to a green paradox than investments in wind or solar power. Still,
the above calibration illustrates that biofuels’ potential to reduce emissions from coal
can reduce intertemporal leakage rates to levels significantly below the 100% that would
obtain in models with one fossil fuel that is always fully exhausted. In a more com-
prehensive model that also includes unconventional oil, the leakage rate would be even
lower, because unconventional oil is more abundant and more emission-intensive than
conventional oil and a closer substitute for biofuels than coal is. On the other hand, we
abstract from emissions from land use changes, which may lead to a downard bias in the
leakage rate.
3.5.2. Renewable energy for electricity
In the second scenario, we consider oil (R) in the non-electricity nest and coal (D)
and solar energy (C) in the electricity nest. The opportunities to employ renewable
energy are highest in the electricity sector. Coal and renewable energy sources are main
inputs for electricity generation, with worldwide market shares of 42% and 19% in 2008
respectively (IEA, 2010b). Investing in hydro-, wind- and solar power may reduce coal
use without causing as strong an increase in short-term oil extraction.
Figure 3.2 depicts the effects of future cost reductions for solar energy. The oil price
is unresponsive for small cost reductions, owing to the limited substitutability between
oil and electricity. Only when solar energy becomes very cheap, it emerges as a credible
substitute for oil and the oil price reacts more strongly. The pattern of intertemporal
carbon leakage is similar. When the cost reduction is not too large, it mainly induces
substitution from coal- to solar-based electricity in the second period. The decrease in
second-period coal use dwarfs the change in oil extraction, giving rise to intertemporal
leakage rates under 1%. The leakage rate goes up only when solar energy becomes very
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Figure 3.2: Effects of future cost reductions for solar-based electricity (parametrization
in Appendix 3.A.2).
cheap in the future: coal is then hardly used anymore, and subsequent cost reductions
increasingly serve to bring forward oil extraction. Extending the analysis to include
natural gas may increase the leakage rate, though not by much as it is relatively emission
extensive compared to coal.
This calibration complements the intuition behind Corollary 3.2, in which the clean
and dirty backstop are perfect substitutes. From an environmental point of view, in-
vestment in renewable energy sources is primarily attractive insofar as it reduces the
use of dirty backstops. When this goal has been achieved, intertemporal carbon leakage
becomes a stronger concern. Compared to the first scenario, the high substitutability
between the clean and the dirty backstop is favourable in terms of the leakage rate. The
estimates from the second scenario suggest that improvements in renewable electricity
technologies are especially suitable for reducing cumulative emissions, without bringing
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Figure 3.3: Effects of future cost reductions for solar-based electricity (parametrization
in Appendix 3.A.2).
forward emissions from scarce fossil fuels.
3.5.3. Conventional and unconventional oil
In the last scenario, we illustrate how cost reductions for solar-based electricity (C) affect
emissions from conventional (R) and unconventional (D) oil in the non-electricity nest.
Cost reductions for solar energy do not cause a big decrease in total second-period
fossil fuel use, but the decrease is larger for unconventional oil: the slope of the dashed
line in the bottom-right panel is larger than that of the solid line in the top-right panel.
This is not surprising as unconventional oil is the dominant fuel in the second period, as
stipulated by the Herfindahl rule. First-period emissions increase as first-period uncon-
ventional oil use is almost unaffected, but the leakage rates do not exceed 6-8%. These
estimates accord with the prediction from Corollary 3.3 that reductions in future clean
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backstop prices primarily go at the expense of dirty backstop demand if the exhaustible
resource and the dirty backstop are good substitutes.
3.6. Spatial carbon leakage
Climate policies may also have unintended side-effects in a spatial setting. When a group
of countries reduces emissions unilaterally, pollution might move to other countries. This
spatial carbon leakage occurs through two main channels (Felder and Rutherford, 1993).
Firstly, dirty industries relocate to countries with laxer regulation. Secondly, a stringent
environmental policy in environmentally conscious countries causes the world market
price of fossil fuels to fall, increasing their use in lax countries. Estimated leakage rates
range from a modest 2-5% to over 100%, the latter implying that unilateral carbon re-
duction policies increase global emissions (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012; Paltsev,
2001; Babiker, 2005).42
Our model can be used to analyze spatial rather than intertemporal carbon leak-
age by relabeling ’period 2’ as a climate-conscious country, ’period 1’ as a non-abating
country and setting the interest rate to zero. The model does not explicitly incorporate
industry relocation effects, but shows how unilateral carbon taxes affect world market
fossil fuel prices and thereby emissions in non-abating countries. Paltsev (2001); Fischer
and Fox (2009); Kuik and Hofkes (2010) argue that changes in energy prices are the most
important determinant of carbon leakage.
Proposition 6.4 shows that spatial carbon leakage rates are below 100%. Reductions
in dirty backstop use in abating countries are not offset by emission increases in non-
abating countries. If unilateral climate policies decrease exhaustible resource prices, as
policy makers sometimes fear, non-abating countries substitute away from dirty back-
stops, mitigating spatial carbon leakage. Leakage may even be negative if interfuel
substitution possibilities differ between countries (as in Table 3.1). The assumption
that total exhaustible-resource supply is fixed is less plausible than in the intertemporal
model, but leads to conservative leakage estimates.
We calibrate a spatial version of the model to illustrate the magnitude of spatial
42Studies on international environmental agreements find a related effect. Because environmental
standards are strategic substitutes, non-signatories will increase emissions (Barrett, 1994; Hoel, 1994).
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Table 3.6: Aggregate demand and prices
for spatial model
ROW EU
Aggregate oil demand 24959 4206
Aggregate coal demand 22143 1953
Oil price 60.40 68.00
Coal price 20.84 31.62
Quantities in mln boe, prices in 2009$ per boe.
Emission intensities in t/boe: 0.3644 for oil;
0.5169 for coal. A full list of definitions and
sources is provided in Table 3.8.
















Perkins (1994) -0.25 0.07 0.11 -0.07 0.52 0.09 -0.74 0.12
Cho et al. (2004) -0.97 -0.01 -0.10 -0.79 19.98 8.25 -20.85 0.40
Ma et al. (2008) -0.27 0.01 0.07 -0.68 4.87 1.18 -12.66 0.09
Serletis et al. (2009)a -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.57 -0.15 -1.06 -0.14








are given by (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32), respectively. λ is defined in
Definition 3.2. a Median estimates over all countries included in the study.
leakage relative to intertemporal leakage. We disregard the time dimension and evaluate
the leakage to the rest of the world (ROW) if the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
carbon price increases above its 2009 level of e 15 per tonne. We restrict ourselves to
the effects on aggregate oil and coal demand; we present a calibration for the electricity
sector in the Appendix. Table 3.6 describes demand and prices in EU and ROW. The
EU accounts for 14% of global oil demand and 8% of global coal demand. The EU ETS
price adds about 50% to the price of coal.
Table 3.7 shows the effects of a carbon tax increase in the EU. The spatial leakage
rates are mostly positive, unlike most intertemporal rates in Table 3.4. The EU consumes
more oil compared to coal than the world at large, so the tax-induced reduction in EU
oil demand is larger than the increase through substitution from coal to oil. A carbon
60
Spatial carbon leakage
tax increase in the EU therefore decreases world oil prices. Energy demand in ROW is
similar to global energy demand. Like in the intertemporal calibration, a decrease in oil
prices triggers an increase in emissions in ROW for four out of five estimates.
The spatial leakage rates tend to be larger than the intertemporal rates in absolute
value, due to two reasons. Firstly, a tax increase has a modest effect on coal consumption
in the EU, as coal demand in the EU is already low to begin with. This means that
the denominator of the leakage rate - the total emission reduction in the EU - is low.
Secondly, the future tax in the previous calibration is subject to a discount rate, whereas
the unilateral tax is not. This exacerbates the reaction of oil suppliers in the three
middle rows in Table 3.7, also increasing the absolute value of the leakage rate. For the
estimates from Serletis et al. (2010), the direct and indirect effects of the EU tax on oil
demand in the EU net out. Oil prices and hence ROW emissions remain unchanged, so
the leakage rate is zero.
Our spatial leakage rates are similar to estimates from the computable general equi-
librium literature on carbon leakage, albeit in the lower part of the spectrum (Di Maria
and van der Werf, 2012). Comparing the intertemporal and spatial leakage rates, in-
tertemporal leakage seems to be a small concern relative to spatial leakage.
Appendix 3.A.3 presents an extended model with two periods and two countries, in
which one country implements a unilateral carbon tax in the second period. A future
unilateral tax reduces second-period emissions in the adopting country. Future emissions
in the non-abating country may increase or decrease, but any increase in emissions is
lower than the reduction in the abating country. The effect of the future unilateral tax on
first-period emissions is governed by a modified version of (3.9) which includes the first-
period demand response in the non-abating country. The unweighted sum of current and
future emissions in both countries always decreases as a result of a future unilateral tax.
Emission damages can therefore only go up when total first-period emissions increase
and the emission discount factor is sufficiently low.
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3.7. Conclusion
We employ a general model to analyze intertemporal carbon leakage in the presence
of an abundant dirty backstop such as coal or unconventional oil. The green paradox
literature overstates the adverse consequences of imperfect climate policies by not taking
into account their potential to reduce emissions from coal and unconventional oil. It
is important to consider these fuels as they already account for 50% of energy-related
emissions, and will become even more important in the future.
A carbon tax increases the price of oil, but the price of coal goes up even more. The
effect of an anticipated carbon tax on future oil demand depends on the relative strength
of a direct own-price and an indirect substitution effect. When improved technology
(e.g. diesel from coal) makes coal a better substitute for oil in the future than it is
today, intertemporal leakage may become negative. Anticipated carbon taxes cause
significant substitution from coal to oil in the future and thereby induce oil owners to
delay extraction. The reduction in present oil supply does not trigger a large increase
in coal demand, as coal is a poor substitute for oil today. Future availability of cheap
renewables lowers coal emissions directly (through substitution from coal to renewables)
and indirectly (cost reductions for renewables decrease oil prices, reducing coal demand).
Calibrations of the model suggest that the effects of anticipated climate policies on
present emissions are small compared to future emission reductions. Interestingly, some
of the intertemporal leakage estimates are negative, implying that a future carbon tax
reduces present emissions. Investments in renewable electricity technologies lead to very
small leakage rates, because they are a good substitute for coal but have only a small
impact on oil extraction.
The aim of climate policy is to decrease cumulative extraction, i.e. ensuring that
some fossil fuels remain in the ground. The ’marginal resources’ are not conventional
oil and natural gas, which are so cheap to exploit that carbon taxes will only affect the
distribution of rents and the timing of extraction. Climate policy should rather aim at
reducing emissions from costly, emission-intensive and abundant resources such as coal
and unconventional oil. The results from this paper imply that these efforts may be





Proof of Proposition 6.3






The result follows by substituting (3.7) and (3.8).
Proof of Proposition 6.4
We first show that the tax increases the consumer price of the exhaustible resource by







Proof. Assume not. Then, because own-price effects are stronger than cross-price ef-
fects (6.10), exhaustible resource demand in period 2 decreases. The tax increases the
period 2 producer price PR−TζR as dPD
dT
= ζD and ζR < ζD. By the Hotelling condition
(3.4), pR increases and demand for the exhaustible resource goes down in period 1. This
violates the requirement that the stock is fully exhausted. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.1 and (6.10) entail dD
D
dT
< 0, establishing (i). Totally differentiate with













Z = 0 (3.16)













Chapter 3: Brown backstops



















ζRdRR − (1 + r) ζDDRD
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The fraction outside the square brackets is negative. The first term inside the square



























The first inequality follows from (6.10); the last equality from (3.A3). Therefore, dE
dT
< 0,
completing the proof of (ii). To prove (iii), we show that the sum of period 1 and 2 dirty
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The second equality in (3.21) follows by substituting (3.17); the fourth by substituting
(3.18). The fraction in (3.21) is smaller than one by (6.10). The second inequality holds
by (6.10) and (3.A3). When I < 0,
d[dD+DD]
dT
is negative by (6.10), completing the proof
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The second equality in (3.22) follows from (3.17); the fourth by substituting (3.18).
Proof of Proposition 6.1
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The weak green paradox occurs when de
dPC





< 0 iff ζRdRR+ζ
DdDR < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.2
We established that dp
R
dPC
> 0, so by (3.4), exhaustible resource prices in both periods
are increasing in PC . Then dD, DD, e + E and E are increasing in PC . It follows that




≤ 1, proving (i). The change in emission damages is
dΣ
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D (−DDR (1 + r)DRC +DDC (dRR + (1 + r)DRR))
(3.28)





and (3.26). By taking derivatives of
(3.28), we obtain (iii) and (iv).
Proof of Corollary 3.1
We omit the proof of (i). For (ii), note that the price of the clean backstop fully deter-









− (1 + r)D
R
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The DDC term in (3.27) is superfluous because of (3.29) and since dirty backstop users are
indifferent between substituting to the exhaustible resource and to the clean backstop.
dΣ
dPC
then has the same sign as the term in square brackets in (3.27).
Proof of Corollary 3.2
We omit the proof of (i). For (ii), DD is infinitely elastic with respect to PC at PC = PD.
From (3.28), we see that limDD
C




D = 0 when P
C < PD. It
then follows that dΣ
dPC
has the same sign as (1− β) ζRdRR + ζDdDR . For (iv), dDR = DDC =
DRD = 0 when p
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Proof of Corollary 3.3
The proof of (i) is analogous to the proof of (iv) in Corollary 3.2. For (ii), we see in
(3.28) that lim(DRR ,DDR )→(−∞,+∞)
λ = 0.
3.A.2. Calibrations







are given by dRR
dpR
dT
, (3.15) and (3.20)
respectively.43 Substituting elasticities for the partial derivatives of the demand function

























































Table 3.8 lists the definitions and sources of the variables used for the calibrations in
Tables 3.4 and 3.7. In the calibrations for spatial leakage, PR and PD are inclusive of a
e 15 per tonne carbon tax.
Table 3.9 contains information on natural gas and coal use for electricity generation
in the EU and in the rest of the world (ROW). The EU relies more on natural gas for
its electricity generation vis-a-vis ROW. Because natural gas is only 60% as emission
intensive as coal, the relative price difference for the two resources is much smaller in the
EU.
Table 3.10 presents the spatial leakage calibration for the electricity sector. As in
the intertemporal calibration in Table 3.5, a unilateral tax increase raises natural gas
demand for electricity generation in the EU for the two bottom elasticity estimates.
Because the EU consumes more natural gas and less coal relative to the world at large,
the direct own-price effect of the tax on natural gas consumption is stronger than in the
intertemporal calibration, and the substitution effect from coal to gas is weaker. For
Ko and Dahl (2001) and Serletis et al. (2010), the reaction of natural gas suppliers is
therefore weaker than in the intertemporal calibration, bringing the leakage rates closer








Table 3.8: Data definitions and sources for emission tax calibrations
Variable Definition Source
Table 3.4
dR, dD Total primary oil and coal demand in 2009, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 544)
DR, DD Total primary oil and coal demand in 2035, mln boe IEA (2010b, p. 619)
pR IEA crude oil import price in 2009, $ per barrel IEA (2010b, p. 71)
PR IEA crude oil import price in 2035, $ per barrel IEA (2010b, p. 71)
pD, PD Average EU steam coal import costs in 2009, $ per boea IEA (2010a, p. III.44)
Table 3.5
dR, dD Natural gas and coal demand for power generation in 2009, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 544)
DR, DD Natural gas and coal demand for power generation in 2035, mln boe IEA (2010b, p. 619)
pR European natural gas import import price in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010b, p. 71)
PR European natural gas import import price in 2035, $ per boe IEA (2010b, p. 71)
pD, PD Average EU steam coal import costs in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010a, p. III.44)
Table 3.7
dR, dD EU total primary oil and coal demand in 2009, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 564)
DR, DD ROW total primary oil and coal demand in 2009, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 544, p. 564)
pR IEA crude oil import price in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010b, p. 71)
pD Average EU steam coal import costs in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010a, p. III.44)
P i pi + e 15bζ i, i ∈ {R,D}
Table 3.10
dR, dD EU natural gas and coal demand for power generation in 2009, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 544)
DR, DD ROW natural gas and coal demand for power generation in 2035, mln boe IEA (2011, p. 544, p. 564)
pR European natural gas import import price in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010b, p. 71)
pD Average EU steam coal import costs in 2009, $ per boe IEA (2010a, p. III.44)
P i pi + e 15aζ i, i ∈ {R,D}
ζ i
Total CO2 emissions from type i in 2009, t
Total primary energy demand for type i in 2009, boe
IEA (2011, p. 544, p. 546)
All energy demand is converted from Mtoe in source data; 1 toe = 7.315 boe. Energy prices are converted from $ per MBtu or $ per
tce in source data; 1 MBtu = 0.1843 boe; 1 tce = 4.787 boe. All 2035 values are from the ’Current Policies’ scenario in IEA (2010b).
a Exchange rate: $1 = e 0.719
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Table 3.9: Demand for electricity generation and prices for spa-
tial model
ROW EU
Natural gas demand for electricity generation 6320 1017
Coal demand for electricity generation 14147 1536
Natural gas price 40.14 46.63
Coal price 20.84 31.62
Quantities in mln boe, prices in 2009$ per boe. Emission intensities in
t/boe: 0.3101 for natural gas; 0.5169 for coal. A full list of definitions and
sources is provided in Table 3.8.
















Söderholm (2000)a -0.82 0.01 0.04 -0.20 4.67 1.18 -3.86 0.31
Söderholm (2001)a -0.38 0.01 0.09 -0.13 2.02 0.10 -1.92 0.05
Ko and Dahl (2001) -1.46 0.72 0.28 -0.57 -1.87 -0.16 -5.30 -0.03








are given by (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32), respectively. λ is
defined in Definition 3.2. a Median estimates over all countries included in the study.
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to zero. The spatial leakage rate for the Söderholm (2000) estimates is higher than the
intertemporal rate in Table 3.5 because the tax’ direct effect on coal consumption in the
EU is low, owing to the low initial level of coal consumption in the EU.
For the calibrations in sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we employ the following model.
Let X denote composite energy and indicate nests by k ∈ {N,E}. The elasticity of
substitution between and within nests is σX and σk, respectively. The value share of
nest k in composite energy demand is αXk ; the share of type i in nest k is α
k
i . Denote























































i = 1. Demand in the second period is described by
a similar system. Exhaustible resource prices pR and PR are endogenously determined
by (3.4) and dR + DR = S. The parameter values are listed in Table 6.1. As (3.34) is
homogeneous of degree zero in S, y and Y , we normalize S to one. Income is chosen such
that Y = (1 + r) y and pR = 60.4 when PC = pC in the second scenario. The interest rate
equals 2% per annum compounded over 26 years. The coal price and emission intensities
for coal and conventional oil are equal to those in Table 3.8. Unconventional oil is 20%
more emission-intensive than conventional oil. We set the unconventional oil price and
the initial biofuel price to 80.
3.A.3. Spatial and intertemporal leakage
In this section, we extend the model to include both a spatial and an intertemporal
dimension, to analyze the effect on emissions when one region implements a unilateral
carbon tax T2 in the second period. We denote variables corresponding to the adopting
country with capitals, and indicate time by subscripts. Then DRD,1 is the derivative of
exhaustible resource demand with respect to the dirty backstop price in the adopting
country in the first period. Exhaustible resource owners must now be indifferent between
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Table 3.11: Parametrization of calibrations in sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3
Variable Interpretation
ζR Emission intensity of exhaustible resource 0.3644
r Interest rate 0.6734
S Exhaustible resource stock 1
y First-period income 84.03
Y Second-period income 140.59
σX Elasticity of substitution between nests 1.5
Section
3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3
σN Elasticity of substitution within non-electricity nest 5 5
σE Elasticity of substitution within electricity nest 5
αXN Value share of non-electricity in aggregate energy 0.5 0.5 0.2
αNR Value share of exhaustible resource in non-electricity nest 0.5 1 0.5
αND Value share of dirty backstop in non-electricity nest 0 0 0.5
αNC Value share of clean backstop in non-electricity nest 0.5 0 0
αER Value share of exhaustible resource in electricity nest 0 0 0
αED Value share of dirty backstop in electricity nest 1 0.5 0
αEC Value share of clean backstop in electricity nest 0 0.5 1
pD Dirty backstop price 20.84 20.84 80
pC Initial clean backstop price 80 46.25 46.25
ζD Emission intensity of dirty backstop 0.5169 0.5169 0.4373
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Similar to (3.8), the unilateral second-period tax increases exhaustible resource prices in
the first period and in the non-adopting country if the tax increases exhaustible resource









R 0 ⇔ ζRDRR,2 + ζDDDR,2 R 0 (3.36)
Proposition 3.5. Following a unilateral carbon tax increase in the second period
(i) DD2 decreases
(ii) under (3.A3), E2 decreases
(iii) under (3.A3), e1 + E1 + e2 + E2 decreases



















(v) under (3.A3), e2 + E2 decreases
Proof. The proof of (i) and (ii) is analogous to Proposition 6.4. Totally differentiating








































D = 0 (3.38)
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ζR − ζD (1 + r)DRD,2
Γ
(3.39d)
where Γ ≡ dRR,1 + DRR,1 + (1 + r) dRR,2 + (1 + r)DRR,2. Analogous to Proposition 6.4, we
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The last inequality follows from (6.10). In (3.40), I, III > 0 and II, IV < 0. When




DDRD,2 ≤ 0, we have II+III ≥ 0. From I+IV > 0 (by (6.10)) it then follows
that
d[dD1 +DD1 +dD2 +DD2 ]
dT2
< 0. Conversely, when ζRDRR,2 + ζ

































































The underbraced term is negative by (6.10) and (3.A3), completing the proof of (iii).
The effect of the tax on first-period emissions is





















































As Γ < 0, first-period emissions increase when the numerator in (3.41) is positive, estab-
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lishing (iv). The effect of the tax on second-period emissions is













































































































































The fifth equation follows by substituting the analog of (3.20) and the sixth from (3.39).
When dRR,2 = −dDR,2
−I − II + III + IV = dDR,2
(
−ζDDRD,2 − ζRDRR,2 − ζDDDD,2 − ζRDDR,2
)
> 0
The inequality follows from (3.A3). Because III + IV > 0, by induction we also have




































The oil market has flavours of a bilateral monopoly. The largest exporters have united
themselves in OPEC, a cartel that controls more than 75% of proven reserves45 and
actively manages supply. Importing countries coordinate on energy policy and energy
security issues through various international organizations such as the IEA, OECD and
EU, and cooperate in the development of renewable alternatives. Consuming countries
are vulnerable to monopoly power because of their heavy dependency on oil, but also
have the means to end this dependency through developing a backstop: a substitute that
can replace oil as the dominant energy source.
To prolong consumers’ dependence on their resource, oil exporters have an incentive
to prevent prices from becoming too high. Indeed, one of OPEC’s aims is to ’secure an
efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers’. Conversely, importing
countries realize that investment in alternative energy sources, such as shale gas or
renewable energy, is not only a remedy to the physical scarcity of oil, but also affects
exporters’ supply decisions. The resulting strategic interaction is the subject of this
paper: we ask how an exhaustible resource seller can adjust the supply path to preserve
its monopoly, and how a buyer can optimally use the ability to develop a substitute.
A key feature of exhaustible resource markets is that expectations about future de-
mand affect current supply. A binding promise by the buyer in the initial period about
44This chapter also circulates as Michielsen (2013c).
45Known reserves that with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future under existing economic
and operating conditions. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012.
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the arrival time of the substitute (Dasgupta et al., 1983; Gallini et al., 1983) will there-
fore not only change market conditions when the substitute comes on line, but also affect
the supply path in all preceding periods (Karp and Newbery, 1993). As time passes, the
effect on supply in early periods becomes sunk, so the buyer faces a different trade-off
than in the initial period. As a result, the buyer’s optimal open-loop strategy is not
time-consistent (Olsen, 1986, 1993): the buyer has an incentive to commit to late devel-
opment in order to depress current prices, but would like to renege on his promise when
the resource becomes scarce (see section 4.3). Sellers who are sufficiently rational to
calculate dynamic equilibria are unlikely to be naive enough to believe announcements
that are not credible. In order to present a realistic model of their supply decision, it is
important to exclude non-credible promises by the buyer. The contribution of this paper
is to derive the closed-loop solution to the investment and supply game.
We use a simple model and a highly stylized representation of the innovation process.
In each period, a monopolistic seller makes a supply offer to a buyer. After observing
the seller’s offer, the buyer decides whether to pay a fixed investment cost and develop
a perfect substitute. Upon investment, the substitute can immediately be produced at
constant marginal cost and competes with the resource. We abstract from uncertainty,
capacity constraints, R&D externalities and imperfect cartelization in order to focus on
the strategic aspects of the resource supply and innovation decisions.
In equilibrium, the seller induces the buyer to delay the adoption of the substitute
until the resource is exhausted. When the buyer cannot commit to future actions, his only
means to influence current supply is to invest immediately. Doing so adversely affects the
buyer in three ways. Firstly, the seller immediately reduces supply following investment.
Secondly, the buyer loses the ability to derive surplus from the resource through saving
the interest on the investment cost. Thirdly, a larger share of the remaining resource stock
is sold at the buyer’s reservation price. From the seller’s perspective, the buyer’s ability
to develop a substitute is equivalent to an already available substitute with a higher
marginal cost. Like in Hoel (1978), the seller limit-prices at the buyer’s reservation price,
which is higher than the marginal cost of the substitute because of the fixed investment
cost. The buyer’s indifference condition for investment only becomes binding when the
remaining resource stock is sufficiently small.
Our model offers an explanation for the slow progress in renewable energy. Developing
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a substitute does not help industrialized countries to capture a larger share of the oil
rent. So as long as oil prices do not become prohibitively high, there is little economic
rationale for substantive efforts.
Four recent papers consider similar questions. Liski and Montero (2011) study the
optimal demand schedule of an exhaustible resource monopsonist that has access to a
substitute. Their results are similar to ours to the extent that the buyer would like
to commit to postpone the switch to the substitute to depress current prices, and the
buyer’s share of the resource surplus increases in the cost of the substitute when the
buyer cannot commit. An important difference is that the perfectly competitive sellers
in Liski and Montero (2011) only compete with the substitute for an infinitesimally short
period. Because the exhaustion of the resource always coincides with the switch to the
substitute, postponing the switch decreases current resource supply. The buyer obtains
lower prices because committing to late invention increases his monopsony power. In our
framework, the monopolistic seller may compete with the substitute for a nondegenerate
period when the buyer can commit the invention time (Olsen, 1993). Postponing the
arrival of the substitute increases cumulative resource supply before invention. Current
prices go down because current supply goes up, rather than because of an increase in
monopsony power as in Liski and Montero (2011). As a result, initial resource use is
higher under commitment than under discretion in our paper, but lower in Liski and
Montero (2011).46
In Harris and Vickers (1995), the arrival of the substitute is a stochastic event and
depends on the buyer’s R&D effort. As the buyer’s effort increases when the stock
dwindles, the seller has an incentive to slow down depletion in closed-loop equilibrium.
Jaakkola (2012) looks at a game with gradual substitute development and convex per-
period investment costs. This generalization prohibits an analytical characterization of
the closed-loop equilibrium. In Gerlagh and Liski (2011), the substitute is not avail-
able immediately following investment, but after an exogenous transition period. By
investing, the buyer can force the seller to sell the remaining stock during the transition
period. The value of this investment option decreases as the resource is depleted. To
compensate the buyer for this decrease, supply is increasing over time during an interval
46A formal proof for the general case is beyond the scope of this paper. We provide an example with
iso-elastic demand in Appendix 4.A.3.
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before investment. Although Gerlagh and Liski look for a Markov-perfect equilibrium,
the time-to-build delay acts as a commitment device.
4.2. Model
Consider a model with a buyer and a seller of an exhaustible resource. We adopt
the notation of Gerlagh and Liski (2011). The buyer derives flow surplus u(qt) from
consuming qt units of the resource. Let u(.) be increasing and continuously differen-
tiable. The surplus function is associated with a consumer utility function ũ (.) satisfying
u (qt) = ũ (qt) − ũ′ (qt) qt and inverse demand function ψ(qt) = ũ′ (qt). A monopolistic
seller is endowed with a finite stock s0 that is costless to extract. The seller aims to
maximize the discounted stream of instantaneous profits π (qt) = ũ
′ (qt) qt. Utility and
profits are discounted at rate r.
The buyer can instantaneously develop a perfect substitute for the resource. By
paying an upfront investment cost I, he gains the ability to produce the substitute at





There are i = 1, .., N periods of time of length ε. Time is continuous but agents only
act at the beginning of each period, i.e. at time points ti = ε(i − 1). They commit
their actions for the entire period. We distinguish between a pre-investment phase A
and a post-investment phase B. In phase A, the buyer has a binary decision variable
kti ∈ {0, 1}, where kti = 1 indicates that the buyer develops the substitute. In phase A,
each period has three stages:
(1) the seller offers to supply a quantity qti
(2) the buyer chooses kti ∈ {0, 1}
(3) when kti = 0, the market clears at price pti = ψ(qti), or when kti = 1, the seller’s





. At the end of the period, the economy moves to regime B.
80
The time-consistency problem
In phase B, the seller is the only mover and chooses quantity qti . The market clears
at price pti = min (ψ(qti), c), because the buyer cannot prevent the seller from compet-
ing with the substitute.
Our timing reflects the mutual dependence of buyers and sellers in natural resource
markets, and oil exporters’ concerns about security of supply: the seller may be able to
dissuade the buyer from investing by making a sufficiently generous offer. Olsen (1993)
uses the same setup as our paper, but the buyer moves before the seller in each period
(stages (1) and (2) are reversed). This timing forces the buyer to invest very early, as he
cannot credibly punish the seller for setting a high price.47 We will characterize the limit
of the equilibrium when ε goes to zero. For convenience, the remainder of the analysis
is therefore presented in continuous time with an infinite horizon.4849
4.3. The time-consistency problem
Olsen (1993) sketches why equilibria in which the buyer can commit the investment
time are not consistent. According to the Hotelling rule, a monopolistic seller equates
discounted marginal revenue in all periods. When the arrival time of the substitute T ′
is fixed, additional supply in any period after T ′ does not cause inframarginal losses
because the resource is sold at the substitute price. As marginal revenue is relatively
high after the arrival of the substitute, the seller would like to sell part of his stock in
the post-investment phase. This is socially inefficient and reduces the buyer’s welfare,
because the seller directly displaces substitute supply using scarce resource units. When
the buyer commits to a late T ′, the seller’s post-investment revenues go down in present
47Olsen does not analyze large initial stocks and restricts himself to the limit-pricing phase. For large
stocks, the buyer cannot credibly prevent the seller from treating his problem as a free-terminal-time
problem with a scrap value, the scrap value being the discounted profits from the limit-pricing phase.
The buyer thus invests before the remaining stock reaches the region that Olsen considers. Because
the resource is exhausted in finite time, the folk theorem cannot sustain Pareto dominant outcomes.
The crucial difference between the timing in this paper and in Olsen (1993) is that the buyer moves in
between the seller’s proposal and the market clearance. Reversing stages (2) and (3) would yield the
same equilibrium as in Olsen (1993): after the seller’s offer in the initial period, the residual game is
equivalent to Olsen (1993).
48The buyer’s ability to develop the substitute guarantees that the strategic interaction ends in finite
time. When N is sufficiently large, changes in N do not affect the equilibrium. Moreover, when
the number of remaining periods is large, the equilibrium strategies do not depend on the number of
remaining periods.
49In general, it is not clear whether the limit of the equilibrium is an equilibrium of the limit game;
see Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for an example.
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Figure 4.1: The buyer’s time-consistency problem
terms because of discounting.
A late T ′ results in higher cumulative extraction in the pre-investment phase and
increased supply in early periods, but is costly for the buyer in later periods: when
the resource becomes scarce, the buyer cannot dispose over the substitute as early as
he would like. After having enjoyed the benefits of high supplies and low prices early
on, the buyer has an incentive to avoid the costs of resource scarcity in subsequent
periods by developing the substitute earlier than announced. We illustrate this incentive
in Figure 4.1. After T̂ , supply drops below the buyer’s reservation quantity q̆, which
is defined such that u (q̆) equals the utility u (q∗) of consuming the long-run substitute
supply q∗ minus the interest on the investment cost rI. After T̂ , the buyer prefers to
invest immediately instead of at the announced time T ′.50
50A formal treatment of the buyer’s commitment optimum is beyond the scope of this paper, and is




When making decisions during phase A, agents take into account their payoffs in phase
B. We therefore first turn to phase B. When the period length ε is sufficiently small,





min (ψ (qt) , c) qte
−rtdt
s.t. ṡ = −qt, qt ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, s0 given (4.1)
The Hamiltonian for this problem and the necessary optimality conditions are
H (q, s, λ) = min (ψ (qt) , c) qt − λq
π′ (qt)− λt ≤ 0, q ≥ ψ−1 (c) c.s.
λ̇t = rλt, lim
t→∞
λtst = 0 (4.2)





ψ (qt)− qtψ′ (qt) for qt ≥ D (c)
c for qt < D (c)
Because a perfect substitute is available at cost c, marginal revenue π′ (qt) is equal to
c for the first q∗ ≡ ψ−1 (c) units and discontinuous at q∗, as the seller starts incurring
losses on inframarginal units. If the seller practices a limit-pricing strategy, supplying
q∗ in each period until exhaustion, the stock is exhausted at time s/q∗. For small values
of the remaining stock, the marginal revenue π′ (qt) |qt≥q∗ of supplying a unit in excess
of q∗ is always lower than the present value of c at time s/q∗. The seller then supplies
q∗ in each period until exhaustion time T . When the remaining stock is large, limit
pricing takes so long to exhaust the stock that π′ (q∗) is higher than ce−rst/q
∗
. It is then
worthwhile to supply qt > q
∗ in early periods.
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When the remaining stock s < s∗
qt = q
∗ ∀ t ∈ (0, T ) , T = s
q∗






∀ t ∈ [0, T −∆)
qt = q








dt+∆q∗ = s (4.4)
The above system defines the seller’s optimal post-investment strategy φI (s; c).
Figure 6.1 illustrates the seller’s supply path during the post-investment phase. In
equilibrium, the seller is indifferent between supplying an extra unit in any period before
T −∆ and marginally extending the limit-pricing period. The present value of marginal
revenue π′ (qt) e
−rt equals ce−rT between [0, T −∆] and at T .
4.5. Closed-loop equilibrium
It will be useful to define the value function for the seller V (s) and buyer U(s) as a
function of the remaining stock during phase A. Denote the buyer’s and seller’s value at
the time of investment by U I (s) and V I (s), respectively. Let k = κ (s, q) be the buyer’s
investment strategy and q = φ(s) the seller’s supply strategy. The value for the seller
is the payoff from choosing the optimal q for an interval of length ε, given the strategic
response of the buyer
V (s) = max
{q}
{[επ(q) + e−εrV (s− εq)](1− κ(s, q)) + V I(s)κ(s, q)}. (4.5)
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Figure 4.2: The seller’s optimal supply (left) and the present value of marginal revenue
(right) during the post-investment phase
We define the value for the buyer analogously
U(s) = max
k∈{0,1}
{[εu(φ(s)) + e−εrU(s− εφ(s))](1− k) + U I(s)k}. (4.6)
Because the buyer can guarantee himself the long-run surplus ū − rI by investing, the
buyer’s strategy maximizes his value of the resource W (s), i.e. the utility the resource
provides on top of his long-run level










[u (qt)− ū] e−rtdt (4.7)
We look for a pair of equilibrium strategies such that φ (s) = argmax{q} V (s) and
κ (s, q) = argmaxk U (s) for all s. Proposition 4.2 states the main result.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. The
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buyer’s equilibrium strategy is
κ (s, q) = 1 ∀ q : u(q) < ū− rI (4.8a)
κ (s, q) = 0 o.w. (4.8b)
The seller’s equilibrium strategy is φ (s) = φI (s;ψ (u−1 (ū− rI))), with φI (s; c) as de-
fined in Proposition 4.1.51
Although the motivation differs in the pre- and post-investment phase, the seller
always supplies at least the buyer’s reservation quantity. In the post-investment phase,
the seller always supplies q ≥ q∗ because there is no loss on inframarginal units for smaller
q. In the pre-investment phase, the seller’s best response to the buyer’s equilibrium
strategy is to supply at least q ≥ q̆, because he would trigger investment for smaller q.
From the seller’s perspective, the threat of the substitute is therefore equivalent to an
already available substitute with a higher marginal cost.
The buyer does not invest before exhaustion because his surplus from the resource
W decreases after investment. Adopting the substitute raises the buyer’s reservation
utility from ū − rI to ū, but not his actual utility as the buyer pays interest rI on the
sunk investment cost. The increase in the buyer’s reservation utility has three effects,
as we show in Figure 4.3. Firstly, the buyer’s surplus from the resource (u(q) minus
the reservation utility) is lower for any given supply path: u (q) − u (q̆) > u (q) − ū.
Secondly, the seller decreases supply in early periods when the buyer invests: φ (s) >
φI (s) when s > s∗ (Hoel, 1978, 1983). The maximum price for the resource decreases
after investment; to compensate for this, the seller increases the price in early periods.
51Because the buyer conditions his strategy on q, there can also exist a large number of other equilibria.
To see this, consider a very small c and a non-negligible I. The seller’s surplus after investment V I (s)
is very small, so the buyer can, for all levels of the remaining stock, threaten to invest unless the seller
offers the buyer’s first-best quantity for that s. When faced with this strategy, the seller’s best response
is to implement the buyer’s first-best. In a bargaining framework, this equilibrium corresponds to a
setting in which the buyer has full bargaining power. Analogously, there exist other equilibria in which
the buyer’s welfare U (s0) is in between the buyer’s welfare in the equilibrium in this Proposition and the
buyer’s welfare under his first-best. A feature of these equilibria that might be considered less desirable
is that the buyer’s best response to a deviation by the seller depends on the buyer’s belief whether the
seller will return to his equilibrium strategy in the future. The equilibrium in this Proposition does not
have this property, because the seller does not find it profitable to deviate by supplying less than q̆ at
any time before the limit-pricing phase, and because the buyer’s indifference condition is binding in the
limit-pricing phase. There also exist mixed-strategy variations of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.2 in
which the buyer invests with a probability σ ∈ (0, 1) if q < q̆: the seller’s extra profits from supplying less
than q̆ in a near-zero interval if the buyer does not invest do not compensate for the long-run decrease
in profits if the buyer does invest.
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< q∗ (T −∆).
Figure 4.3: Resource supply before and after investment as a function of time (left) and
the remaining stock (right)
Corollary 4.1. W (s) ↓ 0 when r ↓ 0
The buyer receives a positive surplus from the resource when the seller is too impatient
to sell the entire stock at the buyer’s reservation price. As r approaches zero, this
consideration vanishes and so does W (s).
In the Appendix, we derive the same results when the buyer can invest a continuous
amount in each period and the marginal cost of the substitute depends on cumulative
investment. The buyer invests the amount that maximizes consumption utility minus
the interest on the investment costs in one go when the resource is exhausted. Similarly,
the seller supplies at least the buyer’s long-run utility until exhaustion.
4.6. Conclusion
Strategic exhaustible resource buyers have an incentive to delay the adoption of a sub-
stitute in order to depress current prices. When the buyer cannot commit to the arrival
time of the substitute, a monopolistic seller can induce the buyer to delay adoption until
exhaustion. In the absence of uncertainty or a fixed time-to-build delay, the threat of a
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substitute has a similar effect as an already available substitute in closed-loop equilib-
rium. The model is highly stylized - for example, OPEC and industrialized economies
both face substantial coordination and free-riding problems that impede their ability to
act as a monopolist or jointly develop a substitute.
Nonetheless, the results accord oil and gas exporters’ efforts to stabilize prices, as
unconventional hydrocarbons present an increasing threat to their revenues. In the
European natural gas market, the emergence of shale gas has reduced Russia’s monopoly
power and its ability to use natural gas prices as a political weapon.52 For the oil
market, the Financial Times notes that ”Saudi Arabia could respond [..] to the current




Proof of Proposition 4.1
The seller supplies q∗ at time t when the MR of supplying an additional unit is lower
than the discounted MR at the time of exhaustion, i.e.
π′ (q∗) ≤ λt = λT e−r(T−t) = ce−r(T−t)
Solving for T − t yields














. We can calculate the threshold stock s∗ such that the seller practices limit
52”Nekrassov [a former Kremlin adviser] rejected suggestions that Russia might hit back by cut-
ting off gas supplies, a tactic the country used in 2009 after the collapse of talks with Ukraine
to end a row over unpaid bills and energy pricing. ”Gas is no longer a weapon,” Nekrassov
said. ”When Russia did that before, it realised that the foreign energy lobby reacted and ef-
forts to find alternative sources were increased. If Russia kept threatening, it knows that no-
body would be buying its gas in 20 years’ time.”” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/23/
cyprus-bailout-kremlin-reprisal-bank-levy, accessed April 2, 2013.
53http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98d7f11c-43aa-11e2-844c-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2PJZKqbk8, accessed April 2, 2013.
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pricing until exhaustion for all s ≤ s∗ by substituting T = s
q∗
and solving for the s such













extracting the first s−s∗ units, marginal revenue rises at the rate of interest and is equal
the present value of marginal revenue at the time of exhaustion
π′ (qt) = ce
−r(T−t)












dt+∆q∗ = s (4.10)
Proof of Proposition 4.2
We make use of a special case of Proposition 3 in (Hoel, 1983).
Lemma 4.1 (post-investment phase, (Hoel, 1983)). When s > s∗, φI (s; c) is increasing
in c.
Because of the buyer’s investment option, the resource is exhausted in finite time.
This means there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We assume
that the number of periods N is sufficiently large, such that the optimal strategies are not
affected by the length of the game. The buyer’s strategy maximizes U(s) with respect
to k. His value from investing is


















(ū− rI) e−rtdt+W I (s; c)
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Let Ŭ (s) denote the payoff when the buyer adopts the equilibrium strategy, and denote































(ū− rI) e−rtdt+W I (s; c̆)
In order to prove that Ŭ (s) ≥ U I (s), it is sufficient to show that W I (s; c) is weakly
increasing in c. By Lemma 4.1, φI (s; c) increases in c for s > s∗. Moreover, ū decreases
in c. Then T − ∆ increases in c. Therefore, W I (s; c) is strictly increasing in c when




< 0 and ∂∆
∂c
≤ 0, so ∂s∗
∂c
≤ 0. When the seller is limit pricing, he will keep
limit-pricing after a reduction in c. Thus, ∂W
I(s;c)
∂c
= 0 for s ≤ s∗.
The seller always supplies at least q̆ given that the buyer only invests when q < q̆.
When the seller chooses a qt < q̆, he triggers immediate investment and is subject to
the more stringent constraint qt ≥ q∗ for the remainder of the game. Choosing qt < q̆
therefore cannot be optimal, provided the period length ε is sufficiently small.
4.A.2. Continuous investment
In this section, we generalize the buyer’s problem: rather than making a discrete invest-
ment decision, the buyer can invest a continuous amount in each period. The marginal
cost of the substitute is a decreasing function of cumulative investment




We can write ū (I) ≡ u (ψ−1 (c (I))). The timing in each stage is
(1) the seller supplies a quantity qti
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(2) the buyer chooses i
(3) the market clears at price pti = min (ψ(qti), c (I))
Profits and utility depend on the stance of technology I in addition to the supply q.
Let φ (s, I) denote the seller’s supply strategy and ι (s, I, q) the buyer’s investment strat-
egy. The value functions are given by
V (s, I) =max
{q}
{
επ (I, q) + e−ǫrV (s− εq, I + ει (s, I, q))
}
(4.11)
U (s, I) =max
{i}
{
ε (u (I, φ (s, I))− i) + e−εrU (s− εφ (s, I) , I + εi)
}
(4.12)
Analogously to the main text, we can express the value of the resource to the buyer as














The equilibrium is similar to the one in Proposition 4.2. The buyer selects the
cumulative investment level I∗ that yields the highest long-run utility ū− rI, and invest
this amount in one go when the resource is exhausted.
Proposition 4.3. Let I∗ be the solution to ∂ū
∂I
= r. There exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies. The buyer’s equilibrium strategy is
ι (s, 0, q) = I∗ ∀q : u (q) < ū (c (I∗))− rI∗ (4.13a)
ι (s, I, q) = 0 o.w. (4.13b)
and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is




c (I) , u−1 (ū (c (I∗))− rI∗)
))
(4.14)
with φI (s; c) as defined in Proposition 4.1.




idt = I∗. Suppose that for a certain buyer’s strategy ~I < I∗. Then by
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0. Suppose that ~I > I∗. Then the buyer must either invest a positive amount when
cumulative investment already exceeds I∗, or invest a large amount when I < I∗ such
that cumulative investment overshoots I∗. We discuss both cases in turn. Firstly, suppose
there exists an I such that I∗ ≤ I and ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > 0 for some s. Let I ′ denote
the largest such I. Then the buyer can marginally improve his welfare by choosing
ι (s, I ′, φ (s, I ′)) = 0. By Assumption 4.1, this increases the long-run utility ū− rI, and
by Proposition 4.2, it increases the value of the resourceW (s, I). Secondly, suppose there
exists an I < I∗ such that ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > I∗− I for some s. Let I ′′ be the largest such
I. Then the buyer can marginally improve his welfare by choosing ι (s, I ′′, φ (s, I ′′)) =
I∗− I ′′. Again, this improves long-run utility by Assumption 4.1 and increases the value
of the resource by Proposition 4.2. By induction it follows that cumulative investment ~I
must equal I∗.
Secondly, we show that given the seller’s strategy (4.14), it is optimal to invest I∗ in
one go when the resource is exhausted. When the resource is exhausted, it is optimal
for the buyer to reach the long-run optimal level I∗ as quickly as possible. Suppose
that the buyer’s strategy entails i1 = ι (0, I1, 0) > 0, i2 = ι (0, I2, 0) > 0 for some
0 < I1 < I2 < I
∗. Then by Assumption 4.1, the buyer can marginally improve his
welfare by choosing ι (0, I1, 0) = I2 − I1 + i2. By induction it follows that the buyer
invests I∗ − I when the resource is exhausted. When the resource is not yet exhausted,
it is optimal to delay investments until exhaustion. Suppose there exists an s > 0 such
that ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > 0 for some I. Let s3 be the lowest such s. Then the buyer
can marginally improve his welfare by choosing ι (s3, I, φ (s3, I)) = 0 and increasing the
investment at exhaustion by the same amount. This does not affect the long-run utility
ū (c (I∗)), but increases W (s, I) by Proposition 4.2.
Thirdly, the proof that the seller’s strategy (4.14) is optimal given buyer’s strategy
(4.13) is analogous to the last part of the proof of Proposition 4.2. Q.E.D.
4.A.3. Commitment and closed-loop equilibria
In this section, we provide an example with an iso-elastic demand function in which a
monopsonistic buyer that already has developed a substitute, as in Liski and Montero
(2011), chooses a lower initial level of resource consumption under commitment than
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in closed-loop equilibrium. In the bilateral monopoly framework that we study in this
paper, initial consumption is higher when the buyer can commit the invention time than
in closed-loop equilibrium.
Let u (q) =
√
q, which corresponds to an iso-elastic demand with elasticity 2. We
numerically compute the resource consumption paths in Liski and Montero’s framework
when the buyer can fully commit qt for all t, in closed-loop equilibrium (where the buyer’s
strategy qt = C (St) is a function of the remaining stock) and in the social optimum.











s.t. Ṡt = −qt s0 > 0, ST = 0
ṗt = rpt, pT = c
where T denotes the time at which the resource is exhausted and the buyer switches to
the substitute. Liski and Montero, pp. 6 show that the buyer’s commitment optimum



















qT = crs0 (4.15b)





C (St)− P (St)C (St)
]
e−r(τ−t)dτ
where qt = C (St) and pt = P (St) are the equilibrium consumption and pricing rule,
respectively. The authors demonstrate (pp. 9) that the equilibrium is given by a first-







− P (S) + P ′ (S)S = 0 (4.16)
with boundary condition P (0) = c. Lastly, the social optimum is characterized by
the Hotelling rule, pt = u
′ (qt) and pT = c and has an analytical solution: T =
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Figure 4.4: Resource consumption in Liski and Montero (2011)
1
2r
ln (1 + 8rs0c
2). Using MATLAB, we numerically solve (4.15) and (4.16) to deter-
mine the consumption paths under commitment and in closed-loop equilibrium for s0 =
20, c = 0.5, r = 0.04.54 Figure 4.4 depicts the results. In line with the intuition in the
main text, resource use in Liski and Montero (2011) is lower under commitment than in
closed-loop equilibrium. When the buyer has full commitment power, pt = pT e
−r(T−t).
By committing to a late switch to the substitute, the buyer reduces initial extraction
but obtains a substantial price discount.
Now return to the bilateral monopoly model in this paper. Dasgupta et al. (1983) and
Olsen (1986) discuss the buyer’s optimal invention time under commitment at length.
We demonstrate the following result through a series of Lemmas.
Proposition 4.4. For iso-elastic demand with elasticity equal or larger than 2 and a
sufficiently large initial stock, initial resource use is higher when the buyer commits the
invention time at t = 0 than in closed-loop equilibrium.
54The code is available upon request.
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Lemma 4.2 (Proposition 1, Olsen (1986)). For iso-elastic demand with elasticity equal
or greater than 2 and s0 sufficiently large, the seller has zero stock remaining at the
buyer’s optimal invention time.
Lemma 4.3 (Dasgupta et al. (1983), pp. 1442). Resource supply at t = 0 increases in
the invention time between 0 and the buyer’s optimal invention time.
Lemma 4.4 (Dasgupta et al. (1983), pp. 1442). For iso-elastic demand with elasticity
equal or greater than 2 and s0 sufficiently large, resource supply at t = 0 decreases in the
buyer’s invention time when the invention time is greater than the buyer’s optimum.
Lemma 4.1 implies that resource supply at t = 0 when the buyer commits to an
infinitely large invention time (which is equivalent to c → ∞) is larger than initial








Many important ecosystems are subject to threshold dynamics: they can rapidly and ir-
reversibly deteriorate when their vitality drops below a critical value. Lakes switch from
a clear to a turbid state when the concentration of algae reaches a tipping point (Schef-
fer, 1997). Droughts, forest fires and logging may fuel a self-reinforcing replacement of
tropical rainforest by grasslands in the Amazon (Nepstad et al., 2008). Ecologists hy-
pothesize that species support ecosystem stability like rivets support a complex machine:
initial component extractions do not affect the system’s performance, but even a small
number of further removals can trigger a sudden collapse (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981).
On a global scale, the climate system is subject to positive feedback mechanisms: the
melting of polar ice caps will increase solar radiation absorption and permafrost melting
in the Arctic could cause large methane releases (Lenton et al., 2008).
The threshold locations that govern these ’catastrophes’ are highly uncertain, because
of our limited knowledge of ecosystem behaviour and since current levels of environmental
stress are without precedent (Muradian, 2001). This uncertainty poses an important
economic tradeoff. Increasing our natural resource use yields temporary (using a piece
of tropical wood in construction or burning a unit of fossil fuel) and/or permanent
(bringing virgin land into production) economic benefits if we stay below the catastrophe
thresholds, but incurs large and long-lasting damages if we do not. The consequences
of temperature rises in the high single digits and upwards for example are likely to
include large permanent loss of biodiversity, sea level rise and increased prevalence of
55This chapter also circulates as Michielsen (2013b).
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extreme weather events. Because of their largely irreversible nature, the possibility
of environmental catastrophes has important implications for intergenerational welfare
analysis (for climate change, see e.g. Keller et al. (2004); Weitzman (2009, 2010)). This
paper asks how concerns for catastrophe prevention affect the long-run concentration of
pollutants and the allocation of natural resource use across generations.
To answer this question, I use a welfare criterion that balances both present and
far-distant future outcomes.56 The welfare of generation t is a weighted sum of expected
discounted utility and the probability that an irreversible catastrophe will occur at any




E u (s) e
−δ(s−t)ds− ξP [τ <∞]
where τ is the occurrence time of the catastrophe. The welfare function generates a
time-inconsistency: the current generation would like to sacrifice their descendants’ con-
sumption for the long-run objective, but the descendants themselves are not as willing
to make these sacrifices once they inherit the economy. When the current generation
recognizes that future generations have different preferences, its response depends on the
nature of the environmental problem. If the pollutant that causes the catastrophe risk is
expected to become obsolete in the near future or if the risk is related to emissions from
a scarce exhaustible resource, the current generation may reduce its consumption in an
attempt reduce the maximum pressure on the ecosystem and hence avert a catastrophe.
If the pollutant is abundant and expected to remain essential, the catastrophe becomes
a self-fulfilling belief.
The literature on optimal control in environmental problems under time-inconsistent
preferences is scarce. Li and Löfgren (2000) look at renewable resource management with
similar preferences as in the present paper, but restrict themselves to full commitment
and thus assume away the time-inconsistency problem. Karp (2005) and Gerlagh and
Liski (2012) study Markov-perfect climate mitigation strategies when regulators use hy-
perbolic discounting. An important difference with the present paper is that generations
56Chichilnisky (1996), Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009) and Long and Martinet (2012) propose
related welfare functions. Chichilnisky (1996) discusses a criterion that consists of a weighted sum of
discounted utility and lim-inf utility. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009) advocate a weighted sum of
discounted utility and a Rawlsian maxi-min criterion; Long and Martinet (2012) propose a weighted
sum of discounted utility and an endogenous set of minimum rights to be guaranteed to all generations.
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with hyperbolic preferences do not explicitly care about the distant future; they merely
place a higher weight on their own felicity. This feature causes hyperbolic regulators with
full commitment power to stabilize emission stocks at a lower level, but start off with
higher emission flows than in Markov equilibrium (Karp, 2005). This ranking between
the commitment and Markov solutions does not always hold with the preferences in the
present paper - specifically, it breaks down in a model that is close to Karp (2005).
Karp and Tsur (2011) consider catastrophic climate change under hyperbolic prefer-
ences in a discrete-choice setting. Mitigation decisions are strategic complements across
generations, and perpetual stabilization and perpetual business-as-usual can both be
Markov equilibria. Different from the present paper, the catastrophe hazard in Karp
and Tsur (2011) persists even when emissions cease perpetually: emissions irreversibly
increase the hazard in all future periods, but do not affect not the catastrophe hazard
in the current period. The range of equilibria in Karp and Tsur (2011) is sensitive to
the functional form of the hazard rate. In equilibrium, generations can only cease emis-
sions at concentration levels at which additional emissions increase the hazard sufficiently
strongly, because large increases in the hazard deter future generations from reneging on
the current generation’s plan to stabilize the carbon concentration.57
It is difficult to infer long-term preferences for environmental goods from market
data. There is a dearth of investment assets with very long horizons, and extrapolat-
ing preferences from shorter-term decisions requires contentious assumptions. Nordhaus
(1994) argues that revealed preferences in the capital market indicate a high degree of
impatience. He calibrates a Ramsey discount rate of an infinitely-lived agent that uses ex-
ponential discounting, and finds a pure rate of time preference of 3% - implying negligible
welfare weights beyond a 50-year horizon. His result is sensitive to both the infinitely-
lived agent and the exponential discounting assumptions. Observed saving decisions are
consistent with concerns for the medium or distant future if we consider a different pref-
erence structure, for example that individuals discount consumption within their own
lifetime but not across generations (Dasgupta, 2012) or hyperbolic discounting (Gerlagh
and Liski, 2012).
Stated-preference studies circumvent this problem and find that people care about
57For stationary optimal control under catastrophic risk, see e.g. Cropper (1979); Reed (1984); Tsur
and Zemel (1996, 2008); Polasky et al. (2011). Contrary to some of these papers, there is no endogenous
(effective) discounting in the present work.
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long-term environmental outcomes, consonant with my welfare criterion. Layton and
Levine (2003) calibrate an exponential discounting model and estimate a 0.7% median
discount rate for climate mitigation measures, whereas Layton and Brown (2000) find no
appreciable difference in willingness to pay for environmental damages that occur in 60
or 150 years. Gattig and Hendrickx (2007) survey evidence that non-monetary indica-
tors of the perceived severity of environmental risks, such as the willingness to engage in
pro-environmental behaviours, are unresponsive to the temporal delay of environmental
impacts. The catastrophe term in my welfare function also captures the nonuse value of
natural assets, which may constitute more than half of their total economic value (Green-
ley et al., 1981; Kaoru, 1993; Langford et al., 1998; Wattage and Mardle, 2008). A large
part of the value people attach to preserving the environment is not related to current
or future use, but to simply knowing that a species or pristine area exists. When the
value of e.g. species protection does not depend on current and future use, the welfare
loss from future extinctions is likely independent of the time of occurrence.
My welfare criterion also addresses deontological motives. The Lockean proviso states
that appropriating natural resources for current use is justified only if ’enough and as
good’ is left for the future. Within a purely consequentialist framework, the risk of a
future catastrophe can be offset by an increase in current consumption. Even if future
generations are compensated, they cannot consent to any compensation. The second
term in the welfare function reflects the difficulty of compensating future generations
for the loss of vital ecosystems, and the uncertainty whether they would be willing to
accept an increase in man-made goods in return. Lastly, the catastrophe term captures
an intrinsic aversion to the idea that the human community, encompassing both current
and future generations, will at some point cause an environmental catastrophe.
The widely-used utilitarian criterion (Nordhaus, 1994; Stern, 2007) results in either
a ’dictatorship of the present’ or a ’dictatorship of the future’ (Chichilnisky, 1996).
With a zero discount rate, the utilitarian approach is insensitive to near-term outcomes,
because the generations that are alive today are vastly outnumbered by their far-future
counterparts. With a positive discount rate, the utilitarianist attaches near-zero weight
to the distant future, as its importance is diminished by compounded discounting.58
58Weitzman (2009) shows that the present value of expected losses from future catastrophes may
be infinitely large even with a positive discount rate, but his assumptions have been subject to much
critique (Millner, 2013). Most prominently, his result requires the utility function to be unbounded from
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Table 5.1: Time inconsistent welfare weights
current utility future utility catastrophe
current generation 1 ρ < 1 ξ
future generation 1 ξ
These properties also apply to hyperbolic preferences, depending on whether the long-
term discount rate is zero or not - but not to the preferences in this paper.
Under the proposed criterion with an explicit concern for catastrophe prevention,
I demonstrate how optimal resource use depends on the nature of the environmental
problem. I consider a sequence of models with a common framework. A series of
non-overlapping generations derive utility from an emission-intensive consumption good.
Emissions from production add to a pollution stock. In each period, a constant fraction
of the stock decays naturally.59 A catastrophe occurs when the pollution stock exceeds
an unknown threshold. The risk can be eliminated by keeping the stock at or below
its current level, which is known to be ’safe’.60 Importantly, each generation’s intrinsic
welfare loss from a catastrophe does not depend on the time of occurrence.61 Table 5.1
illustrates the inconsistency: the current generation discounts future utility relative to its
intrinsic welfare loss from a catastrophe, but future generations do not discount their own
utility relative to the catastrophe loss. As a consequence, future generations emit too
much from the current generation’s perspective and a dynamic game ensues. Generations
have a strategic motive to distort their emissions in order to influence future emissions.
I compare emissions and the probability of a catastrophe in three cases: (a) when the
first generation can commit all current and future emissions (the commitment solution),
(b) when current generations do not anticipate that future generations have different
preferences (the naive solution) and (c) when current generations take into account the
reaction of future generations (the Markov equilibrium).
I firstly introduce a two-period model. This model represents a setting in which the
below. See Buchholz and Schymura (2012) for an elaborate discussion.
59In a broader interpretation, we may think of the emission flows as the one-off benefits of bringing
additional natural resources under cultivation (e.g. cutting down a forest), and the natural decay as the
flow of benefits that cultivated resources can sustainably provide (such as agricultural products).
60This type of catastrophe risk is also studied in Tsur and Zemel (1994, 1996); Nævdal (2006).
61I explicitly allow for the possibility that the catastrophe also has a direct effect on utility.
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catastrophe risk is expected to recede in the near future, for example because techno-
logical change will make the polluting resource obsolete. The first generation may be
more or less cautious under commitment than in Markov equilibrium, depending on the
utility and threshold distribution functions. Because the number of future generations
that can affect the catastrophe risk is small, the current generation has a direct influence
on future decisions. When current and future emissions are strategic substitutes, today’s
generation can pass on the costs of catastrophe prevention to the future by increasing
its emissions. I derive unambiguous results for two functional forms.
Secondly, I consider an infinite-horizon model with an abundant pollutant. This
model is informative when the pollutant is plentifully available and will remain essential
for a long period. Reserves of coal are sufficient to last another 200 years and pose a seri-
ous threat to the global climate unless we develop a substitute. We may also interpret the
pollution stock as the total amount of deforested land: the pressure to convert rainforests
for agricultural use is unlikely to let up any time soon. In Markov equilibrium, the catas-
trophe becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The steady-state pollution stock depends on
beliefs. Given consistent beliefs, individual generations cannot influence the steady state,
and will conclude that mitigation efforts are futile. There even exists an equilibrium in
which the degree of catastrophe aversion has no effect on equilibrium behaviour, that is,
generations act as if they do not care about the long-run future. As opposed to under
hyperbolic preferences as in Karp (2005) and Gerlagh and Liski (2012), who also employ
infinite-horizon models with abundant pollutants, not only steady-state emission stocks
but also emission flows are higher in Markov equilibrium than under commitment. Naive
policies also lead to high pollution stocks eventually, but degrade the environment less
rapaciously. Because naive generations mistakenly believe that pollution concentrations
can be stabilized at a low level, they choose lower emissions than under full rationality.
Lastly, I propose an infinite-horizon model with a scarce pollutant, which is relevant
for local pollution problems related to exhaustible resource extraction. The pollution
stock first increases, but later declines when reserves of the resource become depleted.
When the initial resource reserve is sufficiently small, future generations have limited
ability to increase the pollution stock. Early generations then have an incentive to
reduce emissions in Markov equilibrium that is not present under commitment. By
reducing their own resource use, early generations smooth the time path of emissions,
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allowing natural decay to reduce the maximum pollution stock and hence the probability
of a catastrophe. I provide a numerical example in which initial emissions in Markov
equilibrium are lower than under commitment.
The results from the infinite-horizon model with an abundant pollutant offer an ex-
planation why climate change mitigation efforts are far below the level necessary to
limit temperature increases to two degrees. The embodied carbon in global reserves of
coal and unconventional oil and gas exceeds cumulative historical emissions by a multi-
ple (Kharecha and Hansen, 2008), and natural carbon sinks are insufficient to stabilize
the concentration in the atmosphere unless emissions decrease significantly. Dangerous
climate change will not be averted because of fossil fuel scarcity or carbon dissipation;
only by deliberate and costly reductions in fossil fuel consumption. Rational policymak-
ers who are not willing to foot the bill for the long-term objective of limiting climate
change recognize that their successors are also unwilling to pay. Because the objective
of stabilization at relatively low concentration levels is out of reach, inaction becomes a
self-fulfilling equilibrium.
5.2. Two-period model
Consider a model with two generations, living in periods t = 1, 2. A representative agent
in each generation derives utility ut (zt) from an emission-intensive consumption good
z, the economy’s single commodity (hereafter: emissions). The utility functions satisfy
u′t ≥ 0, u′′t ≤ 0, ∃ ūt : ut (z) < ūt ∀ z. Emissions zt contribute to a pollution stock Dt.
Natural decay is relatively unimportant when the number of time periods is small, so I
abstract from it in this model. I normalize D0 = 0.
Dt = Dt−1 + zt, D0 = 0
A catastrophe occurs when the stock reaches an unknown threshold D̂. The threshold is




. I express the probability of a catastrophe
as a function of cumulative emissions through pdf f (D) and cdf F (D).
Each generation’s (ex ante) welfare wt is given by a weighted sum of discounted utility
(positive) and the probability that a catastrophe will occur in either period (negative).
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The first generation discounts utility of the second generation by a factor ρ < 1, but its
welfare loss from a catastrophe does not depend on the time of occurrence. I distinguish
between three cases. If the threshold is never breached (D2 < D̂), we disregard the
catastrophe term in the welfare functions and ex post welfare Wt is
W1 = u1 (z1) + ρu2 (z2)
W2 = u2 (z2)
If the threshold is breached in the second period (D1 < D̂ < D2), both generations suffer
an intrinsic catastrophe welfare loss ξ:
W1 = u1 (z1) + ρu2 (z2)− ξ
W2 = u2 (z2)− ξ
When the threshold is breached in the first period (D1 > D̂), the second generation
receives utility u, to capture the impacts of a catastrophe on material well-being.62
W1 = u1 (z1) + ρu− ξ
W2 = u− ξ
The welfare functions for the two generations read





u2 (z2)− ξ F (z1+z2)−F (z1)1−F (z1) if z1 < D̂
u− ξ if z1 ≥ D̂
(5.1b)
The second generation observes whether the first generation’s emissions have triggered
the catastrophe or not,63 so it evaluates catastrophe risk using the conditional cdf
62In the remainder of this paper, I assume u > −∞ to be sufficiently small such that the catastrophe
is also undesirable from a point of view of utility maximization. This is not necessary for the formal
analysis however. If the catastrophe does not affect utility, all post-catastrophe generations choose zt
arbitrarily large and u = ūt.
63When the catastrophe is only observed at the end of the second period, the second generation
chooses a higher z2 because there is a probability that the first generation has already triggered the





.64 The discount factor generates time-inconsistency in the preference struc-
ture: the second generation places a higher weight on second-period utility u2 (z2) relative
to the probability of a catastrophe F (D2) than the first generation does.
I distinguish between three solutions. Firstly, the commitment solution (superscript
C), in which the first generation commits all current and future emissions. Secondly, the
’naive’ solution (superscript N), in which the first generation does not anticipate that
future generations will make a different trade-off between u2 (z2) and F (D2). Lastly,
I consider the Markov solution (superscript M), in which the first generation foresees
the preference reversal of the second generation and selects z1 by backward induction,
maximizing its welfare given the optimal response of the second generation.
5.2.1. Commitment solution
When the first generation can commit second-period emissions conditional on whether
the threshold is breached in the first period, zC1 and z
C
2 immediately follow from (5.1a)






































1− F (zC1 )
= 0 if zC1 < D̂ (5.2b)
The first generation equates discounted marginal utility in both periods with the marginal
welfare loss from catastrophe risk. The three components of (5.2a) represent the first
generation’s considerations. The first term is the first generation’s marginal utility.
The second term indicates that higher first-period emissions increase the probability of
reducing second-period utility to u. The third term reflects the first generation’s intrinsic
desire to prevent a catastrophe. When the welfare weight on catastrophe prevention is







64When the first generation is ambiguity-averse, this Bayesian updating would also be a source of
time inconsistency.
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5.2.2. Naive solution
In the naive solution, the first generation behaves as if it could commit both z1 and z2.
































1− F (zN1 )
= 0 if zN1 < D̂ (5.3b)
By definition, z1 is the same in the naive solution as in the commitment solution. Sub-
stituting zN1 = z
C




2 : the second generation
chooses higher second-period emissions than the first generation would have under com-
mitment.65
5.2.3. Markov solution
In the Markov solution, the first generation correctly anticipates the second generation’s















1− F (zM1 )
(5.4)
To avoid clutter, I omit the superscript M in the derivation of the reaction function.
Differentiating with respect to z1, I obtain
u′′2 (r (z1)) r
′ (z1) = ξ
(




f ′ (z1 + r (z1))
1− F (z1)
)
⇔ r′ (z1) = ξ
f ′ (z1 + r (z1)) [1− F (z1)] + f (z1) f (z1 + r (z1))
[1− F (z1)] [u′′2 (r (z1)) [1− F (z1)]− ξf ′ (z1 + r (z1))]
(5.5)
The condition for the numerator in (5.5) to be positive is similar to f having an increas-
ing hazard function. The sign of the denominator depends on the curvature of f . A
sufficient condition for the second generation’s reaction function to be downward-sloping
is f ′ (z1 + r (z1)) ≥ 0. When f ′ (z1 + r (z1)) is sufficiently negative, an increase in z1 low-




ers the marginal probability of a catastrophe to such an extent that it becomes attractive
for the second generation to choose a higher emission level.
The first-order condition for the first generation is
u′1 (z1)− ρf (z1) u2 (r (z1)) + ρ [1− F (z1)] u′2 (r (z1)) r′ (z1) + ρf (z1) u−
ξf (z1 + r (z1)) (1 + r
′ (z1)) = 0
⇔ u′1 (z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
− ρf (z1) [u2 (r (z1))− u]︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
−ξ (1− ρ) f (z1 + r (z1)) r′ (z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IV




Terms I, II and III are also present in the commitment FOC and have the same




> zC2 . The points at
which terms II and III are evaluated are different than in the commitment solution.
Holding z1 constant, term II is unambiguously larger in the Markov solution: because
the second generation chooses higher emissions, the utility loss to the second generation
u2 (z2) − u in case of a first-period catastrophe is larger than under commitment. This
effect makes the first generation more cautious. Whether term III makes the first
generation more conservationist in Markov equilibrium depends on the local curvature
of the threshold pdf. The Markov FOC also contains an additional term IV that is not
present in the commitment FOC. This is the strategic motive to influence the second
generation’s emissions through the second-period catastrophe hazard. When r′ (z1) is
negative (positive), the first generation can reduce z2 by increasing (decreasing) its own
emissions.
Comparing (5.6) and (5.2a), it is not possible to say whether first-period emissions
are higher in the Markov or in the commitment solution without assuming functional




When catastrophe risk is expected to recede in the medium term, current decision
makers can directly influence their successors’ actions and the probability of a catastro-
phe. Interestingly, the desire to reduce perceived ’overconsumption’ by future generations
can lead current decision makers to increase their own emissions, even if they so increase
the probability of a catastrophe. The results from this section are less relevant when
catastrophe risk persists over long horizons, for example because the pollutant remains
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essential into the far future: the current generation has limited ability to affect the poli-
cies of distant generations. The infinite-horizon models in the next two sections deal
with more persistent risks.
5.3. Infinite horizon, abundant pollutant
Consider an infinite-horizon model with a continuum of non-overlapping generations and
an abundant pollutant. As in the previous section, each generation derives utility from
its own emissions u (z (t)) and cares about future utility (discounted at rate δ) as well as
the possibility of a catastrophe occurring at some point the future. A constant fraction
α of the pollution stock decays in each period, so that
Ḋ = z − αD (5.7)
Utility is concave and bounded. The pollution stock only has a direct effect on utility
when a catastrophe occurs. The hazard rate ψ (D) ≡ f(D)
1−F (D)
is increasing.
Assumption 5.1. u (D, z) = u (z) , u′ (z) > 0, u′′ (z) < 0 ∀z and limz→∞ u (z) = ū.
Assumption 5.2. ψ′ (D) ≥ 0.
When the catastrophe occurs, all subsequent generations receive utility u < ū. As
in section 5.2, a catastrophe is immediately observable, and generations condition their
strategy on whether the catastrophe has occurred already. Because the post-catastrophe
game is trivial, I focus on pre-catastrophe strategies. Throughout, I assume existence
of optimal solutions and that D (t) is non-decreasing along the optimal path.66 The
intuition for this assumption is as follows. Keeping the stock constant already eliminates
the catastrophe hazard. A trajectory in which the stock is V-shaped or declining during
an interval of time results in lower discounted utility than an alternative path that
keeps the stock constant over the same interval, without reducing the probability of a
catastrophe.
Define η (t) ≡ ψ (D (t)) (z (t)− αD (t)) as the instantaneous catastrophe hazard at
time t and H (t) ≡
∫ t
0
η (s) ds as the cumulative hazard, and let τ denote the occurrence
66Tsur and Zemel (1996) prove these properties for ξ = 0.
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time of the catastrophe. For the remainder of this paper, W denotes a generation’s
welfare given a future emissions path, and V denote welfares at this generation’s optimal
decision. For a given admissible trajectory z (s), the welfare of generation t is67
W t (D (t)) =E
(∫ ∞
t
(u (z (s))1τ>s + u1τ≤s) e
−δ(s−t)ds
)
− ξ P [τ ∈ [t,∞)]
1− P [τ ∈ [0, t)]




(u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]) e−δ(s−t)ds
− ξ P [τ ∈ [t,∞)]
1− P [τ ∈ [0, t)]
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD) (5.8)
In Appendix 5.A.3, I outline the necessary conditions for stationary dynamic optimiza-
tion problems with uncertain thresholds, as derived in Nævdal (2006).
5.3.1. Commitment solution
If the first generation can commit all current and future emissions, it maximizes (5.8)




WC (D (0)) =
∫ ∞
0
(u (z (s)) [1−H (s)] + uH (s)) e−δsds− ξ P [τ ∈ [0,∞)]
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (0) = D0, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD)
}
(5.9)
I may rewrite the problem by including the intrinsic welfare loss from a catastrophe in








u (z (s)) [1−H (s)] + uH (s)− η (s) ξeδs
)
e−δsds
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (0) = D0, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD)
}
(5.10)
The eδs term in the round brackets ensures that the intrinsic welfare loss from a catastro-
phe is constant in present terms, regardless of the time of occurrence. As time passes, it
becomes prohibitively costly from the first generation’s point of view to risk a catastro-
67τ is distributed as a Poisson process, as described in the Appendix. For brevity, I omit the distri-
bution of τ in the main text.
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phe, because the utility discount rate diminishes the benefits of future emissions relative
to the intrinsic catastrophe loss. The first generation therefore stabilizes the emissions
stock at some finite date t′ such that the marginal benefit of increasing the pollution stock
(higher current utility and higher steady-state utility if the threshold is not breached)
equals the expected marginal cost (a permanent decrease in utility and the intrinsic
welfare loss evaluated at τ = t′ if the catastrophe does occur).
Proposition 5.1. The commitment solution is characterized by a steady-state pollution




















A formal analysis of the comparative statics of the steady state is complicated by
the presence of two endogenous variables in (5.11), DC and t′. In the next subsections,
I derive comparative statics for the naive and Markov steady states and discuss the
intuition behind them.
5.3.2. Naive solution
In the naive solution, each generation t solves a problem that is similar to (5.10), with




W t,N (D (t)) =
∫ ∞
t




s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD)
}
(5.12)
In (5.12), the intrinsic welfare loss from triggering a catastrophe at time s evaluated by
generation t decreases in t (ξ is multiplied with eδ(s−t), compared to eδs in the commitment
solution). Each generation t envisions a preferred steady-state stock Dt,N , but as every
subsequent generation places a higher weight on its own utility, and thus a lower relative
weight on catastrophe prevention, the stock targets Dt,N increase over time. The targets
converge to a unique level DN that even the most distant generations do not want
to exceed, as the marginal welfare gain of higher steady-state utility falls short of the
permanent utility reduction and the welfare loss associated with a catastrophe.
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Proposition 5.2. The solution to generation t’s problem is characterized by a steady-























































− u− αξ R 0
The left and right hand side of (5.13) represent the marginal benefit and cost of
increasing the steady-state stock, respectively. Because of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, the
left hand side is decreasing and the right hand side is increasing in D. Therefore, it
cannot be optimal for any generation t that inherits stock DN to choose zt,N (t) > αDN .
As a consequence, the pollution stock never exceeds DN .
The net effect of the pollution decay rate α on the steady-state stockDN is ambiguous.
When α increases, a given stock level allows for higher emissions without risking a
catastrophe. This effect increases the steady state stock. However, holding DN constant,





increases, which depresses DN . A higher discount rate δ also has two opposing effects.
On one hand, it increases the relative weight of the current gain of increasing the stock
u′ (αD) compared to the stream of possible future utility reductions (u (αD)− u) /δ.
This effect encourages higher steady-state stocks. On the other hand, it also increases
the relative importance of the intrinsic catastrophe loss ξ compared to the stream of
future utility gains if no catastrophe occurs. This consideration decreases DN . The net
effect depends on the relative magnitudes. If the utility loss from a catastrophe is small,
the latter effect is more important. If the weight of the intrinsic catastrophe loss is small,
the former effect dominates.
Corollary 5.1. DC ≤ DN
The steady-state stock is higher in the naive solution than in the commitment solu-
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tion. Future generations have higher relative welfare weights on their own utility, and
thus reoptimize towards higher steady-state pollution stocks.
5.3.3. Markov solution
AMarkov equilibrium is defined by a policy function ζM (D) such that zM (t) = ζM (D (t)) ∀ t.68
In Proposition 5.3, I show that there exists a continuum of Markov equilibria which can
be ranked by their steady-state pollution stocks. Early generations’ emissions depend on
their beliefs about future emissions. When generation t believes that future generations
will increase the stock up to a certain level DM , its choice of zM (t) has no effect on the
maximum pollution stock. Each generation thus maximizes expected discounted utility
subject to the stock not exceeding the perceived maximum. The range of equilibria is
bounded by two considerations. The equilibrium steady-state stock cannot exceed the
level that maximizes expected discounted utility (the first component of (5.8)) disre-
garding the intrinsic loss. When the perceived steady-state stock is below the naive
steady-state DN , far-future generations will want to further increase the stock.
Proposition 5.3. Let DM1 = D























(u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]) e−δ(s−t)ds
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, D (s) ≤ DM ∀ s ≥ t, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD)
(5.15)












M (D) if D < DM
αD if D ≥ DM
(5.16)
68For convenience, I present the analysis of the Markov equilibrium in this section and in section 5.4 in
continuous time. The equilibria presented are the limiting cases of the equilibria when each generation
is alive for a period of length ǫ and ǫ goes to zero.
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When generations have consistent beliefs about the steady-state stock, the beliefs
become self-fulfilling, even if they result in an inefficient equilibrium DM > DN . The
upper bound of the equilibrium range DM2 may either increase or decrease in α, as in
the naive solution. As opposed to DM1 , the upper bound unambiguously increases in
δ: DM2 does not depend on ξ, so the only effect of a higher discount rate is to increase









/δ. The DM = DN equilibrium yields the highest
welfare for all generations as it comes closest to internalizing the intrinsic welfare loss
from a catastrophe. When DM = DM2 , each regulator behaves as if he does not care
about the long-run future (ξ = 0). By contrast, in the naive solution each generation
believes it decides the steady-state stock. Since it is in no generation’s interest to exceed
DN , D (t) > DN is ruled out.
Corollary 5.2. The first generation’s welfare in the naive solution is lower than in the
Markov solution when DM = DN .
The naive solution suffers from a different inefficiency. Generation t mistakenly per-
ceives the steady-state stock to be Dt,N < DN , so its emissions do not maximize ex-
pected discounted utility under the correct belief DN . In the Markov solution with




(u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]) e−δ(s−t)ds subject to D (s) ≤
DN ∀ s ≥ t. Figure 5.1 illustrates emissions and stocks in the three scenarios. Emis-
sions in the naive solution are initially close to those in the commitment solution, but
increasingly diverge as future generations put more weight on their own utility than their
predecessors. The Markov solution converges to the same maximum stock as the naive
solution, but the maximum is attained much earlier, resulting in higher welfare for early
generations than in the naive solution.
Proposition 5.4. At each point in time, the emission stock is lower in the commitment
solution than in the naive and Markov solutions: DC (t) ≤ DN (t) ≤ DM (t) ∀ t > 0.
Regulators in the commitment and naive solutions maximize a weighted sum of ex-
pected utility and catastrophe risk, so the optimal path is the same as in a constrained
optimization problem in which the regulator maximizes expected discounted utility sub-
ject to the stock not exceeding an exogenous ceiling DC or Dt,N at any point in time (see
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Figure 5.1: Emission flows (left) and stocks (right) in commitment, naive and Markov
solutions
Chakravorty et al. (2006, 2008)). By Proposition 5.3, Markovian regulators also solve a
constrained optimization problem in equilibrium. The ’carbon budget’ is larger in the
naive and Markov solutions, so conditional on the stock D the emission flows are higher
than in the commitment solution. Because emissions can be ranked for any given stock,
the stocks can also be ranked unambiguously at each point in time.
The progress on prominent objectives such as biodiversity preservation and limiting
climate change has so far not been encouraging. Current policymakers care less about
future consumption than future policymakers do, so the environment is best served when
the current generation has full commitment power. In the absence of commitment, a
catastrophe becomes more likely because future generations are unwilling to comply
with current plans of ’pollute now, clean up later’. Fully rational policies lead to the
fastest degradation: because rational decision makers realize that their successors are
not more willing to pay for the environment than they are, the long-term objective of
limiting catastrophe risk to acceptable levels is out of reach and it is optimal to continue
under business-as-usual.
The dismal results in this model rely on a large number of generations having an
unlimited ability to pollute. Section 5.2 varied the number of generations; the next
section considers pollutant scarcity.
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5.4. Infinite horizon, scarce pollutant
In this section, I analyze optimal emissions when the pollutant is scarce. Cumulative
emissions (i.e. pollutant consumption) cannot exceed a resource supply S. Unless other-
wise noted, I preserve the notation from section 5.3. Let Dmax (t) ≡ maxs<tD (s) denote
the maximum stock that has been reached until time t and τ ≡ argmint
{
Dmax (t) ≥ D̂
}
be the occurrence time of the catastrophe. For simplicity, and because the resource con-
straint already limits post-catastrophe utility, I abstract from direct utility reductions
after a catastrophe. Generation t’s welfare is
W t (S (t) , D (t) , Dmax (t)) =
∫ ∞
t
u (z (s)) e−δ(s−t)ds− ξ P [τ ∈ [t,∞)]
1− P [τ ∈ [0, t)]
s.t. Ṡ = −z, Ḋ = z − αD, Ḋmax = 1{D=Dmax} (z − αD) , S,D,Dmax ≥ 0 (5.17)
When the remaining resource supply is sufficiently small compared to the current pol-
lution stock, the Hotelling extraction path that maximizes discounted utility can be
followed without catastrophe risk. Optimal extraction falls quickly enough over time
so that the current ’safe’ pollution stock is never exceeded. Because catastrophe risk is
the only source of time inconsistency, this result applies to the commitment, naive and












denote the combinations of S and D for which the emissions z (t) that maximize dis-
counted utility (disregarding catastrophe risk) equal the natural decay of the current
stock αD. Define SB : R+ → R+ as {S : (D,S) ∈ B}. Given a pollution stock D, SB is
the level of resource supply such that the combination (S,D) is in the set B. SB is an
increasing function: the higher the pollution stock D, the higher the remaining resource
supply for which the discounted-utility maximizing z(t) equals αD.
Lemma 5.1. If generation t inherits S ≤ SB (D), the commitment, naive and Markov
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u (z (s)) e−δsds s.t. Ṡ = −z, S ≥ 0
}
(5.18)
I assume that the pollution stock is non-decreasing before the terminal phase in which
extraction follows a Hotelling path and the catastrophe hazard is zero. The intuition
behind this assumption is similar to section 5.3. If it is worthwhile to increase the stock
and risk a catastrophe at time t, it can only be optimal to reduce the stock at t′ > t if
it is necessitated by a dwindling resource supply. Lemma 5.2 shows that the terminal
phase is preceded by a non-degenerate interval in which the pollution stock is constant.
This result too applies to all three (commitment, naive and the Markov) solutions. The
marginal cost of emissions is discontinuous at z = αD when D = Dmax in all three
solutions. When the system is close to the terminal phase, the benefit of increasing the
stock is small. As a result, even far-future generations are hesitant to risk a catastrophe.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that D = Dmax and S = SB (D) + ǫ, ǫ small. Let W (S,D) be the
welfare function when D = Dmax. Then argmaxzW (S,D) = αD.
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, together with the assumption that the stock is non-decreasing
before the terminal phase, divide the time horizon into three regimes for all (commitment,
naive and Markov) solutions: a first regime with an increasing pollution stock, a second
with a constant stock and a third with a declining stock. Lemma 5.2 characterizes the
boundary between the second and third regime; I now turn to the boundary between
the first and second regime, i.e. the maximum value of S for which the pollution stock
is kept constant for a given D. Unlike the minimum value of S for which z = αD for a
given D from Lemma 5.2, the maximum is not equal across the commitment, naive and
Markov solutions: the shadow cost of pollution plays an important role in the decision
when to stabilize the stock, and this cost is higher in the commitment solution than
in the naive and Markov solutions. Again, I introduce some auxiliary notation. Define
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W̃ k (S,D) , k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M} : {(S,D) : S > SB (D)} → R+ as
W̃C,t
′




u (z (s)) [1−H (s)] + uH (s)− η (s) ξeδt′
)
e−δ(s−t)ds
s.t. Ṡ = −z, Ḋ = z − αD, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD) , S,D ≥ 0
z (s′)− αD (s′)
>
≤ 0 ∀ s′
<
≥ t′
W̃N (S (t) , D (t)) =
∫ ∞
t
(u (z (s)) [1−H (s)] + uH (s)− η (s) ξ) e−δ(s−t)ds




(u (z (s)) [1−H (s)] + uH (s)− η (s) ξ) e−δ(s−t)ds
s.t. Ṡ = −z, Ḋ = z − αD, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD) , S,D ≥ 0
z (s) = ζM (S (s) , D (s)) ∀ s > t
If the initial generation commits to stabilizing the stock exactly at time t′, the welfare
of a fictitious generation t ≤ t′ that shares the initial generation’s preference for catas-
trophe prevention is equal to W̃C,t
′
. If generation t is the first generation that keeps
the stock constant in the naive or Markov solution, its welfare is equal to W̃N or W̃M ,
respectively. Similar to the model with an abundant pollutant, the initial generation
simultaneously decides on the triplet (t′, S (t′) , D (t′)) at which it will stabilize the stock
in the commitment solution, but the combinations (S,D) at which the stock can be
stabilized in the naive and Markov solutions do not depend on time. Now I can define
the combinations (S,D) that mark the boundary between the values of (S,D) for which
the pollution stock increases, and for which it remains constant. Let
Ai ≡
{





W̃ k (S ′, D) = αD
}}
, k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M}
and define SAk : R+ → R+ as
{
S : (D,S) ∈ Ak
}
, k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M} as the value of S
for which (S,D) is in Ak for a given D.
Lemma 5.3. SAC,t′ (D) > SAN (D) ≥ SAM (D)
The literal interpretation of Lemma 5.369 is of limited direct interest, but the Lemma
69If the initial generation were to stabilize the pollution stock at some D under commitment, it will
have a larger resource supply remaining when reaching this D than naive or Markovian generations
would have if they were to stabilize pollution at the same level of D.
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is useful for a graphical intuition of the extraction paths in the commitment, naive and
Markov solutions. Figure 5.2 shows the movement through the state space along the
optimal path in the commitment solution (the (S,D) combinations that are in the sets
B and Ak are on increasing but not necessarily straight lines). Starting from the initial
condition, the pollution stock increases and the resource supply declines, resulting in a
northwest movement in the (S,D) plane until the state reaches a point on the rightmost
solid line. From then on, the pollution stock remains constant and the resource supply
declines, giving rise to a westward movement until the state is in the set B. In the last
phase, the pollution stock and resource supply both decline. In the naive and Markov
solutions, the first phase (in which the pollution stock increases) continues until the state
reaches a point on the dashed line, which is strictly to the northwest of the line that
marks the transition to the second regime in the commitment solution.
S
D
(S, D) ∈ B
(S, D) ∈ AN ,AM




Figure 5.2: Movement through the state space along the optimal path
An analytical comparison of the commitment, naive and Markov paths is beyond
the scope of this paper. In section 5.3, the commitment and Markov paths were sim-
ilar in the sense that they both maximized expected discounted utility subject to the
stock remaining below an exogenous ceiling - the only difference being the value of this
exogenous ceiling. Also with a scarce pollutant, the commitment path looks like the solu-
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tion of a time-consistent constrained optimization problem, with the value of the ceiling
depending on the initial generation’s choice of (t′, S (t′) , D (t′)). The Markov solution
will look different however. The intuition is that there is a unique point in AM that
can be approached from the initial state as the solution to a time-consistent constrained
optimization problem.70 From the initial generation’s perspective, the pollution stock
at this point is too high.71 If the initial generation believes that subsequent genera-
tions will behave as if they solve a time-consistent constrained optimization problem, it
can profitably deviate by decreasing its resource use, which results in a lower maximum
pollution stock. Though the resource supply is still exhausted eventually, emissions are
spread more evenly over time. This allows the natural decay to reduce the maximum
carbon stock, and hence the probability of a catastrophe. Hence, the maximum stock is
higher in Markov equilibrium than under commitment, but the maximum is approached
in a comparatively slower fashion.
The results in section 5.3 (in which the pollutant is abundant) are a limiting case of
the model with a scarce pollutant. When the initial resource supply is sufficiently large,
the actions of early generations will be similar to section 5.3. I perform a simulation to
illustrate emissions in the commitment and Markov solutions when the resource supply is
limited. I use a quadratic utility function and a discrete grid for (S,D,Dmax). Figure 5.3
depicts the results. In this example, initial emissions are lower in Markov equilibrium
than under commitment, because of the first generation’s incentive to reduce emissions
outlined at the end of the previous paragraph.
5.5. Conclusion
It is well known that discounted utilitarianism can recommend environmental degrada-
tion as optimal policy. This paper shows that welfare criteria that explicitly value the
long-run future may also not prevent a catastrophe when the environmental problem is
long-lived and caused by abundant pollutants. Future generations will not reduce their
70The (S,D) combinations in Ak are positively correlated, whereas the (S,D) combinations such
that the pollution stock reaches the exogenous ceiling D in a time-consistent constrained optimization
problem when the remaining resource supply equals S are negatively correlated.
71The pollution stock is higher than the level at which the stock is stabilized under commitment, and
the remaining resource supply at the moment of stabilization is lower than under commitment.
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Figure 5.3: Emission flows (left) and stocks (right) in commitment and Markov solutions
consumption to stabilize pollution concentrations at the current generation’s preferred
level. As a result, rational policymakers conclude that mitigation is futile, and equilib-
rium behaviour may look as if each policymaker has no intrinsic desire for catastrophe
prevention. Given the large reserves of coal and unconventional oil, this is a worrying
message for limiting climate change. My results suggest that if today’s generation wants
to enact its preferences and if commitments through policy rules are not possible, its
best chance is to develop a technological commitment device such as a substitute for
these abundant fossil fuels - rather than reducing consumption and hoping that future
generations will do the same.
The paper also suggests that instrumental and intrinsic catastrophe aversion have
different implications for equilibrium policies. Generations are more likely to preserve
the environment if they value its contribution to their descendants’ utility, for example
because ecosystem services are valuable in production and consumption, than if they care
for the environment for its own sake. Environmental amenities that have no economic
value are more likely to be sacrificed by future generations that care more about their own




5.A.1. Two-period model: ranking zC1 and z
M
1
Lemma 5.4 provides unambiguous rankings of zC1 and z
M
1 for iso-elastic and quadratic
utility when the catastrophe threshold follows a uniform distribution. When D̂ is uni-
formly distributed, the terms III in the first-order conditions (5.6) and (5.2a) are equal.
We are thus left with the terms II, which make the first generation more conserva-
tionist in Markov equilibrium, and the strategic term IV . The sufficient condition
f ′ (z1 + r (z1)) ≥ 0 for the second generation’s reaction function to be downward slop-
ing is satisfied for a uniformly distributed catastrophe threshold. The strategic effect
thus encourages the first generation to emit more. This typically raises cumulative emis-
sions,72 but changes the ratio between first- and second-period marginal utilities to the
first generation’s benefit. For iso-elastic utility, the strategic effect dominates the effect
from term II, and emissions are higher in Markov equilibrium than under commitment.
For quadratic utility, the converse applies and the first generation is more prudent in the
Markov solution. The intuition is that with quadratic utility, the second generation’s
utility is more concave in prices than the quantity demanded (i.e. the reaction function)
is, compared to under iso-elastic utility. Increasing first-period emissions, which raises
the effective price of second-period consumption, therefore strongly affects the second
generation’s utility but not so much the quantity demanded in case of quadratic utility.
This makes it less attractive to increase first-period consumption in Markov equilibrium
than in the case of iso-elastic utility.
Lemma 5.4. Let D̂ be uniformly distributed (F (D) = D/D̄ and f(D) = 1/D̄) and






1 . For quadratic utility ut (zt) = azt − 12bz2t , zM1 < zC1 .
Proof. First, consider iso-elastic utility ut (zt) =
z1−ηt
1−η
. If the catastrophe has not occurred























72The proof contains functional forms for the reaction functions, from which one can derive conditions
for |r′ (z1)| < 1
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It can be shown that the left-hand side of (5.19) is larger than the left-hand side of (5.20)
for all z1 and ρ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, zM1 > zC1 .
Now consider quadratic utility ut (zt) = azt− 12bz2t . If the catastrophe has not occurred























































































































































































































)2 = 0 (5.21)
Letting zC1 = z
M
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5.A.2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof. I omit the superscript C except to indicate the steady state. From (5.10) it is
apparent that if z (t) = αD (t) for some t, we must also have z (s) = αD (s) ∀ s > t.
Otherwise, the first generation could improve its welfare by choosing z (t) > αD (t),
as the current value cost of triggering a catastrophe is lower at t than at s. More-
over, the pollution stock must stabilize at some finite level because limz→∞ u
′ (z) = 0,
limD→∞ ψ (D) >> 0 and sinceD (s) is monotonic along the optimal path. Combining the
above observations, there exists some t′ such that D (t′) = DC and z (t) = αDC ∀ t ≥ t′.








u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]− η (s) ξeδt′
)
e−δsds












s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD)
}
(5.22)
In the above problem, the current-value welfare cost of triggering a catastrophe at time s
is always equal to ξeδt
′
, whereas this cost depends on the time of occurrence (ξeδs) in the
original problem (5.10). The above problem has the same solution as (5.10) evaluated
at D (t) = D (t′), but (5.22) is stationary whereas (5.10) is not. The derivatives of
WC (D (t′)) and W̃C (D (t′)) with respect to z (t′) have the same sign. Because (5.22) is
stationary, I can analyze its steady state, assuming it is approached by a path in which
D (s) is non-decreasing. t′ and D (t′) = DC satisfy the conditions in the proposition
text if and only if z = αDC is the optimal steady-state policy in (5.22). Let ṽ and µ̃
denote the costate variables for Ṽ (D (t)) = maxz W̃ (D (t)) and D, respectively. From
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Appendix 5.A.3, the steady-state conditions are
Ḋ = z − αD = 0 (5.23a)





























u (αD)− u+ δξeδt′
]
Therefore, t′ and DC must satisfy (5.11). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof. By the argument in the main text, the steady-state stock cannot exceed DN .
Consider a generation t that inherits stock D (t) < DN . Let Dt,N (t′) and zt,N (t′)
denote the stock and emissions respectively at time t′ > t in generation t’s preferred
path. Suppose that Dt,N = DN and Dt,N (t′) = Dt,N .73 Analogous to the proof of



















If (5.13) holds at DN , the right hand side of (5.24) exceeds the left hand side at Dt,N =
DN since t′ > t. By Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, we must therefore have Dt,N < DN .
I complete the proof of limt→∞D
t,N = DN by noting that whenever Dt,N < DN and
Dt,N (t′) = Dt,N , generation t′ > t prefers Dt



















73If Dt,N = DN but D (t) does not reach DN in finite time, a modified version of the below argument
still applies: for t′ arbitrarily large and ǫ arbitrarily small, the left hand side of (5.24) evaluated at
DN − ǫ is larger than the right hand side.
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If Dt



















Clearly, (5.25) and (5.26) cannot hold simultaneously. When (5.25) holds, the left hand
side of (5.26) is larger than the right hand side at Dt,N : generation t cares less about
consumption at t′ > t than generation t′ does, so they cannot both intend to stabilize
at Dt,N at time t′. Generation t′ will choose Dt
′,N > Dt,N , so zt
′,N (t′) > αDt,N . As the
stock approaches DN , the target levels Dt,N must also approach DN . The comparative





































































(α + δ) [α (α + δ) u′′ (αDN)− αψ (DN) u′ (αDN)− ψ′ (DN) (u (αDN)− u+ δξ)]
(5.27)
All terms in the denominator are negative by Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. The total effect

























































(α + δ) [α (α + δ) u′′ (αDN )− αψ (DN) u′ (αDN)− ψ′ (DN) (u (αDN)− u+ δξ)]
(5.28)
The denominator is the same as in (5.27). The sign of ∂D
N
∂δ
is thus determined by the
sign of the numerator. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 5.1
Suppose that DC is reached for the first time at time t′ > 0. Then it can only be optimal


















If (5.13) holds at DN , the right hand side of the above equation exceeds the left hand
side at DC = DN . By Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, we must therefore have DC < DN .
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. Recall that DM1 and D
M
2 are unique by Proposition 5.2. I verify that the equilibria
in the proposition text satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Let t be sufficiently large and
suppose that generation t believes that future generations will follow (5.16) andD ≥ DM .
Then generation t believes that if it increases the stock, future generations will keep the
stock constant.
First, consider the case in which DM < DN . By Proposition 5.2, generation t would
prefer to reach a higher steady-state stock in the naive solution, that is if it could commit
all emissions from t onward. I show that this implies that in the Markov solution,
generation t will choose z > αD. When t is sufficiently large, Dt,N is arbitrarily close
to DN . Furthermore, in generation t’s preferred path zt,N (s), Dt,N is reached in finite
time. This means there is exists a t′ > t such that










The interpretation of (5.29) is that, at t′ > t and Dt,N (t′) > D (t), generation t would
choose to increase the pollution stock by Dt,N − (1− α)Dt,N (t′) > 0 if the stock would
remain constant in all subsequent periods. But then by Assumption 5.1 and Assump-
tion 5.2, it must be welfare-improving to increase the stock by the same amount at D (t),
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given that future generations keep the stock constant at the new level: the marginal util-
ity of consumption is higher, the hazard rate is lower and the current-value cost of a
catastrophe is lower. Therefore, DM < DN cannot be an equilibrium.
Now turn to the decisions of early generations that inherit a stock D (t) < DM .
If generation t believes that subsequent generations will follow (5.16), it realizes that
its actions will not affect the maximum stock DM . When all future generations also
believe the maximum stock equals DM , the preferences of all generations that inherit
D (t) < DM are no longer time-inconsistent. Then the problem of generation t reduces





(u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]) e−δsds
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD) , D (s) ≤ DM ∀ s (5.30)
The solution to this optimal control problem coincides with the Markov solution. Anal-
ogous to Proposition 5.1, the steady state of the unconstrained version of (5.30) - the





Therefore, stocks larger than DM2 are never visited in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof. Using the results from Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, I can rewrite (5.10), (5.12)




W k (D (t)) =
∫ ∞
t
(u (z (s)) [1− (H (s)−H (t))] + u [H (s)−H (t)]) e−δsds
s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (t) = Dt, Ḣ = ψ (D) (z − αD) , D (s) ≤ Dk ∀ s
}
, k ∈ {C, {t, N} ,M}
(5.31)
whereDC < Dt,N < DM for 0 < t <∞. When decidingDC andDt,N in the commitment
and naive solutions, generations trade off discounted utility and the present-value welfare
cost of triggering a catastrophe: a higher steady state stock increases the former, but
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also the expected welfare loss from a catastrophe. Given their choice of DC or Dt,N and
the time at which the steady state will be reached, the steady state is approached as
in a time-consistent constrained maximization problem in the commitment and naive
solutions (as in the Markov solution). I can represent the optimal strategy in each




, k ∈ {C, {t, N} ,M}, where ζC (D) and ζt,N (D) are
only optimal along the equilibrium path. DC < Dt,N < DM implies ζC (D) < ζt,N (D) <
ζM (D) if and only if
∂ζ(D;Dk)
∂Dk




≡ maxzW k (D) be the value of





















By (5.32), along the optimal path
VD =
δV − u (z)






Substituting (5.34) in (5.33), I obtain
u′ (z) +
δV − u (z)
z − αD = 0
⇔ (z − αD) u′ (z) + δV − u (z) = 0
⇔ z̃u′ (z̃ + αD) + δV − u (z̃ + αD) = 0
where z̃ = z − αD. Totally differentiate with respect to Dk
∂z̃
∂Dk
u′ (z̃ + αD) + z̃
∂z̃
Dk





u′ (z̃ + αD) = 0
⇔ ∂z̃
∂Dk








By the above, we must have ∂z̃
∂Dk
> 0. Having established ζC (D) < ζt,N (D) <
ζM (D) ∀ D, it automatically follows that DC (t) < DN (t) < DM (t). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof. I focus on the case S = SB (D); the proof for S < SB (D) is analogous. It
is sufficient to show that for z (s) = argmaxz
{∫∞
t





τ <∞|D̂ ≤ D (t)
]
= 0. Suppose z (s) < αD (s) for some s ≥ t. Then by continuity
of D, S and z, there exists a neighborhood (s, s′) such that z (σ) ≤ αD (σ) ∀σ ∈ (s, s′).
Conversely, when z (s) = αD (s), there exists a neighborhood (s, s′′) such that z (σ) <
αD (σ) ∀ σ ∈ (s, s′′) since ż < 0 in the solution to (5.18). Combining these two obser-
vations, z ≤ αD throughout. Then D (s) ≤ D (t) ∀ s ≥ t, so P
[




Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. Denote V (S,D) as maxzW (S,D). When D = Dmax, the marginal cost of re-





< 0. Since VD = 0 and u
′ (αD) = VS at (S,D) = (SB (Dmax) , Dmax) by
Lemma 5.1, continuity of VD in S prescribes
u′ (αD) > VS
u′ (αD) < VS − VD + ξψ (D)
for S in a neighborhood to the right of SB (D). This implies z = αD. But then there




< 0 such that z = αD satisfies the first order conditions for
S ∈ (SB (D) , SB (D) + ǫ) and the Hotelling path is optimal for S ≤ SB (D). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.3









u (z (s)) e−δsds s.t. Ḋ = z − αD, D (0) = D̄, D ≤ D̄, Ṡ = −z
}
(5.35)
be the maximum value of discounted utility disregarding catastrophe risk, subject to the
constraint that the pollution stock never exceeds the current level.74 Without loss, let
74The characteristics of this problem are discussed in Chakravorty et al. (2006, 2008).
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t′ be the first moment at which the pollution stock is kept constant (t′ may be different
between the commitment, naive and Markov solutions). Suppose there exists a (S∗, D∗)
such that (S∗, D∗) ∈ Ak, k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M}. Since the regulator in charge of emissions
at t′ (the initial generation in the commitment solution, and generation t′ in the naive
and Markov solutions) is indifferent whether or not to increase the stock, we must have
u′ (αD∗) = Ṽ C,t
′
S (S






(S∗, D∗)− V H (S∗)
)
u′ (αD∗) = Ṽ NS (S
∗, D∗)− Ṽ ND (S∗, D∗) + ψ (D∗)
(
ξ + Ṽ N (S∗, D∗)− V H (S∗)
)
u′ (αD∗) = Ṽ MS (S
∗, D∗)− Ṽ MD (S∗, D∗) + ψ (D∗)
(
ξ + Ṽ M (S∗, D∗)− V H (S∗)
)
(5.36)
In the commitment and naive solutions, and when ζMS (S,D) ≤ 0 in the Markov solution,
the regulator in charge at t′ knows that future regulators will not further increase the
stock. Therefore, the catastrophe hazard is zero in all future periods, so
Ṽ C,t
′
(S∗, D∗) = Ṽ N (S∗, D∗) = Ṽ M (S∗, D∗) = V̄ (S∗, D∗) (5.37)
The marginal value of the resource is equal to that in a setting without catastrophe risk
in which the pollution stock is constrained below the current level:
Ṽ kS (S,D) |(S,D)∈Ak = V̄S (S,D) , k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M} (5.38)
Similarly, the value of increasing the stock by one unit without causing a catastrophe
(Ṽ kD, k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M}) equals the increase in discounted utility from marginally
increasing the exogenous ceiling in (5.35):
Ṽ kD (S,D) |(S,D)∈Ak = V̄D (S,D) , k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M} (5.39)
By (5.37), (5.38) and (5.39), when the second and third equations in (5.36) hold, we have
u′ (αD∗) < Ṽ C,t
′
S (S





′ − V H (S∗)
)
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Hence, there cannot exist a (S∗, D∗) such that (S∗, D∗) ∈ Ak, k ∈ {{C, t′} , N,M}.
Because Ṽ C,t
′
SS < 0, Ṽ
C,t′
DS > 0 and Ṽ
C,t′
S − V HS < 0, there exists a S∗∗ > S∗ such that
u′ (αD∗) = Ṽ C,t
′
S (S






(S∗∗, D∗)− V H (S∗∗)
)
and hence (S∗∗, D∗) ∈ At′,C . This establishes SAC,t′ (D) > SAN (D). SAM (D) = SAN (D)
fulfills the condition of an equilibrium: in Markov equilibrium, generation t′ will not
increase the stock if it would not increase the stock in its first-best and if it expects future
generations also not to increase the stock. However, if it does expect future generations
to increase the stock, it may be optimal to choose z > αD, so that SAN (D) > SAM (D).
Q.E.D.
5.A.3. Piecewise deterministic optimal control
Consider a random variable ε with probability density function f (ε) defined on [0,∞)
and cumulative density function F (ε). Denote the actual value of ε by ε̃. The hazard





. Let x ∈ X ⊆ Rn denote the vector of state variables and
define a threshold function Φ (x, ε) = 0. The catastrophe occurs when Φ (x, ε̃) = 0. I
assume ∂Φ
∂xi
≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n and ∂Φ
∂ε
≤ 0: higher values of the state variables bring the
system ’closer’ to the threshold, and higher values of ε̃ imply a higher threshold. Define
φ : X → R+ as {ε : Φ (x, ε) = 0, x ∈ X}. φ (x) is the value of ε such that the threshold
is reached when the state variables take on value x. Because of the assumptions on the
partial derivatives of Φ, φ′ (x) ≥ 0.
Definition 5.1. Let x : R+ → X be continuous and differentiable almost everywhere.
x (t) is monotonically increasing with respect to Φ (x (t) , ε) = 0 and ε if and only if for
any t0 and t1 such that t0 < t1 it holds that
Φ (x (t0) , ε0) = Φ (x (t1) , ε1) ⇔ ε0 ≤ ε1
For trajectories of the state variables x (t) that are monotonically increasing with
respect to Φ (x (t) , ε) = 0, φ (x (t)) increases over time. From here on, I restrict attention
to such trajectories, as trajectories with decreasing state variables will not be optimal.
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Then the occurrence time of the catastrophe τ is a Poisson process:
τ ∼ f (φ (x (τ)))φ′ (x (τ)) x′ (τ)
Nævdal (2006) models the catastrophe as a discrete jump in the state variables. He
argues that this approach is more general than a discrete jump in instantaneous utility,
the approach I take in this paper. The latter can always be modeled as the former, but
not the other way around. When the catastrophe occurs at time τ , the jump in the state






















where x (τ−) = limt↑τ x (t) and x (τ
+) = limt↓τ x (t). Nævdal (2006) shows that expected
discounted utility is maximized by solving the following problem





f (x, z) e−δtdt
)




















ψ (x (s)) g (x (s) , z (s)) ds
)
(5.41)
where we write g (x, z) for x′ (t). The risk-augmented Hamiltonian for this problem is
H (x, µ, z) = u (x, z) + µg (x, z) + ψ (φ (x))φ′ (x) g (x, z)
×
[








u (y, z) e−δ(s−t)ds s.t. ẏ = g (y, z) , y (t) = x (5.43)
is the value of continuing optimally when the catastrophe occurs at time t and results
in state x. For brevity, I write (.|τ) as shorthand for (.|τ = t). The post-catastrophe
problem is a standard deterministic control problem with costate variables µ (s, t|τ). Note
that ∂
∂x
Ṽ (t, x|τ) = µ (t, t|τ) and ∂
∂x
Ṽ (t, x+ q (x) |τ) = (In + q′ (x))µ (t, t|τ), where In
is the n-dimensional identity matrix and q′ (x) is the Jacobian of q (x). Lastly, J (t, x)
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in (5.42) is





u (y, z) e−δ(s−t)ds
)




















ψ (x (s)) g (x (s) , z (s)) ds
)
(5.44)
The differential equation for ṽ = Ṽ (t, x (t)) is then (see the Appendix in Nævdal (2006))
˙̃v = δṽ − u (x, z) + ψ (φ (x))φ′ (x) g (x, z)
(
ṽ − Ṽ (t, x+ q (x) |τ)
)
(5.45)
The Hamiltonian (5.42) gives rise to the following conditions
u = argmax
υ
H (x, µ, υ) (5.46)
µ̇ = δµ− ∂
∂x
f (x, z)− µ ∂
∂x
g (x, z)− λ (x) (µ (t|t, x+ q (x)) (In + q′ (x))− µ)
− λ′ (x)
(
Ṽ (t, x+ q (x) |τ)− ṽ
)
(5.47)
where λ (x) = ψ (φ (x))φ′ (x) g (x, z). Lastly, define the transversality conditions. If x is
the optimal path, then for all admissible y and ẏ = g (y, u), we must have
lim
t→∞
µe−δt (y (t)− x (t)) ≥ 0 lim
t→∞
z (t) e−δt = 0 (5.48)
Problem (5.22) has a single state variable: x = D. The growth rate g (z,D) of the
pollution stock is z − αD and the catastrophe hazard is ψ (φ (D)) = ψ (D). The stock
does not affect utility directly, so µ (t|t, x+ q (x)) = 0. Because the optimal z post-
catastrophe is arbitrarily large and the first generation conditions its strategy on catas-
trophe occurrence, the jump in the state variable q (D) at time τ is ū−u+ δξeδt′ , where
ū = limz→∞ u (z). This ensures that post-catastrophe generations receive utility u and








The management of nonrenewable
resources with amenity value
under hyperbolic discounting
6.1. Introduction
Some important natural resources provide a perpetual stream of benefits when left in-
tact, but do not regenerate when economic activity directly or indirectly causes them
to deteriorate. Biodiversity provides a wide range of ecosystem services and plays an
important role in pharmaceutical research (Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001), and a low
carbon concentration in the atmosphere ensures a hospitable climate. Both of these re-
sources can be expended for immediate economic gain - e.g. by cutting down the habitat
of an endangered species - but even small disruptions cause irreversible damage. Extinct
species are gone forever, and the mean lifetime of carbon emissions from fossil fuels is in
the tens of thousands of years (Archer, 2005).
The decision whether to ’consume’ these resources balances immediate gains against
costs that are spread over many generations. There are positive and normative reasons to
use a time-declining pure rate of time preference (DPRTP) for such decisions. DPRTPs
arise naturally when there is uncertainty about the exponential discount rate or when ag-
gregating the time preferences of heterogeneous individuals (Weitzman, 2001). DPRTPs
can simultaneously explain the short-term impatience implied by capital market interest
rates75 and concerns for the long-run future from stated preference surveys76 and intro-
75Nordhaus (1994) argues that observed short- and medium-term interest rates reveal a high time
preference, but extrapolating these rates to long horizons is not innocuous.
76Layton and Brown (2000) find no significant difference in willingness to pay for preventing environ-
mental damages that occur in 60 or 150 years.
135
Chapter 6: Nonrenewable resources with amenity value
spection (Gerlagh and Liski, 2012). DPRTPs also address the normative concern that
individuals are entitled to be impatient within their own lifetime, but not to similarly
discount the welfare of future generations.
This paper analyzes the consumption of a nonrenewable resource with amenity value
under hyperbolic discounting, a special case of DPRTP. Marginal consumption utility
is decreasing and bounded; the amenity value is linearly proportional to the remaining
stock;77 the number of generations is infinite. It is well known that hyperbolic preferences
are dynamically inconsistent: generation t values utility at t+2 relatively more vis a vis
utility at t+1 than generation t+1 does (Laibson, 1998). As a result, today’s generation
may appreciate the resource for its ability to provide amenity value into the far future,
but its valuation of the resource goes down significantly if it believes the next generation
will deplete the resource, because each generation applies a high short-term discount
rate. Therefore, today’s generation is more inclined to conserve if it believes that future
generations will also conserve, but more likely to consume if future generations will also
consume.
For an intermediate range of amenity values, the intergenerational game in which
regulators are sophisticated and foresee the different preferences of their successors has
multiple equilibria: a Pareto-dominant one in which the resource is fully conserved, and
a large number of suboptimal equilibria with positive consumption. By contrast, naive
regulators who believe they can fully commit future actions always conserve: since they
have no intention to consume in the future, the motive to preempt their successors’
consumption does not exist for these naifs. Fully rational policies can thus lead to worse
outcomes than policies that are based on naive beliefs.78
Still, large initial resource stocks can only be partially rather than fully exhausted in
subgame perfect equilibrium. Each generation only consumes a unit of the resource if it
77Many of our results go through with concave amenity values, but for clarity and tractability we
prefer the linear specification.
78A similar ”sophistication effect” occurs in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Grenadier and Wang
(2007). In the former, an agent decides when to perform an activity that confers an immediate reward
but can only be performed once. In the latter, an investor decides when to exercise an American call
option that is in the money. Sophisticated agents anticipate that their future selves will perform the
activity or exercise the option too early from the point of view of the current self, and therefore perform
the activity suboptimally early in equilibrium compared to their naive counterparts. In contrast to the
current paper, there is no multiplicity of equilibria. The equilibrium in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is
unique because the number of periods is finite; in Grenadier and Wang (2007) because the volatility in
the value of the underlying asset ensures the option is always exercised in finite time. For an application
of the model in Grenadier and Wang (2007) to forest economics, see Di Corato (2012).
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believes that subsequent generations will otherwise consume this unit sufficiently quickly.
But future generations’ marginal propensity to consume cannot be high for all levels of
the resource stock - otherwise, consumption in some future periods would go to infinity
when the initial resource stock is very large, and the marginal utility from consumption
in those periods would fall short of the welfare gain from enjoying the amenity.
Our results suggest that the management of nonrenewable resources with amenity
values has flavours of a stag hunt game. Each generation may prefer to see the resource
conserved indefinitely, but only implements a conservationist policy if it believes that
the resource will not be used up in the future. There may thus be a role for policies
that help generations to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant conservation equilibrium. In
line with experimental evidence that framing is important for cooperation in stag hunt
games (Ellingsen et al., 2012), designating the natural resource as a nature reserve can
help future generations to coordinate on the superior conservation equilibrium. Such a
policy may also have a commitment role by creating legal hurdles or legislative costs for
future exploitation.
Interestingly, our result that resource depletion is more rapacious under sophisti-
cated than under naive beliefs contrasts with findings from previous work on renewable
resources (Karp, 2005; Fuji and Karp, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2010).79 In case of an nonre-
newable resource with amenity value, naive regulators understand that current consump-
tion irreversibly reduces long-run utility, tempering their impulse to consume. Resource
regeneration severs this link between current-period and long-run utility however. A
naive regulator that manages a renewable resource with amenity value may ultimately
aim for the steady state corresponding to his long-run discount rate, but does not realize
that his successors will not replenish the stock to this level. Sophisticated regulators
on the other hand reduce their consumption to compensate for the overconsumption of
their successors. This intuition suggests that increased resilience need not be a blessing
when an ecosystem is managed by naive policy makers, because resource regeneration
instills in naifs an unwarranted optimism regarding future stocks. In the Appendix, we
79Karp (2005) considers a model in which consumption contributes to a pollution stock that reduces
utility. In each period, a fraction of the stock decays naturally. Karp shows that regulators with full
commitment power start off with higher consumption than in Markov equilibrium, but stabilize the
stock at a lower level. It follows that a sequence of naive regulators would reach a higher steady-state
stock than in Markov equilibrium. Hepburn et al. (2010) show that a sequence of naive regulators
may eventually extinguish a fishery stock (without amenity value), even though early regulators do not
intend such an eventual collapse.
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provide a numerical example in which steady state welfare and welfare under stationary
discounting are lower under naive beliefs when the resource regenerates, compared to the
case of a nonrenewable resource.
6.2. Model
Consider a sequence of generations living in periods t = 1, 2, ...,∞, with each generation
represented by a single agent. The economy contains a nonrenewable natural resource
that has both consumption and amenity value. Generation t’s marginal consumption
utility is bounded from above by φ, and instantaneous felicity is linear in the remaining
stock with slope θ:
vt =u (qt) + θ (St − qt)
u′ (.) > 0, u′′ (.) < 0
0 = lim
q→∞
u′ (q) < θ < φ ≡ u′ (0) <∞ (6.1)
subject to stock dynamics
St+1 = St − qt (6.2)
The representative agent in period t has hyperbolic preferences over its own felicity and
the felicity of all subsequent generations. The welfare of generation t, given a sequence
{qt+σ, St+σ}∞σ=0, is
wt ({qt+σ, St+σ}∞σ=0) = vt + β
∞∑
τ=1
δτvt+τ , β, δ ≤ 1 (6.3)
When β < 1, decision-makers are more impatient with respect to short-term outcomes
than with respect to long-term outcomes. Preferences are time-inconsistent in this case:
the relative importance of vt compared to vt+τ is higher from the perspective of agent t
than from agent t− 1 for all τ .
When the resource’s amenity value is sufficiently high, full conservation (qt = 0 ∀ t)
Pareto-dominates all other consumption paths. That is, each generation prefers full
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conservation to any other consumption path.













∀ q′ 6= q
As a result, naive policy makers fully conserve the resource under the parameter
values in Proposition 6.1. Sophisticated regulators play a game against their successors.
In Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), the current generation’s strategy qt = ζ (St)
depends only on the current stock and is a best response if future generations will play
ζ (St+τ ) ∀ τ :
ζ (St) = argmax
q
{




δτ [u (ζ (St+τ )) + θ (St+τ − ζ (St+τ ))]
}




Initially, we only exclude mixed-strategy equilibria; later, we confine ourselves to every-
where differentiable strategies.






, then ζ (S) = 0 ∀ S is a Markov perfect






, then ζ (S ′) = 0 ∀ S ′ ≤ S cannot be a MPE.
Proof. When all future generations choose ζ (S) = 0, the result follows directly from the
first line of (6.7). Q.E.D.
There also exist equilibria with positive consumption. When preferences are incon-
sistent (β < 1), the current generation discounts consumption of the resource in the
immediate future at a comparatively high rate vis a vis the distant future. If the current
generation believes that the next generation(s) will consume the resource, the long-term
amenity value of the resource will not be realized. The current generation can then only
influence whether the resource will be consumed today or in the near future. Because
the near-term discount rate is relatively high, the current generation may prefer to con-
sume the resource itself rather than having it consumed by its immediate descendants.
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Resource depletion can thus become a self-fulfilling belief, even when full conservation
is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium - as we illustrate in the next Example. Denote S̄ as





Example 6.1. Let S ≤ S̄ with S̄ and
θ
1− βδ < φ < θ
(
β
1− δ + 1− β
)
Then ζ (S) = S and ζ (S) = 0 are both MPEs.
Dynamic games with hyperbolic discounting have a wide range of equilibria, especially
if we allow discontinuous and nondifferentiable strategies (Krusell et al., 2002; Krusell
and Smith, 2003). For example, we can obtain a new MPE by modifying an existing
MPE such that ζ (S) = 0 for S larger than some S ′. Conservation is an equilibrium for
large S per Proposition 6.2, and the original strategy remains an equilibrium for small
S.





0 for S ≥ S ′
ζ (S) for S < S ′
is also a MPE ∀ S ′.
Each equilibrium strategy ζ (S) can also be used to formulate a new equilibrium for
a different initial stock. To see, this, suppose we increase the initial stock by ∆ units.
If each generation behaves as if these ∆ will be preserved forever, no generation has an
incentive to modify its behaviour and consume these units. The extra units then act as






to each generation, and ζ̃ (S +∆) = ζ (S) is an
equilibrium.80
Proposition 6.3. Let ζ (S) be a MPE and define ζ̃ (S) : ζ̃ (S +∆) = ζ (S) ∀ S. Then
ζ̃ (S) is also a MPE.




Proposition 6.3 implies that equilibria can also be defined in terms of cumulative
resource use, rather than in terms of the initial stock. By Example 6.1, there exist equi-
libria in which a small initial resource stock, of say 1 unit, will be completely exhausted.
Then there also exists an equilibrium in which an initial stock of 101 units is consumed
until there are 100 units remaining, which are then conserved indefinitely.
Now confine attention to policy rules that are everywhere differentiable. We also
impose ζ ′ (S) ≤ 1, which seems a ’reasonable’ property for an equilibrium. Hereafter, we
call this an ’admissible’ equilibrium. As it turns out, we can straightforwardly rule out
ζ ′ (S) = 1.
Lemma 6.1. ζ ′ (S) 6= 1 ∀ S ≥ S̄
Generations with positive consumption balance two considerations: the marginal
increase in instantaneous felicity must equal the marginal reduction in discounted future
felicities and amenity values. If the reaction function were to have slope 1, the latter
term would be equal for two sufficiently close values of the stock, but the former would
not. Therefore, ζ ′ (S) = 1 implies a violation of the first-order condition.
We already established that whenever conservation is Pareto-dominant, conservation
is an equilibrium. When the consumption value of the resource is sufficiently low, full
conservation is the only MPE:
Proposition 6.4. For φ < θ
1−βδ
, as well as for φ = θ
1−βδ
and S > S̄, ζ (S) = 0 in all
admissible equilibria.
At the threshold value of φ, generation t is indifferent between enjoying the amenity
value of a marginal resource unit for one period and having the unit consumed by gen-
eration t + 1 and consuming the unit in period t. This threshold for φ coincides with
the value that permits the exhaustion of small resource stocks from Example 6.1 and,
by extension, some discontinuous consumption equilibria from Proposition 6.3.
Proposition 6.5 shows that consumption must be equal to zero for some values of the
stock in any equilibrium.






, then there exists an S∗ such that ζ (S∗) =
0.
(ii) For φ in a right neighbourhood of θ
1−βδ
, there exists an S̃ such that all admissible
equilibria satisfy ζ (S) = 0 ∀ S > S̃.
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When φ is in the range for which conservation is Pareto-dominant but positive con-
sumption is an equilibrium strategy, generation t only chooses to consume a marginal
resource unit in equilibrium if it believes that subsequent generations will otherwise con-
sume this unit sufficiently quickly. More specifically, because δ < 1 and ζ ′ (S) < 1,
generation t only consumes a marginal unit if future generations will otherwise consume
this unit sufficiently quickly. Future generations’ marginal propensity to consume cannot
be large for all levels of the resource stock however - otherwise, resource consumption
tends to infinity in some future periods and marginal utility tends to zero when S becomes
very large. This would contradict the requirement that marginal consumption utility al-
ways exceeds the current-period amenity value θ. Therefore, there is some value of the
resource stock S∗ for which future generations will conserve a marginal unit for a large
number of periods, and for which the current generation hence chooses ζ (S∗) = 0. At
S∗, the diminishing marginal utility of future generations acts as a coordination device.
By a similar argument, large initial stocks are never fully exhausted in equilibrium.
Proposition 6.6. Let the initial stock S0 be sufficiently large. Then in any admissible
equilibrium,
∑∞
t=0 ζ (St) < S0.
Propositions 6.3 and 6.6 indicate that the steady-state value of the resource stock
may depend on the initial stock. Large initial stocks are not reduced below some S∗
in continuously differentiable equilibria, but if the initial stock equals S∗, there exist
equilibria with ζ (S∗) > 0.
6.3. A regeneration paradox: a more resilient resource reduces welfare
The previous section demonstrates that a nonrenewable resource with amenity value is
depleted less rapaciously by naive than by sophisticated regulators: a sophisticated reg-
ulator may consume the resource today in order to preempt his successors, whereas a
naif does not plan to consume in the future and is hence more conservationist. The sub-
optimal outcomes (e.g. undersaving or overconsumption) that often arise in hyperbolic
discounting models with naive regulators do not occur: because the resource does not
regenerate, the naif understands that he cannot compensate for splurging today with
future restraint. When the resource does regenerate, a naive regulator may be tempted
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to choose a high level of consumption today, mistakenly believing that the resource will
regrow to his desired long-run level in the future.
In this section, we explore the conjecture that resource regeneration decreases welfare
under naive beliefs, because it exacarbates the naif’s misperception regarding future
consumption and future resource stocks. We provide a numerical example in which
steady state welfare and welfare under constant discounting are lower under naive beliefs
when the resource is renewable, compared to when it is nonrenewable. Let the growth
of the resource be given by a Rickert curve
St+1 = Ste
γ(1−St) − qt (6.5)
where a nonrenewable resource is described through γ = 0, and consider the quadratic
utility function
vt = aqt −
1
2
bq2t + θSt+1 (6.6)
Table 6.1 lists the parameter values. They are such that θ
1−βδ







meaning that a naive regulator would conserve indefinitely if the resource is nonrenew-
able. When consumption is positive, we must have
vq (qt, St)− βδV ′ (St+1) = 0 ⇔ a− bqt − θ − βδV ′ (St+1) = 0
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where V is the value function of the time-consistent problem with constant discount
factor δ. We estimated the value function with the CompEcon package from Miranda
and Fackler (2002), and its numerical derivative using a two-sided difference approach
with 3000 grid points. Figure 6.1 depicts the value function for different levels of the
stock. When the resource is nonrenewable, the value function is linear in the stock. In
case of a renewable resource, the marginal value of the resource is low for large and
intermediate stocks. Even for some S below the value that maximizes the sustainable
yield (S = 0.4962), V ′ (S) is smaller when γ = 0.06 than when γ = 0: because the
resource can be replenished in the future, the loss from present consumption is not as
large as in the case of a nonrenewable resource.








































Figure 6.1: Value function (left) and marginal value (right) for renewable and nonrenew-
able resource
Table 6.2 shows the evolution of consumption qt, the resource stock St, felicity vt
and welfare wt. A nonrenewable resource is always conserved, so the values in the right
half of the table are constant over time. For high levels of the stock, the marginal value
of the resource is relatively low when the resource is renewable, so initial consumption
is very high in this case. Long-run consumption is positive when γ = 0.06, but the
steady-state stock is less than half of the initial value. As a result, the first generation’s
welfare is slightly higher when the resource is renewable than when it is nonrenewable -
owing to the high first-period consumption - but all subsequent generations are worse off
compared to the nonrenewable-resource benchmark. The often-applied welfare criterion
of the felicity stream with stationary discounting,
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1vt, is also lower when the
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Table 6.2: Naive consumption, felicity and welfare paths for
renewable and nonrenewable resource
Renewable Nonrenewable
t qt St vt wt qt St vt wt
1 0.360 0.9 0.864 2.590 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
2 0.109 0.545 0.329 1.909 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
3 0.038 0.451 0.166 1.710 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
4 0.021 0.428 0.125 1.660 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
5 0.016 0.423 0.115 1.648 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
6 0.015 0.421 0.113 1.645 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
7 0.015 0.421 0.112 1.645 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
8 0.015 0.421 0.112 1.644 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
9 0.015 0.421 0.112 1.644 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
10 0.015 0.421 0.112 1.644 0 0.9 0.167 2.444
This table contains qt, St, vt and wt when the regulator in control
at time t acts as if he can commit all future consumption. The wel-
fare function is given by (6.3) with functional forms (6.5) and (6.6).
Parameter values are in Table 6.1. A time-consistent regulator with
discount factor δ would stabilize the stock at S = 0.766.
resource is renewable (3.262) than when it is nonrenewable (3.340).
6.4. Conclusion
Amenity values provide a perpetual flow of services that are valued by policy makers that
have a special concern for immediate consumption, but discount the distant future at a
low rate. Conservation efforts crucially depend on the current policy maker’s confidence
that natural resource will remain intact in the future, and not be depleted for immediate
economic gains in the medium term. Sophisticated regulators understand that they can-
not control future policies, and may thus be inclined to consume the resource before their
successors will. Public commitment or coordination devices, such as the establishment
of nature reserves, may remedy the coordination problem between generations.
Naive regulators do not contend with future depletion, and are thus more likely to
follow a conservationist policy. The naif’s shortsightedness does not lead to suboptimal
145
Chapter 6: Nonrenewable resources with amenity value
policies precisely because the resource is nonrenewable: the naive regulator values the far
future, and understands that future well-being is irreversibly compromised by current
depletion. This paper has raised the possibility that resource regeneration may be a
curse for these naifs, as it could lead to a mistaken belief that future replenishment can
compensate for today’s consumption.
6.A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. It is sufficient to show that a generation’s welfare decreases when it increases










+ φ = −θ
(
β
1− δ + 1− β
)





























Proof of Example 6.1
Proof. By Proposition 6.2, the second inequality guarantees that ζ (S) = 0 is an MPE.
Now suppose that the current generation believes that its successors will choose ζ (S) =
S. Then it will also want to choose ζ (S) = S if the marginal welfare of consuming the
last unit of resource itself exceeds the marginal welfare of having the last unit consumed
by the next generation, that is if
θ + βδφ < u′ (S) ≤ φ
A solution only exists if the current generation’s welfare gain from consuming the re-




Proof of Proposition 6.3
Proof. From the definition of an equilibrium
ζ (St) = argmax
q
















1− δ + 1− β
]}




Suppose that all generations use ζ̃ (St +∆) = ζ (St) ∀ St. Then for all St,
u (q) + θ (St − q) + β
∞∑
τ=1




1− δ + 1− β
]
=

























Because q = ζ (St) maximizes the left hand side of (6.8), q = ζ̃ (St +∆) = ζ (St)
maximizes the right hand side. Then ζ̃ (St +∆) satisfies the conditions of an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 6.1
Proof. From (6.4), generation t’s first order condition when ζ (St) > 0 is
∂wt
∂qt









[1− ζ ′ (St+σ)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
[u′ (qt+τ ) ζ






If generation t conserves an additional resource unit, term I indicates the fraction of this
unit that survives to time t+τ . The subsequent term in square brackets denotes how the
addition of one resource unit at time t+ τ affects the felicity of generation t+ τ , which
from generation t’s perspective is discounted at rate βδτ−t. When there is an interior
solution such that (6.9) holds, ζ ′ (S∗) = 1 implies that (6.9) must hold for S∗ and S∗+ǫ (ǫ
small). But the third term in (6.9) is equal for the St+1 = S
∗−ζ (S∗) = S∗+ǫ−ζ (S∗ + ǫ),
whereas marginal utility is different for ζ (S∗) and ζ (S∗ + ǫ) = ζ (S∗) + ǫ. Therefore,




Proof of Proposition 6.4
Proof. The Euler equation reads


















[1− ζ ′ (St+σ)] [u′ (ζ (St+τ )) ζ ′ (St+τ )


















[1− ζ ′ (St+σ)] [u′ (ζ (St+τ )) ζ ′ (St+τ )


















(u′ (ζ (St+1))− θ)
))
= δ [βθ + (1− (1− β) ζ ′ (St+1)) (u′ (ζ (St+1))− θ)] (6.10)












(u′ (ζ (St+1))− θ)




But by the assumptions in the Proposition text, u′ (qt) ≤ φ < θ1−βδ , contradicting (6.11).
Therefore, we cannot have ζ (S) > 0 when φ < θ
1−βδ
. By Lemma 6.1, ζ ′ (S) is strictly
smaller than one when S > S̄. In this case, (6.11) holds with strict inequality, contra-
dicting u′ (qt) ≤ φ = θ1−βδ . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6.5
Proof. (i) Suppose that ζ (S) > 0 ∀ S. Equation (6.9) implies







[1− ζ ′ (St+σ)] [u′ (qt+τ ) ζ ′ (St+τ ) + θ (1− ζ ′ (St+τ ))]
}
>











Consider some very large T . Given that generation t prefers to conserve a marginal re-







it can only be optimal to choose qt > 0 if at least a fraction ǫT bounded away from zero














≥ ǫT ∀ S. But resource use is bounded in each period: the marginal
utility of resource consumption u′ (qt) must always exceed the current-period amenity
value θ because of the assumption that ζ ′ (S) ≤ 1 throughout. If (6.13) were to hold
for all S, resource use in some periods would go to infinity when S becomes arbitrarily
large. Therefore, there must exist an S∗ such that ζ (S∗) = 0.
(ii) For φ in a right neighbourhood of θ
1−βδ
and St sufficiently large, ρ (St) > 0 requires
that ρ′ (St+τ ) ≈ 1 ∀ τ ≤ T for some large T by (6.9) and (6.10). Then analogously to




ζ ′ (St) =− δ (1− β) ζ ′′ (St+1) (u′ (ζ (St+1))− θ)+
δ [(1− (1− β) ζ ′ (St+1)) u′′ (ζ (St+1)) ζ ′ (St+1)] (6.14)
81We can limit attention to what happens before t + T because of the assumption that ζ ′ (S) ≤ 1;
otherwise, the divergence of ζ ′ (S) could theoretically outweigh the discount factor’s convergence to zero.
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Because ζ (St) ≈ ζ (St+1) and ζ ′ (St) ≈ ζ ′ (St+1) ≈ 1, (6.14) is approximately equivalent
to
u′′ (ζ (St))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ζ ′ (St)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈1
(1− δ + (1− β) ζ ′ (St+1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= −δ (1− β) ζ ′′ (St+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0
(u′ (ζ (St+1))− θ)
(6.15)
which yields a contradiction. Therefore, we cannot have ζ (S) > 0 for large S when φ is
in a right neighbourhood of θ
1−β
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.6
Proof. If ζ (S) > 0 ∀ S ≤ S0 for all sufficiently large S0, then analogous to the proof of
Proposition 6.4, eqn (6.12) must hold for all sufficiently large S. But then
∑T
t=1 qt (T large)
becomes arbitrarily large when S0 is sufficiently large, which violates the boundedness
of ζ (S). Therefore, for large S0 there must exist an S
∗ < S0 such that ζ (S
∗) = 0. It
follows automatically that
∑∞
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